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ABSTRACT
[n this project [ investigate how the psychological characteristics o f key political 
leaders, their beliefs and personality traits, affect foreign policy. I use a multi-method 
approach. This includes both statistical analyses involving quantitative measures of 
leaders’ psychological characteristics and policy preferences, as well as qualitative case 
studies of foreign policy decision making. I investigate two primary questions. First, 
what relationships exist between the psychological characteristics o f political leaders and 
their policy preferences in times of international conflict? Second, how are the views of 
presidents and prime ministers reconciled with those of their key advisors in the creation 
of a national foreign policy? I investigate these questions through an examination of 
sixteen foreign policy decisions that were made by eight governments in three countries, 
the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom.
I find a number of linkages between the psychological characteristics decision 
makers and their policy preferences. Having personality characteristics like high levels of 
distrust and a high need for power made it more likely that a decision maker would 
support conflictual policy options. Individuals who saw the world around them as more 
cooperative, were more willing to take risks, and perceived themselves as having the 
ability to affect historical development were more likely than others to favor cooperative 
policy options, as were those who saw the world as basically predictable. The dominant 
analogies that decision makers relied on when making decisions and their images o f their 
opponents appear to have affected their policy preferences as well. The linkage between
iv
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psychological characteristics and policy preferences appears to be particularly strong for 
those decision makers who have expertise in foreign policy and a well-developed belief 
system about the nature of world politics. These same psychological characteristics and 
policy preferences in turn affect the proposals that decision makers choose to adopt as 
official state policy.
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CHAPTER L 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
If the general public has a popular image of the manner in which foreign policy is 
created, surely one aspect of that understanding is that top-level decision makers who 
are charged with setting and implementing foreign policy have the ability to make a 
powerful personal imprint on world politics. There seems to be a general belief that 
many of the decisions that have shaped our world could have turned out quite differently 
if different people had been setting policy during key periods. This belief about the way 
foreign policy is created is quite understandable. Most of the books the average person 
might have been exposed to on the topic, including well-known titles like The Best and 
the Brightest (Halberstam 1972), The Wise Men (Isaacson and Thomas 1986), and 
innumerable memoirs and biographies focusing on the behaviors of high-level 
government officials, have conveyed the idea that the world we live in is largely shaped 
by the individuals who lead us. Much of the news media focuses on this influence on 
world affairs as well.
This viewpoint has been reinforced by the fact that in some cases the actions 
advocated by leading government officials, men who largely guided national policies 
during periods of international upheaval, seemed so unique from those pursued by their 
contemporaries, and appeared to be closely tied to their personal characteristics. One is 
left wondering how history might have developed differently if other individuals had been 
in charge o f setting policy. For example, the decision to land United Nations troops at 
Inchon, the Israeli policies leading up to the invasion of Lebanon, and the course o f U.S.
I
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policy in Vietnam have been attributed largely to plans pushed by Douglas MacArthur 
(de Rivera 1968), Ariel Sharon (Maoz 1990), and Henry Kissinger (Walker 1977), 
respectively. Questioning how differently world politics might have developed if 
different individuals had been in these decision makers’ positions of authority leads to all 
sort of interesting counterfactuals (Fearon 1991; Lebow 2000; Tetlock and Belkin 
1996), some with seemingly small impact on history, but others with potentially 
enormous consequences. Take, for example, the counterfactual that Woodrow Wilson 
lost his reelection race in 1916, a highly plausible counterfactual given that he won with 
the narrowest Electoral College victory o f any presidential candidate between 1876 and 
2000. Given that “all his successors have been Wilsonian to some degree, and 
subsequent American foreign policy has been shaped by his maxims” (Kissinger 
1994:91), one is left to wonder how differently our world might be now if he had not 
played his influential role at the conclusion of World War I.
Adherents to this school of thought, that individual decision makers have a highly 
personal effect on world politics, believe that if we want to understand why decision 
makers favor particular policies and order the specific actions that the states and 
organizations they lead carry out, we should investigate variation in the personal 
characteristics o f political leaders. By examining what type of people hold high office, 
the nature o f their backgrounds, their beliefs, their images of other political actors, and 
other similar characteristics we can better understand and predict the behavior of foreign 
policy decision makers (Neustadt and May 1986). Since decision makers “never respond 
to the actual event or situation”, but instead to their own view of it (de Rivera 1968:31),
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it is worthwhile to study who they are and how they see the world if we hope to 
understand why they act as they do.
There are many examples of research supporting the position that in order to 
understand foreign affairs we must understand the individuals who make policy 
decisions. Some scholars have even gone so far as to bring up what might appear to 
many to be the minutiae of the daily lives of past decision makers to underline their point 
that the political behavior of powerful individuals’ was powerfully affected by certain 
core personal characteristics. For example, knowing that the Marquis of Salisbury was 
“overweight and rumpled in physical appearance” (Kissinger 1994:178), or that Robert 
McNamara attended the University of California at a time when rationalism and scientific 
methodologies dominated academic discourse in Berkeley (Twing 1998) might not 
immediately appear to add to our understanding of their behaviors in office. But in so 
far as such characteristics are symptomatic of the way that decision makers think about 
the world, their particular set of goals and motives, and the strategies and tactics that 
they wish to use to achieve those goals, presenting such attributes can still be used to 
colorfully illustrate the point that world affairs are highly dependent upon the particular 
individuals charged with directing a country’s foreign policy. While the Marquis of 
Salisbury’s personal appearance may not have been important in and of itself, it was 
indicative of his behavior as a traditional, status quo Tory peer, and understanding how 
he saw himself and wanted others to view him informs us of the types of things he hoped 
to achieve in office. Understanding how Robert McNamara learned to think informs as 
to how he thought about, framed issues, and evaluated competing policy options during 
his tenure as Secretary of Defense.
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Of course, one does not necessarily need to accept a particular author’s asserted 
reasoning as to the source of a key decision maker’s belief system and personality traits 
to be moved by the basic concept of foreign affairs being primarily determined by the 
personal characteristics o f those individuals charged with making national decisions.
This is an idea that resonates with many people. But while it is a popular concept, is 
foreign policy really made this way?
One would have good reason to doubt this proposition. While the idea might be 
popular in the general public, much of the academic literature in international relations 
holds that other factors direct foreign policy. The major theories of international 
relations tend to greatly prioritize the influence of broad forces. These include 
structural, societal and organizational influences such as the balance of power and 
alliance systems (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Huth 
1996; Layne 1993; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979), a state’s need to maximize its security or 
power (Gilpin 1984; Morgenthau 1948), the pressures of bureaucratic influences 
(Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999; Betts 1977; Halperin 1974) and domestic 
politics (Hagan 1987; James and Oneal 1991; Milner 1997; Morrow 1991; Snyder 1991), 
cultural affinities and regime types (Dixon 1994; Doyle 1986; Lai and Reiter 2000; Maoz 
and Russett 1993; Moravscik 1997; Rummei 1983; Weart 1994), ethnic similarities and 
differences (Cottam and Cottam 2001; Henderson 1997), and international institutions 
(Keohane 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995; Keohane and Nye 1977; Young 1986). 
Theories focused on these factors are premised on international behavior being the 
product of group interests or systemic attributes. Consequently, they have either given
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little weight to the impact of decision makers on foreign policy, or ignored them 
altogether.
However, a growing literature has provided increasing support for the position
that world politics is significantly affected by the psychological characteristics of the men
and women who make foreign policy decisions. Some of these works follow in the long
tradition of descriptive case studies that stress the personal characteristics of leaders and
how they affect the political behavior of key decision makers (Cottam 1992; Khong
1992; Larson 1985; Starr 1984; Swansbrough 1994; Twing 1998). There is also a
growing body of literature, heavily influenced by work in psychology, in which scholars
are finding considerable support for this linkage between psychological characteristics
and foreign policy behavior by rigorously testing quantitative models of decision making
(Herrmann 1986; Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995; Schafer and Crichlow 2000;
Suedfeld and Bluck 1988; Walker and Schafer 2000; Walker, Schafer and Young 1998).
This work has so far been quite promising. This project adds to this growing literature
by providing a systematic test o f the linkage between the psychological characteristics of
decision makers and foreign policy behavior. I test this relationship across a diverse set
of cases and a diverse sample o f decision makers, including not only national executive
leaders, but also their top foreign policy advisors.
Existent Literature on the influence of Decision Makers’ Psychological 
Characteristics on Foreign Policy
More and more research is being produced that suggests focusing solely upon the 
influence system or state-level variables, or upon group interests like class, nationality, 
ethnicity or bureaucratic affiliation excludes, a key set o f  factors in the creation o f
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foreign policy. This work holds that international behavior may be powerfully influenced 
by the psychological attributes of key individuals in world politics. This position may not 
appear shocking. After all, “state action is the action taken by those acting in the name 
of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers” (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 
1969:202). But providing precise, systematic evidence that leaders are more than simply 
the personification of some larger force has been contingent upon creating reliable, valid 
measures of leaders’ key personal characteristics. That process has been slow to come 
to fruition, and is further complicated by the fact that it is often impossible for scholars 
to directly observe and analyze the psychological characteristics of national political 
leaders. But over time a body of literature has begun to form that provides theoretical 
and empirical support for the validity o f a number o f measures of leaders’ personal 
attributes, as well as preliminary findings linking these characteristics to particular 
preferences and behaviors.
Scholars interested in the role that the psychological characteristics of key 
decision makers have in shaping international affairs have approached this subject from a 
number o f angles. Some of these studies have been aimed at explaining the behavior of a 
single individual, while others have focused on the behavior of a particular 
administration, and of course some have examined large numbers of decision makers to 
test the generalizability of these effects. The effects of a wide variety of influences have 
been investigated. Some investigators have focused primarily on cognitive phenomena, 
topics like beliefs and perceptions that provide insights into how individuals consciously 
structure the world around them. Others have studied the impact that the personality 
traits of decision makers have on their political behavior.
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Another divide in this literature concerns the methodologies used by the 
practitioners examining these topics. Some investigators, particularly trained historians, 
have used traditional content analysis techniques that involve an extensive review of 
primary sources to provide detailed descriptions of the backgrounds and behaviors of 
key leaders and their advisors. These measurement techniques are particularly 
associated with investigations o f a number of psychological characteristics that seem to 
be best subdivided into categorical groups. Three prominent examples of these 
characteristics are briefly described below.
Several investigators have stressed the importance that analogies have on the 
development of foreign policy. By focusing on the impact of analogies researchers are 
focusing on the way individuals structure the world around them and turn to particular 
past events as reference points to guide them in making decisions about the future. 
Scholars investigating why international leaders acted as they did in a wide variety of 
situations and across a broad range of issue areas have found evidence that their behavior 
was substantially influenced by the historical analogies they relied upon to try and better 
understand the situations they faced (Goldgeier 1994; Hemmer 1999; Hybel 1990;
Khong 1992; Jervis 1976; May 1973; Neustadt and May 1986; Smith 1972). Seeing an 
event as similar to one in the past, their preferences and actions were affected by the 
lessons each “learned” from that past event. Studies in this area can provide key insights 
into the causes of past political events. But they can also provide important information 
that can help us predict future political behavior as well. If we understand the personal 
perceptual lens of a current decision maker, and the analogies they are likely to rely on.
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this literature suggests that we will have a key clue to the choices and decisions they are 
likely to make in the future.
Another vein o f this research involves the effect that the images of leaders have 
on international affairs. An image is a political actor’s “view of itself and its universe” 
(Boulding 1959:120). “Once formed, these cognitive constructions become filters 
through which information passes” (Young and Schafer 1998:81). Having different 
images of another political actor can lead to attributing it with quite different motives 
and interacting with it in opposite ways. Leaders’ images have been found to impact 
international relations in a variety of settings including relations between the US and the 
USSR, US actions in Latin America, and relations between Iran and Iraq (Blanton 1996; 
Cottam 1986; Herrmann 1986, 1988; Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995; Holsti 1970).
A decision maker's interpersonal style has also been connected to the political 
behavior they exhibit in office. This characteristic represents the manner in which an 
individual interacts with others. This involves a variety of facets of interpersonal 
behavior, for example, whether a person is introverted or extroverted. Grounding their 
research in interpersonal generalization theory, Lloyd Etheredge (1978) and Graham 
Shepard (1988) have found evidence that patterns o f intra-elite policy disagreements at 
the highest levels of the U.S. government from 1900-1984 were at least partially the 
product of the interpersonal styles of key leaders. Etheredge (1978) and Graham (1988) 
found that officials with high-dominance personalities were more likely than others to 
advocate the use of force. Additionally, Etheredge (1978) found that extroverts were 
more likely than others to advocate cooperative policies.
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Other scholars interested in the effect that the beliefs and personality traits of 
national leaders and their key advisors have on political behavior have investigated the 
issue using a somewhat different approach. Drawing upon work in a variety of 
disciplines, notably political science, psychology and communications, these investigators 
built quantitative measures of several key psychological characteristics. These new 
tools allow us to measure an individual’s core beliefs and personality traits much more 
reliably than we were able to previously. This advance also allows us to include these 
measures in statistical models. We are therefore able to rigorously test the effects of 
these variables while controlling for the impact of other influences on political behavior.
It is fair to say that the creation of these new measures has revolutionized the study of 
the impact that the psychological characteristics of political leaders have on their 
behavior.
Much of the early work in this area was necessarily focused on establishing the 
validity of the operationalizations of these measures o f decision makers’ psychological 
characteristics. Therefore, inquiries into this topic have frequently been aggregate 
studies, focusing upon a large group of elite individuals such as US senators (Tetlock 
1981), a collection of heads of government (Hermann 1980, 1984) or members of the 
British parliament (Tetlock 1983). This approach has been used so that the findings can 
be established as largely generalizable. But some of these tools have also been refined in 
studies designed to enrich our substantive knowledge of particular political leaders such 
as George H. W. Bush (Schafer, Young and Walker 1996; Winter 1993), Jimmy Carter 
(Walker, Schafer and Young 1998), Bill Clinton (Schafer and Crichlow 2000), Mikhail 
Gorbachev (Winter, Hermann, Weintraub and Walker 1991), John F. Kennedy (Marfleet
|
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2000), Lyndon Johnson (Walker and Schafer 2000), Shimon Peres (Crichlow 1998), 
Yitzhak Rabin (Crichlow 1998), and Ronald Reagan (Weintraub 1986).
Measures have been created to scale a variety of leaders’ psychological 
characteristics. These include both cognitive phenomena, such as one’s beliefs, 
perceptions and how they consciously structure the world around them, and personality 
attributes. Personality attributes include leaders’ psychological needs and other matters 
related to emotional predispositions. These involve unconscious impulses that affect 
individuals’ social interactions and political choices. Below I discuss the most prominent 
cognitive and personality characteristics that have been examined in this literature. I 
include all o f these measures in the analyses I conduct later in this work.
One area of this research that deals with the impact of leaders’ cognitive 
processes is the literature on leaders’ operational codes. A leader’s operational code 
essentially represents his or her answers to a set of questions about the fundamental 
nature o f international affairs. Some of these questions deal with the leader’s views 
about the basic nature and characteristics of the political universe. For example, is the 
political universe basically cooperative or conflictual? Or to what degree is history 
shaped by chance? Other questions address issues dealing with an htdividual’s tendency 
to rely on particular behavioral tendencies when confronting challenges in the realm of 
foreign policy (George 1969). For example, what strategies and tactics does an 
individual tend to favor? While once chiefly applied to the study of collective 
bureaucratic and political organizations (Merton 1940; Leites 1951; Leites 1953), for 
example the Soviet Politburo, it has come to be firmly associated with the study of 
individual leaders. This approach has been used to study a wide variety o f political
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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leaders such as Dean Acheson (McLellan 1971), George H. W. Bush (Schafer, Young 
and Walker 1996), Bill Clinton (Schafer and Crichlow 2000; Schafer, Young and Walker
1996), Frank Church (Johnson 1977), John Foster Dulles (Holsti 1970), Lyndon B. 
Johnson (Walker and Schafer 2000), John F. Kennedy (Marfleet 2000), Henry Kissinger 
(Starr 1984; Stuart and Starr 1981; Walker 1977), and Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin 
(Crichlow 1998). Leaders’ operational codes have been found to have a key influence 
on their behavior. For example, in a study of U.S. policy creation during the Vietnam 
War (Walker 1977), the pattern of decisions by the United States to pursue more 
aggressive or conciliatory tactics at particular times was found to closely mirror 
predictions based on the preferences and beliefs o f Henry Kissinger. In another study 
(Walker, Schafer and Young 1998) changes in the foreign policies of the Carter 
administration over time were found to reflect changes in Carter’s operational code.
This included finding a predicted pattern of change by issue area. Carter’s beliefs 
changed over time to reflect new information he learned as he interacted with other 
political actors.
Several researchers interested in the role of key individuals on foreign policy have 
focused on the impact of a leader’s conceptual complexity. This variable is focused on 
how an individual structures his or her cognitions. It differentiates between individuals 
according to whether they have a complex understanding of the world that allows fora 
considerable amount of ambiguity or whether they rely upon a few set categories to 
classify their surroundings. Variation in this characteristic has been linked to a wide 
variety of phenomena. Several studies have shown that decision makers who exhibit 
lower levels of complexity are more likely than others to prefer conflictual policy
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options, while more complex decision makers are more likely to favor cooperative 
behavior (Hermann 1977,1980, 1984; Hermann and Hermann 1989; Suedfeld, Wallace 
and Thachuk 1993; Tetlock 1981). These findings have been augmented by research 
showing that situations that led to military conflict were preceded by periods during 
which the complexity level of government officials involved in choosing to launch attacks 
declined (Suedfeld 1981; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977; Suedfeld, Tetlock and Ramirez 
1977; Wallace, Suedfeld and Thachuk 1993). Additionally, once forced into a fight, the 
complexity levels of decision makers in nations that have suffered from surprise attacks 
fall after their country has been assaulted (Suedfeld and Bluck 1988). National leaders 
who have low levels of complexity are more likely to create advisory systems that are 
formal, hierarchical, and stifle intra-administration dissent, while those with higher 
levels of complexity are more likely to favor more open advisory processes (Preston
1997). This can have an important impact on international relations as investigations 
into the groupthink phenomenon have found that more closed decision-making 
structures that limit the consideration of a broad range of information and policy options 
are more likely than more open groups to adopt conflictual policy decisions (Herek, Janis 
and Huth 1987; Schafer and Crichlow 1996). One study (Suedfeld, Corteen and 
McCormick 1986) of battles in the U.S. Civil War has found that victory on the 
battlefield can be predicted according to the relative complexity of the generals involved 
in a conflict. The general with the higher complexity level was victorious in the battles 
these researchers examined. An examination of negotiating behavior during crises 
(Santmire, Wilkenfetd, Kraus, Holley, Santmireand Gleditsch 1998) found that groups 
with more homogeneous levels of complexity were more likely to be able to reach
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mutually beneficial outcomes. This is believed to occur as having a common complexity 
level apparently assists negotiators’ ability to understand their adversaries’ goals, and 
helps them avoid missteps in communication. Another study (Suedfeld and Rank 1976) 
found a strong link between the long range success of revolutionary leaders and their 
conceptual complexity. This was an examination of 19 leaders involved in the English 
Civil War and the American, Russian, Chinese and Cuban revolutions. The results 
showed that the eleven men in the sample who were able to retain positions o f power 
until their voluntary retirement or death all appeared to have low complexity levels 
during the revolution, when having a single-minded approach to problem solving might 
have been somewhat desirable, but their complexity levels rose as they became engaged 
in the consolidating the legitimacy of their new governments in the post-revolutionary 
period. The eight leaders in the sample who were forced out of power showed no shift 
in their complexity levels between the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period.
Much of the work investigating whether or not the personality traits of key 
decision makers affect their political behavior examines those individuals’ motives. An 
individual’s motives are that person’s primary psychological needs. These are things that 
a person is unconsciously driven to possess. While the effects of a number of different 
motives have been studied, two of the most commonly researched are need for power, 
and need for affiliation. These two motives “repeatedly emerge as the two fundamental 
dimensions o f social behavior and interpersonal traits” (Winter 1987). A leader’s need 
for power represents his or her need for impact and prestige in social relationships 
(Winter and Carlson 1988). Need for affiliation is associated with a deep concern for 
maintaining friendly relationships with others (Winter and Carlson 1988). These motives
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have been linked to a variety of preferences and behaviors. The power motive has been 
linked to aggressiveness and risk-taking (Winter 1973, 1993; Winter and Stewart 1977), 
as well as to holding strong nationalist sentiments (Hermann 1980, 1984). In a study of 
LT.S. presidents from Washington to Reagan it has been found to be strongly related to 
whether or not the country entered a war during that president’s administration (Winter 
1987). The affiliation motive can have an important impact on the way decisions are 
made as it has been linked to relying on the opinions of friends as opposed to experts. 
Individuals with a high need for affiliation have a tendency to interact with those who are 
similar and a tendency to avoid those who are dissimilar (Winter and Carlson 1988).
This motive has also been shown to influence individuals to respond unusually 
aggressively if they feel they have been betrayed by a friend (Winter 1993) The effects 
of these variables have been observed in both aggregate studies examining a broad 
spectrum of derision makers, and in research projects that have focused on just a few 
well known individuals, such as Saddam Hussein, Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon 
(Weintraub 1986; Winter 1993; Winter and Carlson 1988; Winter, Hermann, Weintraub 
and Walker 1991).
Another personality attribute that has been found to affect the behavior of 
political leaders is their distrust o f others. This characteristic represents an individual’s 
tendency to doubt or suspect the motives and actions o f others. It conveys a person’s 
level of unease toward others in their environment (Hermann 1980:21). As trust is a key 
component in creating cooperative relationships (Ostrom 1998) it is not surprising that 
heads of government who have high levels o f distrust have been found to be less willing 
than other leaders to make commitments with others in the international arena. These
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leaders also tend to exhibit high levels o f nationalism and have a high need for power 
(Hermann 1980). In terms of issue-specific effects, leaders who have higher levels of 
distrust have been found to be more likely than others to oppose the removal of barriers 
to trade between states (Crichlow 1999).
Questions from the Literature on the fmpact of Psychological Characteristics
The study of how the psychological characteristics of elite decision makers shape 
their political behavior is still a young research program. However, the examples listed 
above illustrate that research into a wide array of psychological characteristics has 
produced promising results. These seem to confirm that at least in certain circumstances 
these variables can have a powerful effect on political behavior. These characteristics 
have been found to affect such matters as leaders’ tendencies toward conflict or 
cooperation, their strategies and tactics in international relations, how they frame and 
interpret international events, and how they structure their advisory systems. The 
subfield has progressed to a stage where even a few prominent exponents of more 
traditional, systemic approaches to explaining international relations have begun 
incorporating rudimentary measures representing individuals’ psychological 
characteristics in their models (Bueno de Mesquita 1985; Huth, Bennett and Gelpi 1992; 
Huth, Gelpi and Bennett 1993).
But while this literature has reached a stage where it appears that further 
systematic inquiries into the political effects of leaders’ psychological characteristics are 
a promising, potentially important area o f study if one hopes to gain a better 
understanding o f the creation o f foreign policy, it would be misleading to argue that this 
literature has moved far beyond that stage. Several pieces of this research suffer from
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one or more notable weaknesses. Some of it can be criticized on the basis of 
methodological shortcomings. For example, some of these analyses (Hermann 1977, 
1984) rely on correlations to support causal relationships between personal 
characteristics and political behavior, or theoretical linkages among psychological 
characteristics. An even more common weakness is the use of individual case studies. 
For example, research into the impact of leaders’ images o f other political actors has 
included works on Carter administration policy toward Nicaragua (Cottam 1992), 
President Reagan’s views of El Salvador (Blanton 1996) and the Truman 
administration’s perception o f the Soviet Union (Larson 1985). While these works 
definitely have their merits, it is difficult to establish the generalizability of a phenomenon 
in this way This problem is exacerbated when the dependent variable, the behavior of 
the state or the preferences of key individuals, is measured in an imprecise manner, as 
has frequently been the case. Also, several o f these studies have focused solely upon the 
impact of a single psychological characteristic. This does not allow for the consideration 
of how these variables may interact to affect policy preferences, nor does it allow for an 
examination of the relative power of these characteristics.
And there is an additional weakness in the previous literature that is highly 
relevant to this project. Much o f it has been based solely on studies of predominant 
leaders and other heads of government. If one hopes to find broader support for the 
proposition that elite individuals are key in shaping foreign policy, more research needs 
to be done that includes key advisors in addition to the head o f government. That early 
research studying the impact o f individuals on foreign policy focused on predominant 
leaders was understandable. It was most likely that individuals’ psychological
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characteristics would be key when one individual controlled the policy-making process. 
But the degree to which the behavior of other decision-makers is affected by these 
variables is still unclear. Presidents and prime ministers have been found to have been 
affected by their psychological characteristics — but what about their advisors and 
ministers? Some have suggested that the views of senior advisors may be principally 
affected by other factors, for example the particular institutions they represent in the 
decision-making process (Allison 1971). But it has also been argued that the behavior of 
those holding key strategic positions in a government is more likely to reflect their 
personal predispositions than that of other officials (Greenstein 1969). Settling this 
disagreement is important. In many cases high level advisors have played at least as 
central a role in shaping foreign policy as the head of the national executive has So 
understanding why they favor the policies that they do can be just as significant as 
understanding the reasons behind the preferences of presidents and prime ministers.
Additionally, there remains a need for further systematic research into how the 
psychological characteristics o f leaders and advisors shape the policy-making process. 
Recently a number of enlightening works have been written on this subject (Burke and 
Greenstein 1989; Hargrove 1993; Preston 1997). These have included the presentation 
of theoretical models that explicitly link underlying psychological influences on 
decision-group members with administrative and bureaucratic dynamics. While this is 
certainly not a new position (George 1980; Janis 1972), they have expanded the focus of 
this argument and have provided important support for their positions through their own 
qualitative research. But more work in this area is needed. While it seems clear some 
psychological characteristics are important in this process, which these are is not entirely
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clear. No one has yet conducted a quantitative analysis disentangling the effects of these 
variables so that we can learn which, have the most influence.
This project builds upon the previous work in this area by providing an unusually 
comprehensive test of the relationships between the psychological characteristics of 
political leaders, including both heads o f government and their senior advisors, their 
preferred policy options, the dynamics of the policy-making process, and the official 
policies adopted by the state. I test the effects of twelve psychological characteristics, 
including both cognitive and personality factors. I test these relationships through an 
analysis of sixteen foreign policy decisions made by eight different governments in three 
countries across a forty year period using a multi-method research design. This 
systematic, rigorous approach provides a thorough investigation o f the role o f the 
psychological characteristics of elite decision makers in shaping foreign policy across a 
relatively large and varied set of cases. More generally, this project adds new and 
important findings to the ongoing debate about the impact o f elite individuals on foreign 
policy decision making.
The remaining five chapters are organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 is 
a detailed research design. In this chapter I address issues such as case selection and the 
operationalization o f the independent and dependent variables. In Chapter 3 1 investigate 
questions dealing with factors affecting the personal policy preferences o f decision 
makers. For example, do their psychological characteristics affect their personal policy 
preferences? Do these effects vary by country? How do decision makers who play 
different bureaucratic roles differ from one another? In Chapter 4 I investigate questions 
related to the creation of official state policy. For example, does official state policy
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generally mirror the personal policy preferences of the national executive leader? How 
do the psychological characteristics of decision makers affect the process of decision 
making? In Chapter 5 1 present two short case studies, one dealing with the Iran Hostage 
Crisis and one dealing with the Gulf War. In this chapter I use process-tracing methods 
(George and McKeown 1985) to more fully illustrate some of the relationships between 
decision makers’ psychological characteristics and their foreign policy behavior that were 
shown to exist in the quantitative analyses in chapters 3 and 4. These case studies also 
allow me to investigate the impact of some other psychological variables that I was not 
able to include in the quantitative analyses. In Chapter 6 I summarize this project’s 
findings.
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CHAPTER2 
RESEARCH DESIGN
The purpose o f this study is to provide a systematic investigation of the effects of 
the psychological characteristics o f political leaders upon foreign policy decision-making. 
It is designed to produce a uniquely broad and rigorous test of this relationship. The 
actions, preferences and characteristics of heads o f government and their key advisors in 
three countries, the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, are examined through 
both quantitative and qualitative analyses. By examining decision-making in sixteen 
cases in which governments weighed engaging in international conflict in a variety of 
settings, this project sheds new light on how the psychological characteristics of political 
leaders shape their own policy preferences, and that of their state, as well as the patterns 
of policy creation that exist at the highest level of government.
While this research investigates a variety of matters related to the link between 
leaders’ psychological characteristics and the creation of foreign policy, two questions 
are central to this study. First, what relationships exist between the psychological 
characteristics of political leaders and their policy preferences in times of international 
conflict? Second, how are the views of presidents and prime ministers reconciled with 
those of their advisors in the creation of a national foreign policy? In particular, do the 
psychological characteristics o f these individuals play an important role that process? 
Research Method
This is a multi-method project that includes both quantitative and qualitative 
sections. The reason for this is straightforward. While a key feature of this work is its
20
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use of reliable quantitative measures, it remains the case that the foreign policy-making 
process is often affected by other factors that are not easily quantified. Including a 
qualitative analysis section allows for an examination o f the effects o f these variables. 
Therefore, in addition to a statistical section, this project features two case studies of 
foreign policy decisions in order to investigate the impact of such factors as the key 
analogies used to frame leaders’ understanding of a situation, and the interpersonal 
rapport that existed between key decision-makers.
The statistical analysis includes tests of two data sets. The first is designed to 
address the question — How do the psychological characteristics of leaders and advisors 
affect their choice of a preferred policy option? In investigating this question the unit of 
analysis is the individual, that is, each head of government and each advisor in every case 
of decision (N=55). So, for example, President Carter during the Hostage Crisis in Iran 
is one unit, Defense Secretary McNamara during the Cuban Missile Crisis is another unit, 
Defense Secretary McNamara during the Six Day War is another unit, Prime Minister 
Begin during the invasion of Lebanon is another, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir 
during the invasion of Lebanon is another, and so on. Each data line includes the 
leader’s preferred policy option at the time of the decision, which in this analysis is the 
dependent variable. Each data line also includes all the indices representing each 
subject’s psychological characteristics, and five control variables.
The second data set is used to investigate the following question — How are the 
policy preferences of a state created? Here the unit o f analysis is each state decision 
(N=16). The data line includes the level of conflict represented by the action taken by 
the state (the dependent variable), and control variables representing the quality of
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information processing conducted by the decision-making group, the level of conflict 
instigated by the state’s opponent, and the level of perceived threat to national interests. 
It also includes the variables representing the psychological characteristics and policy 
preferences of the head o f government and the advisors involved, and variables 
representing the mean of the advisory team for each psychological characteristic as well 
as the mean level of conflict the advisors favored.
This section of the study addresses a variety of questions dealing with the 
relationship between heads of government and their top advisors, and more generally 
with the impact key individuals have on the creation of foreign policy. Among them are 
the following. Do the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders 
significantly affect the level of conflict a state implements in pursuit o f its foreign policy 
agenda? How close are the preferences of heads of government to those of their 
advisors? Do the views of advisors impact a state’s actions when they differ from those 
of the leader of the national executive? How much influence does the head of a state’s 
foreign ministry have on its foreign policy? Whose policy preferences matter more, those 
of the head of government or those of advisors?
The qualitative analysis section includes in-depth case studies of two of the cases 
of decision included in the project the failed attempt to rescue the American hostages 
held in Iran in April o f 1980 and the Gulf War. These cases were selected since they 
provide for an examination of the psychological effects of leaders across decision groups 
that are widely perceived to have believed in different ideologies.
Beyond providing descriptive detail about each decision, the case studies provide 
another means of gathering information that may support or challenge the hypotheses
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investigated in this project. They provide for the ability to consider the influence of 
factors including additional psychological characteristics of leaders that are difficult to 
quantify or whose attributes are difficult to compare across cases, but that still have an 
important influence on the course of decision making. For example, it is through these 
case studies that I assess the influence of the analogies that were prevalent within 
discussions among the members of a particular decision-making group. It would be 
quite difficult to include meaningful analogy variables in my statistical data set as the 
analogies that are likely to be prevalent in a case vary according to which country is 
acting, and I include decisions made in three countries in my analysis. The case studies 
also provide a good venue to consider how interpersonal dynamics among decision 
makers affected their behavior. It is with these limitations in mind that case studies are 
included in the project in order to provide a comprehensive investigation of the effects of 
individuals on the creation of foreign policy 
Case Selection
This project includes an analysis o f sixteen cases o f decision. In order to examine 
foreign policy decision making in a wide variety o f contexts, it focuses on decisions 
made by eight different administrations in three countries. I examine two cases of 
decision per administration- All of these cases involved major events affecting 
international relations in which policy was set by the top-level decision makers in a state. 
However, for each administration I coded one case that was clearly a “high stakes” 
decision, and one case that was a relatively “low stakes” decision. A case was 
considered “high stakes” if decision makers saw an exceptionally serious threat to 
national interests, and the possibility o f engaging another country’s ground forces or
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navy in international combat was actively considered by a country’s leadership. Cases 
which involved less immediate or severe threats to the national interest, and in which 
using one’s army was not seriously considered by top-level decision makers, were 
considered to be relatively “low stakes”. This is done as previous research (Jam's and 
Mann 1977; McCalla 1992) has shown that patterns of decision making differ depending 
on the level of the threat to national interests that is involved in a situation. These cases
include variation in the time period of the decision, the form of government of the state 
involved and the ideological leanings of the parties in power. The eight administrations 
and the sixteen cases I include in the analysis are listed below in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Cases Included in the Analysis
Head of Government Decision Event
I. John F Kennedy I. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
2. The Conflict in Laos, 1961
2. Lyndon B. Johnson I. Operation Rolling Thunder, 1965
2. The 6 Day War, 1967
3. Jimmy Carter I. The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission, 1980
2. The Ogaden War, 1978
4. Ronald W. Reagan I. The Invasion of Grenada, 1983
2. Negotiations to Remove Noriega, 1988
5. George H.W Bush 1. The Gulf War, 1990
2. The Yugoslavia Civil War, 1992
6. Bill Clinton 1. The War in Bosnia, 1995
2. Reinstating Aristide in Haiti, 1994
7. Menachem Begin 1. The Invasion of Lebanon, 1982
2. Bombing the Osiraq Nuclear Plant, 1981
8. Margaret Thatcher I. The Falklands War, 1982
2. Sanctioning South Africa, 1985
The cases were selected as follows. First, I conducted an extensive review of the
foreign policy actions, considered, by each of these governments by reading reputable case
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studies focusing on these administrations and the memoirs of key participants involved in 
these decisions. I then made a list o f possible cases to include in the analysis. To make 
this list a case needed to have been the subject of enough reputable descriptive analyses 
so that it would be possible to code the views of participants and the nature of the 
surrounding geopolitical situation both before and during the foreign policy 
decision-making process. It also needed to show evidence of at least some degree of 
variation in the preferences of the key leaders involved in setting policy. This need not 
have been intense disagreement, but the case should have included some variation in 
decision makers’ views o f the situation at hand and possible responses to it. Once this 
list was created two cases were selected to investigate for each administration. This was 
done somewhat randomly, but with two caveats. First, once the first case was selected, 
if it was clearly a “high stakes” case or a “low stakes” case, other cases of that 
magnitude o f seriousness were excluded from being selected with the second choice 
given the point made above about the different way such challenges are dealt with. 
Secondly, if there were any cases closely tied to the case that was selected first, those 
cases were excluded from also being included in the analysis. So, for example, once the 
decision to include the launching of the Operation Rolling Thunder was included in the 
analysis, no other Vietnam-related decision could be the second case included for the 
Johnson administration. This was done to try and lessen the chances that an 
administration’s scores would be skewed by focusing solely upon what might be a single 
anomalous policy area.
The number o f individual decision makers who were examined during each case 
varied depending upon the actual number of top decision makers involved in the process,
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and whether or not materials existed that could be used to determine their psychological 
characteristics. Who I included depended upon who were the key principals in each 
decision; those who were most active in setting state policy and whose personal 
preferences in each case of decision are known and may have affected other leaders. 
When possible I made sure to include members o f the decision-making team who held 
contrasting opinions on the appropriate action that the nation should take in order to 
increase variance in the dependent variable. The decision makers I chose to focus upon 
were generally those filling the most senior positions in the government, though in some 
cases lower level advisors were also coded if they played an important role in the 
decision-making process. I coded the national executive leader (the president or prime 
minister) in every case. I also coded the head of the State Department or Foreign 
Ministry in every case as those individuals are generally considered to be the national 
executive leader’s top foreign policy advisor, and they tend to play a very active role in 
most of their country’s dealings with other countries. The other individuals included in 
the analysis held a variety of positions in government. These included Defense Secretary 
(or Minister), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Advisor, Vice 
President, Treasury Secretary and Deputy Secretary o f State, among others. In most 
cases I coded the national executive leader and either two or three or his top advisors. 
The Dependent Variables
I investigate two primary dependent variables, though both are derived using the 
same measure. I first test whether the psychological characteristics of leaders affect their 
policy preferences. I also investigate how the policy preferences o f individual leaders are
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aggregated into a national policy. Both dependent variables represent policy options and 
involve scaling levels of conflict or cooperation.
The measure I use to represent these various preferences and policies was 
developed to provide a continuous conflict/cooperation scale for World Events 
Interaction Survey (WEIS) data. WEIS was created to provide a detailed, quantitative 
way of measuring international events around the world over time. While it was 
designed to classify events into one of 61 discrete categories, it was not constructed to 
provide for the coding of these categories along a common conflict/cooperation 
dimension. However, a number o f such scales have nonetheless been created as they 
facilitate investigations of many different questions in the study of international relations. 
I will rely on the scale created by Joshua Goldstein (1992) as his research (Goldstein 
1991, 1992; Goldstein and Freeman 1990) shows it to be slightly more accurate than 
similar scales (Andriole 1984; Vincent 1979; Walker, Bohlin, Boos, Cownie, Nakawaja, 
and Willson 1984), and since it is the only one to provide weights for all 61 WEIS event 
types. Examples of these weights, which I use as the dependent variables in my analysis 
are: military attack = -tO.O, break diplomatic relations = -70, halt negotiation = -3.8, 
issue formal complaint = -2.4, express regret = +1.8, host visit = +2.8, promise material 
support = +5.2, extend economic aid = +7.4. Goldstein’s scale was derived from a 
ranking of these categories performed by a panel of international relations scholars.
I use this scale to measure two variables. The first of these is an individual 
decision maker’s personal policy preference. That is, the policy option they personally 
preferred at the beginning of the final stage of decision-making. I also use this scale to 
measure the official policy that is adopted, by the state.
j
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
Decision Maker’s Policy Preference
An individual’s personal policy preference is coded as follows. First, the policy 
option (or options) they preferred at the beginning of the final decision-making period 
was identified through a reading of reputable case study material describing how leaders 
came to adopt an official state policy in the particular situation being studied. If they 
only favored one policy option they are given the Goldstein score matching that option. 
For example, if they wanted to pursue negotiations they are scored +3, if they wanted to 
send a military force to the area they are scored -7.6, or if they favored a blockade 
(seizing position and possessions) they are scored -9.2. If the individual favored a 
variety of policy options, but all were in either a cooperative or a conflictual direction, 
that individual’s preference is scored using their most extreme policy preference. So, for 
example, if an individual favors both specific non-military sanctions (-5 .8) and halting 
negotiations (-3.8), they are scored -5.8. The reason forthis is that such an individual 
appears committed toward pursuing either a carrot or stick approach to dealing with the 
conflict at hand, and the most extreme position shows how far they are willing to move 
in that direction. I also retested my models substituting this personal policy preference 
score with one computed from the mean score of the various policies favored by 
individuals who favored multiple policy options in the event that all o f those policies 
were in either the cooperative or conflictual direction. The results of these tests were 
quite similar to those produced using my initial scoring of this variable. Therefore, I 
chose to use the most extreme cooperation or conflict score as I felt that approach was 
more theoretically appropriate. However, in the instances in which an individual favored 
multiple policy options, options that included both cooperative and conflictual moves,
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then that individual is scored according to the mean score of their policy preferences. 
This is done since these individuals appear to believe that it is best to pursue a variety of 
policy avenues to produce one overall policy approach. Combining the scores o f these 
policy options therefore reflects the intensity and direction of the general approach to 
international relations that an individual decision maker thinks is appropriate. So, for 
example, if someone believes that instituting both a blockade (-9 .2) and starting 
negotiations (+3) is the approach their country should take, they are scored -3.1.
Official State Policy
Official state policy is coded in exactly the same way as personal policy 
preference, except that instead of scoring the policy preference of an individual I score 
the option or options that the key decision makers in the situation under study agreed to 
implement as their country’s official policy.
The scoring of these two variables was verified by conducting a reliability check. 
This involved training another coder on the use of these scales and coding procedures. 
Once that was done, three cases were randomly selected. The second coder then coded 
the personal policy preferences o f each participant and the country policy preference in 
those three cases. This check produced an intercoder agreement score of .88. 
Measuring Decision Makers’ Psychological Characteristics
The key data in this project are the measures o f political leaders’ psychological 
characteristics, and the measures of the policy preferences they, and eventually the state, 
adopt Therefore, the data must accurately and precisely reflect the phenomena they 
purport to represent. With this in mind, the psychological characteristics o f political 
leaders are measured with “at-a-distance” techniques (Winter, Hermann, Weintraub and
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Walker 1991) that have previously been found to be valid indicators of key variables. 
At-a-distance measurements are done through quantitative content analyses of leaders’ 
verbal utterances. Each psychological characteristic is measured by breaking down a 
leader’s comments in a manner that is pertinent to the variable under investigation. For 
example, when measuring a decision maker’s distrust of others one counts the number of 
times the speaker modifies his or her comments about other political actors in a way that 
conveys misgivings or unease. The number o f such comments is then divided by the 
total number of statements a speaker makes about other political actors to determine 
their level o f distrust. While some of the other measures use more complex formulas, the 
basic idea is the same with each variable. Decision makers’ comments can be broken 
down into units and quantified in ways that give us reliable measures of core 
psychological characteristics.
This technique for measuring the psychological characteristics o f leaders is built 
upon the assumption that verbal statements are indicative o f their basic beliefs and 
personality traits. This connection can be found by examining certain patterns of 
language which are indicative an individual’s basic psychological characteristics 
(Hermann 1980, 1984; Walker, Schafer and Young 1998; Weintraub 1986; Winter 1973, 
1987, 1991, 1993). By examining the typical form of people’s statements about 
themselves and others, or the manner and frequency with which they use particular 
words and phrases, it is possible to glean an understanding o f their basic beliefs and 
traits. While some of these may fluctuate with situational changes, the characteristics 
that I am measuring using these techniques are fundamental attributes of an individual
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and as such should remain somewhat constant. Therefore, it is possible to accurately 
measure these characteristics.
As another example, consider the concept o f conceptual complexity. This 
characteristic represents the differentiation people see in the world around them. Does a 
person see his or her surroundings as complex, or are they easily categorized? This 
characteristic can be measured by computing the relative frequency with which one uses 
words and phrases that convey differentiation in the world as opposed to words and 
phrases that describe the world in narrow terms. So if a person shows a tendency to use 
words like “seems”, “maybe”, “possible” or “somewhat” more than words like “always”, 
“never”, “must” or “of course” they are considered to be cognitively complex. A 
continued reliance over time on words like the former set suggests that the speaker is 
cognizant of the existence of a complex and diverse set of factors shaping his or her 
environment.
Of course a frequent criticism of this approach as a way of measuring leaders’ 
characteristics is that what decision makers say may not reflect who they are. Such 
critics generally are not suggesting that leaders are carefully crafting a public facade to 
hide their true intentions and beliefs. Doing so over a prolonged period of time can 
prove quite difficult. While such actions may occur on occasion, “leaders usually 
believe what they say and say what they believe” (Lagon 1994:24). The greater concern 
is that public comments are often the product o f speech writers or are affected by 
previously planned “talking points”, and therefore do not reflect the psychological 
attributes of the individual leader who says them but instead represent the group that 
planned them. This concern about essentially ghost-written comments has led
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researchers such as Margaret G. Hermann (1980, 1984) to rely solely upon spontaneous 
comments that are thought to better reflect the views of the speaker as they are not 
planned. Others have focused upon comments, that though prepared in advance, are 
known to be largely the product of the speaker. This is the approach often taken by 
David Winter, much of whose research involves the use o f the State of the Nation 
Addresses of American presidents (Winter 1987). While there has been little research 
verifying this concern, some preliminary findings (Schafer and Crichlow 2000) suggest 
spontaneous comments may indeed better reflect the attributes of individual leaders, 
particularly in terms of their personality characteristics. Therefore I rely on spontaneous 
comments, such as press conferences and interviews, when coding leaders’ attributes.
In order to employ at-a-distance measures of leaders’ psychological 
characteristics I needed to obtain statements made by the leaders I examine. The number 
of these comments, and the time period from which they were gathered, necessarily 
depended on the availability of texts for coding. Ideally, when the existence of texts 
recording spontaneous comments allowed for it, codings were based upon verbal 
utterances made shortly before the final stage of decision making began, in order to have 
the most timely measurements possible. While large fluctuations in the core 
psychological traits o f individual decision makers are unlikely, there has been some 
evidence that decision makers do learn from actions that occur in their environment and 
their core beliefs and traits shift accordingly (Schafer and Crichlow 2000). This being 
the case, using timely comments to measure leaders’ characteristics is preferable. 
However, it should also be noted that it is important to exclude comments made by 
leaders during the actual decision-making process as they could be influenced by events
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occurring during the case being studied, and thus the independent variables would 
actually be consequences of the dependent variables in my model (the endogeneity 
problem). While the lengthy time period over which some of the decisions included in 
the analysis were made does not make it practical to exclude all comments made during 
them, all the utterances used for coding purposes were drawn from time periods prior to 
the onset o f the final stage of decision making that occurred in any given case.
When deciding on what time frame I should base my coding of decision makers’ 
psychological characteristics, I was guided both by the desire to base my measurements 
on timely comments, and by the desire to base these measurements on a number of 
comments dealing with a variety of foreign policy issues. But my selection of a proper 
time frame was also affected by another factor. Recorded comments were much easier 
to find for some individuals than others. Therefore, I decided to use different temporal 
periods from which to base my measurements of the psychological characteristics of 
national executive leaders and my measurements of the psychological characteristics of 
their key advisors. Since national executive leaders tend to make public statements on 
foreign policy with great regularity I code all o f the spontaneous comments that they 
made on foreign policy issues during the month preceding the onset of decision making 
in a case. Since their advisors make fewer public comments of this sort I analyze all of 
the spontaneous foreign policy comments that they made during the two month period 
prior to the onset of decision making in a case. In the handful of cases in which a 
decision maker did not make a public spontaneous comment on foreign policy during 
these time frames I based my codings o f their psychological characteristics on the last
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such comment I could find that they made prior to the onset of the decision making 
process that met the necessary coding criteria.
Because of these concerns I had to settle on a date that marked the beginning of 
the decision-making process in each case. This was done by reviewing case study 
literature on each of the cases. In several cases this was a rather clear cut decision. For 
example, November 4, 1979, the day the hostages were taken, was used as the key date 
marking the beginning of the decision-making process in the Iran hostages case. In a few 
cases the decision was not as clear. In those situations, which usually occurred in cases 
that were part o f protracted conflicts, I used a  date that marked a salient act that set the 
final stage of decision making in motion. For example, I used the attack on Pleiku to 
mark intensification of the decision-making process that settled the decision to launch air 
attacks against Vietnam, and the Racak massacre as the key event that spurred American 
decision makers to settle on a new policy in Kosovo1.
Once I set the relevant time frames I began to collect all spontaneous foreign 
policy comments that I could find that were made by the key participants in the 
decision-making bodies I am examining during these periods. Most of these were 
comments in the form of press conferences and interviews. These comments were drawn 
from a wide variety of sources. The sources I consulted most often in my search for 
these comments were The Public Papers o f the President, the State Department
1 The dates I used for the 16 cases were: Laos — March 9,1961: Cuban Missile Crisis — 
August 22, 1962; Operation Rolling Thunder—February 6, 1965; 6 Day War — May 18, 
1967; Ogaden — December 31, 1977; Iran Hostage Crisis — November 4, 1979; Grenada 
— October 22,1983; Negotiating with Noriega — February 4, 1988; Gulf War —August
2, 1990; Yugoslavia — May 1,1992; Hard — May 6,1994; Kosovo — January 15, 1999; 
Falkfands — March 31, 1982; Sanctioning South Africa — June 21, 1986; Attacking 
Osiraq — October 14, 1980; Invading Lebanon — June 3, 1982.
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Bulletin, the public affairs web sites of the White House, the U.S. Department of State 
and the U.S. Department of Defense, interviews in U.S. News & World Report, the 
Public Statements o f the Secretary o f Defense, Hansard and Israel's Foreign Relations: 
Selected Documents. In order to be included in the sample of comments that was used 
to measure decision makers’ psychological characteristics these remarks had to be made 
during the relevant time frame, be spontaneous, address a foreign policy issue, and, 
because of the requirements of one of the coding systems I use, the Verbs in Context 
method, be at least 1500 words in length2.
As discussed earlier, a number of psychological characteristics can be 
hypothesized to potentially affect one’s tendency to support either conflict or 
cooperation in the conduct of world affairs. My analysis includes an investigation of the 
effects of twelve psychological characteristics that are hypothesized to affect foreign 
policy behavior. These characteristics can be accurately and precisely measured through 
quantitative content analysis techniques whose validity has been confirmed in previous 
research. The first four psychological characteristics I include are personality traits. 
These are measured using quantitative content analysis techniques drawn from the trait
analysis work of Hermann (1980, 1987b). The remaining psychological characteristics I
2 Finding spontaneous statements to use for Vice President Johnson in the Laos case and 
Vice President Humphrey in the Rolling Thunder case proved difficult. In each case they 
had just assumed an office in which they did not often have occasion to make public 
statements on foreign affairs, and I did not find that they had made spontaneous foreign 
affairs statements at the end of their service in the Senate that met the coding 
requirements. Therefore, in their cases I developed a base of comments to use to code 
their psychological characteristics by combining two foreign policy statements each had 
made during their final year in the Senate. Similarly, as I had difficulty finding 
sufficiently lengthy spontaneous comments made by Israeli ministers Burg and Shamir in 
1980,1 combined two statements made by those ministers in the months preceding the 
Osiraq decision in order to form a sample of comments from which to measure their 
psychological characteristics.
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investigate are aspects of leaders’ operational codes. The operational code variables are 
measured according to the procedures designed by Walker, Schafer and Young (1998). 
These variables are discussed below. For each variable I provide a brief description o f 
what it represents, how it is hypothesized to affect the behavior of political leaders, and 
how it is measured.
I personally coded the decision makers’ traits and beliefs according to the 
formulas listed below for eleven of these variables. I tested the reliability of my 
measurements of these eleven variables by cross-coding my scoring of the characteristics 
o f seven decision makers with codings done by other trained coders. These produced 
intercoder agreement scores o f .93 for Need for Power, .91 for Distrust, .88 for Need 
for Affiliation, and .92 for the operational code variables. Conceptual Complexity was 
measured using a software program specifically designed to measure such variables. As 
this method relies on set word dictionaries that distinguish between high complexity and 
low complexity statements, the reliability of these codings is not an issue.
Need for Power
Need for power represents an individual’s “concern for establishing, maintaining, 
or restoring one’s power, i.e., one’s impact, control, or influence over others” (Winter 
1973:250). It is the underlying need of a leader to dominate social relationships, 
including maximizing his or her authority in the political arena. This concern with one’s 
influence is also associated with narcissism (Fodor and Farrow 1979), and can lead 
individuals to ignoring moral considerations when making decisions (Fodor and Smith 
1982). The index used to measure this characteristic is created from verbs for which the 
speaker, or a group with whom he identifies, is the subject. Specifically, it is the number
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of these verbs which convey a strong forceful action, unsolicited assistance, or attempts 
to control, impress or influence relative to the number of these verbs which do not have 
such a meaning (Hermann 1987b: 7-8). Individuals whose comments about themselves 
contain more references to taking forceful or influential actions are considered to have a 
higher need for power. Given that this variable includes impulses toward favoring the 
use of forceful action and securing control in a situation, I hypothesize that a high need 
for power is positively related to conflictual policy preferences. Previous research has 
produced support for this position (Winter 1980, 1987, 1993), though earlier literature 
also suggests that need for power may more strongly influence leaders’ tendency to 
create dramatic, crisis-oriented foreign policies than it does their tendency to support 
conflictual policy options once they are involved in a crisis (Hermann 1980, Winter 
1987).
Distrust
This variable represents an individual’s level of “doubt, uneasiness, misgiving, 
and wariness of others — that is, an inclination to suspect the motives and actions of 
others” (Hermann 1987a: 125). It basically entails how suspicious an individual is of 
others in his or her environment. The index used to measure distrust of others involves 
nouns and noun phrases referring to people or groups with whom the speaker does not 
identify. Specifically, it is calculated on the basis of the number of these words and 
phrases that are modified to reflect misgivings, uneasiness, wariness, distrust or doubt 
about them from the speaker, relative to the number of these words or phrases that do 
not convey such feelings (Hermann 1987b: 16-17). The particular modifiers that convey 
distrust include obvious words such as conniving and conspiratorial, but may also in
i
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certain contexts include such words as inscrutable and enigmatic. I hypothesize that 
those who are more distrustful of others will be less willing to cooperate with them and 
hence will be more likely to turn to force as a means of settling international disputes. 
Previous research has found that decision makers who have higher levels o f distrust are 
less likely to favor cooperative international policies (Crichlow 1999).
Conceptual Complexity
Conceptual complexity represents the degree of differentiation one recognizes in 
his or her environment. This includes finding differentiation in people, ideas and policies, 
among other things. More complex individuals see a variety of reasons behind a 
position, and are willing to consider the possibility of ambiguity existing in their 
environment. They are more flexible in reacting to other objects and ideas. More 
conceptually simple people tend to classify objects along good-bad, either-or dimensions. 
They are less willing to accept ambiguity (Hermann 1987b: 12). Coding conceptual 
complexity is done on the basis of individual words. It is a ratio based on the number of 
words one uses that convey differentiation in one’s surroundings relative to the number 
of words one uses that convey a world that can be divided into only a few categories. 
Examples o f high complexity words include “maybe”, “perhaps” and “seem” Examples 
of low complexity words include “absolutely”, “every”, and “indisputable” (Hermann 
1987b: 12-14). Following previous findings (Hermann 1977, 1980; Tetlock 1979) I 
hypothesize that leaders higher in complexity will be more willing to consider a broader 
variety o f policy options and favor cooperative international policies. I expect they will 
be less likely to resort to force to solve international disputes.
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Need for Affiliation
This variable represents individuals’ need for close, friendly relationships with 
others (Atkinson 1958; Hermann 1980, 1984, 1987a; McAdams 1982), and may 
manifest itself in a “fear of being disliked” (Winter 1993:113). It is measured using a 
technique devised by Hermann (1987b) that focuses upon all the verbs in an individual’s 
comments. A person’s affiliation score is the number of verbs they use that convey a 
concern with affiliation divided by the total number of all the verbs they use. A verb is 
coded for affiliation if it fits in one or more of the following categories: shows a positive 
feeling for another person or country; shows a reaction to a separation or disruption of a 
relationship; represents companionate activities; shows nurturing acts. In line with the 
general thrust of the existing literature (Hermann 1980, 1984) my basic hypothesis is that 
individuals exhibiting a high need for affiliation will be less likely than others to support 
conflictual activities as they are likely to harm interpersonal relations between the parties 
involved. However, it should also be noted that previous research (Winter 1993) does 
suggest a certain type of situation in which a high need for affiliation may make leaders 
more conflictual. When a leader is responding to an act of bad faith by another 
individual or state with whom they perceived themselves as having had a positive 
relationship, a higher need for affiliation may make it more likely that they will respond 
with higher levels of conflict as they may feel a heightened sense of betrayal.
Strategy (Operational Code Instrumental Index I)
A leader’s approach to goals conveys his or her beliefs about the most successful 
way to achieve their aims. It is their basic strategic orientation — their preferred means 
of acting in the political arena. This index shows whether a leader has a tendency toward
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cooperative or conflictual behavior by placing them on a cooperative-conflictual 
continuum. It is measured on the basis of attributions individuals makes about 
themselves and the groups with whom they identify. The index score equals the percent 
of actions attributed to the self that are positive or cooperative minus the percent of self 
attributions that are negative or conflictual. It varies between I (a completely 
cooperative orientation) and -1 (a completely conflictual orientation) (Walker, Schafer 
and Young 1998:180). I hypothesize that leaders with a more conflictual approach to 
goals, seeing conflictual strategies as possessing more utility than cooperative ones, will 
be more likely to support conflictual policy options.
Tactics (Operational Code Instrumental Index 2)
This index represents the tactics a leader prefers to utilize. While Strategy 
represents the basic direction of a leader’s preferred method of political interaction, 
Tactics is a measure of the intensity of this preferred orientation. This index is created 
by coding actions attributed to the self on a seven point conflict-cooperation scale. For 
example, verbal acts are considered to be less powerful indications of one’s preferred 
tactics than one’s physical actions (either cooperative or conflictual). The mean intensity 
of self attributions is then divided by three to create a scale ranging from -1 (most 
conflictual tactics) to I (most cooperative tactics) (Walker, Schafer and Young 
1998:180). I hypothesize that leaders who believe conflictual tactics are most effective 
will be most likely to support conflictual policy options.
Risk Orientation (Operational Code Instrumental Index 3)
This characteristic represents the variety of categories o f action an individual uses 
in interacting with fee political world around them. Decision makers who rely on only a
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few categories of action as they attempt to achieve their goals are considered to be risk 
acceptant. They are opening themselves up to the risks that attend relatively predictable 
behavior. Those decision makers who use a wide variety of categories of action in their 
dealings are considered to be more risk averse. This index equals I minus the Index of 
Qualitative Variation for self-attributions (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998:180). See 
the Political Future index for a definition of the Index of Qualitative Variation. This 
scale varies between 0 and 1. The higher a decision maker’s number on this scale, the 
more predictable and risk-acceptant they are. I hypothesize that more predictable, 
risk-acceptant decision makers will be more likely than others to support cooperative 
policy options. I do this as I believe that in their comments about their own political 
actions, leaders of Western countries in the late twentieth century will tend to stress their 
good relations with other states and their desire for cooperative actions when discussing 
world affairs. It seems much more likely that individuals who rely on only a few 
categories o f behavior will rely on cooperative categories more than on conflictual 
categories. I expect pursuing conflict to be the exception to the general course of 
events. Therefore I expect individuals who use a wide variety of types of action in world 
affairs, including both types of cooperation and types of conflict, are more likely than the 
average decision maker in my sample to have a preference for conflictual policy options. 
Political Universe (Operational Code Philosophical Index I)
This variable informs us whether a leader thinks the political universe is 
fundamentally cooperative, fundamentally conflictual, or where it fits on a 
cooperative-conflictual continuum if it is between those two poles. The index used to 
measure this variable is based upon the frequency and intensity o f verbs used by the
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speaker attributing others with particular actions. The scale is the percentage of verbs 
attributed to a person or group with whom the speaker does not identify that have a 
positive or cooperative connotation minus the percentage of verbs attributed to a person 
or group with whom the speaker does not identify that have a negative or conflictual 
connotation (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998:178). I hypothesize that individuals who 
see their universe as fundamentally conflictual will see little utility in pursuing 
cooperative policy options since other actors will probably not reciprocate them. 
Therefore, those who see the political universe as conflictual will be more likely to 
advocate conflictual international policies than those who see the political universe in a 
more cooperative light.
Optimism (Operational Code Philosophical Index 2)
This variable reflects an individual’s fundamental optimism or pessimism about 
the course of political events. It represents how likely an individual thinks it is that he or 
she will be able to achieve his or her basic political goals. This index is based on the 
mean intensity of cooperation and conflict attributed to others in the political universe. 
This is done as the chances for securing one’s goals in a political setting are affected by 
the level of conflict or cooperation exhibited by other actors in one’s political 
environment. Transitive verbs representing actions taken by “others” are scaled on a 
seven point index (-3 to +3). The mean attribution is divided by three to achieve an 
optimism/pessimism score between I and -1 (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998:178). I 
hypothesize that those who are more pessimistic about realizing their values will be more 
likely to turn to the use o f force as they see others around them engaging in negative, 
conflictual acts.
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Political Future (Operational Code Philosophical Index 3)
This variable represents an individual’s belief about the stability of the course of 
future political events. Does one face a world filled with constant change, or does one 
face a world in which events occur in a predictable fashion? To study this belief we 
observe the variety of acts an individual attributes to other political actors. If someone 
sees others only performing a few types of actions their behavior is considered to be 
somewhat constant and therefore rather predictable. However, if someone attributes 
other political actors with taking many different types of actions this suggests that they 
see the world as relatively uncertain and unpredictable. The index used to measure this 
characteristic equals I minus the Index of Qualitative Variation for other-attributions. 
“The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of the number of different pairs of 
observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a 
distribution with the same N (number of cases) and the same number of variable 
classifications” (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998:179). The index varies between “0”, a 
highly unpredictable future, and “ I” a highly predictable future. I hypothesize that 
decision makers who see the world as a more predictable place will be more likely to 
support cooperative policy options. The development o f closer ties and cooperative 
operations between states is to some degree dependent upon building common bonds of 
trust (Ostrom 1998). The development o f such relationships is likely to be contingent 
upon following and building faith in certain patterns of behavior that are likely to be 
easier to maintain and observe in a more predictable world. Therefore I hypothesize that 
decision makers will be more cooperative in a predictable world that facilitates the 
building of bonds of trust and shared norms between states.
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Control (Operational Code Philosophical Index 4)
This variable represents the degree to which a leader believes he can control 
historical development, specifically, political events. So we should expect that 
individuals who attribute most political action to themselves believe that they have more 
control over the development of history than individuals who attribute most political 
actions to others. Therefore, this index is measured according to the ratio o f actions 
attributed to the self to actions attributed to others. The index equals the number of self 
attributions divided by the sum of self attributions plus other attributions. It varies 
between I and 0. Higher numbers connote the perception of having greater control over 
historical development (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998:179). I hypothesize that 
leaders who see themselves as having more control over historical development will be 
less likely to employ force to settle disputes than other leaders. Seeing themselves as 
controlling their surroundings they may be less likely to fear other political actors and 
feel the need to resort to the use o f force to defend their positions and interests. This 
belief may be inversely related to a decision maker’s need for power. Earlier work has 
shown that leaders who have a high need for power, a need to maintain control over 
their surroundings, are more aggressive than others (Winter 1973, 1987). So we may 
accept those who perceive themselves as having already secured such control may have 
less o f  a proclivity to turn to conflictual action to achieve their goals.
Chance (Operational Code Philosophical Index 5)
This characteristic represents the degree to which an individual believes that the 
world around them is the product o f chance. This variable is of course related to the two 
preceding variables as the role of chance is a fimcrionofthe predictability of events and
i!
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one’s control over one’s environment. The index score is created by subtracting the 
product of the Political Future and Control indices from 1. Scores vary between 0 and I 
with higher scores showing that an individual attributes chance with a greater role in the 
shaping of events. I hypothesize that decision makers who attribute a greater role to 
chance will be more likely than others to support conflictual policy options as they will 
seemingly be less trustful of others upholding the norms and agreements that exist 
between states that ameliorate international relations.
Control Variables
While the variables representing fundamental psychological characteristics of the 
political leaders charged with making decisions on official state policy are the matters of 
primary interest in this analysis, they are not expected to account for all of the variance in 
the dependent variables. The following variables are also included in my models to 
control for the effects of other influences that shape the preferences of individual 
derision makers and official state policy.
Country o f the Decision Maker
t hypothesize that decision makers from certain states will be more likely than 
others to rely upon the use o f force to achieve their political goals. Therefore I test three 
dichotomous variables to see if being from a particular country in my sample makes 
decision makers and their states more likely to pursue particular policies. I hypothesize 
that Israelis and Americans will be more likely to support conflictual policies. I do this 
because o f the relatively weak geopolitical position o f Israel and the targe military force 
that American leaders have at their disposal. I hypothesize that British leaders will be
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more likely to support less conflictual policy options given that country’s lack of an 
equivalent military force that can be used to achieve its goals.
Level of Provocation
This variable represents the seriousness of the action taken by a state’s opponent. 
It is hypothesized that the more serious the action taken against a state, the more likely it 
is that a state’s leaders will respond by supporting conflictual foreign policy options.
This variable is scored using a 1-5 scale. “I” represents a negative diplomatic action, for 
example denouncing an action taken by another state. “2” represents a violation of 
international norms. “3” represents an attack against an ally of a state. “4” represents a 
military buildup that threatens a state. “5” represents a direct military attack on a 
country 
Threat Level
The degree of commitment a leader or state is likely to make to a particular 
course of action is likely to be affected by the nature of the stakes at issue. Therefore the 
type of threat a state faces is included as another control variable. It is coded on a three 
point scale, “ I” representing a threat to peripheral interests, “2” representing a threat to 
strategic interests, and “3” representing a threat to vital interests, t hypothesize that 
support for conflictual policies is positively related to higher levels of threat. Leaders are 
likely to be more willing to take the risks involved in engaging in international conflict if 
they perceive the situation at hand as particularly dire.
Type of Post (Diplomatic, Military)
While the bureaucratic politics approach to the study of political decision malang 
(AIBson 1971) has received a considerable amount of criticism (Art 1973; Bendor and
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Hammond 1992; Krasner 1971; Rhodes 1994), it remains influential with even strong 
criticisms of it still finding the basic concept behind it compelling enough to merit further 
investigation (Welch 1992). Given that, two control variables are included in the model 
to represent the type of post decision-makers occupy. This is done to account for 
influences that leaders may feel from the segment o f the government they represent to 
promote policy options that give their segment of the government the primary role in 
addressing international disputes. That is, I hypothesize that officials representing 
diplomatic interests will likely promote more cooperative tactics, policies they would be 
in charge of implementing, and leaders representing the military will be more likely to 
promote conflictual options that they would be in charge of implementing. While the 
argument that such bureaucratic influences will be more important in decisions made by 
the middle-level of the government (Rosati 1981) may well be true, “such conflicts can 
occur at any level of the political system and in high, as well as low, salience policy 
contexts” (Hart and Preston 1997:7). So two dummy variables are included in the 
model: Diplomatic Post (coded “1” for those representing a foreign office and “0” for 
others) and Military Post (coded “I” for those representing a defense ministry or military 
force and “0” for others).
Information Processing.
There is a good deal o f evidence that the manner in which a group operates 
affects the policies it produces. Particularly prominent in this regard is the literature 
associated with the groupthink research program. While originally focused upon the 
potential detrimental effects o f tendencies toward concurrence-seeking that often 
develop within groups in an effort to maintain a collegial atmosphere (Jam's 1972,1982),
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the scope of this research has expanded and now it focuses upon a wider set of issues 
involving the quality of decision-making. One common finding in this broader research 
(Haney 1997; Herek, Jam's and Huth 1987; Schafer and Crichlow 1998) is that the 
quality of information processing significantly affects the outcomes that result. As many 
of the “errors” often found in information processing, such as biases toward particular 
types of information and stereotyping of the process or others involved in it, can 
exacerbate stress and feelings of ill will toward others during decision-making, I 
hypothesize that one of the outcomes o f poor information processing is to make leaders 
more likely to adopt conflictual policy options when they come together to set official 
state policy. Schafer and Crichlow’s (1998) quantitative study of the process-outcome 
connection in foreign policy decision-making during the last quarter of the twentieth 
century has already provided some support for this hypothesis.
This control variable is scaled from 0-7 depending upon the number of potential 
errors that are present during the decision-making process. The list of potential errors is 
derived from Schafer and Crichlow (1998) and is based upon the work of a variety of 
scholars concerned with the quality o f decision-making (George 1980; Haney 1997; Hart 
1990; Herek, Jam’s and Huth 1987; Jam’s 1982; Jervis 1976; Khong 1992; Thomson 
1994). It includes: poor information search, biased information processing, survey of 
objectives, survey of alternatives, stereotype of situation, stereotype of out-group, and 
pressures toward uniformity. After reviewing case-study material on each decision event 
the case is coded by aggregating the total number o f errors that occurred during the 
decision-making process.
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It should be noted that I only include this variable in models aimed at explaining 
the official policy a state adopts. 1 do not include it in models aimed at explaining 
individual decision makers1 initial policy preferences as these exist prior to the onset of 
the final stage of decision making. Hence they should not be affected by problems that 
occur during that stage of decision making.
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CHAPTER 3
PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND POLICY PREFERENCES
In this chapter I focus upon information that can be gleaned from a data set of 
the personal characteristics of 55 key individuals, including both national executive 
leaders and their top advisors, involved in setting national policy during 16 cases of 
decision. In particular, I am interested in the impact that the twelve psychological 
characteristics discussed in the preceding chapter had on their policy preferences. Did 
these characteristics affect the propensities o f decision makers to favor cooperative or 
conflictual policy options when facing challenges to their interests in the international 
arena? If so, by showing that such relationships exist across a varied sample of decision 
makers facing a wide variety o f policy decisions, including not only national executive 
leaders, but also the policy preferences o f their senior advisors, these analyses will 
strengthen the argument that world politics is partially a function of the individuals who 
make foreign policy decisions. That is, that national policies are not solely the product 
of rational calculations of by a unitary state trying to maximize its interests, but reflect 
the predisposition, beliefs and emotional needs of the individuals who act in the name of 
the state.
As I am hypothesizing that psychological characteristics have important 
influences on political behavior, I am primarily interested in determining whether or not 
such effects exist. However, I am also interested in improving our knowledge of the 
nature o f  these effects. Therefore I also conduct analyses aimed at better understanding 
what variables may affect decision makers’ psychological characteristics, and how these
50
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
characteristics fit together and are related to one another. Toward that end, after 
sections in which examine the psychological characteristic variables and their impact on 
the personal policy preferences of decision maker, I conduct analyses investigating 
whether or not there were cross-national differences between the psychological 
characteristics of decision makers. Additionally, I investigate the differences between the 
psychological characteristics o f decision makers who held diplomatic offices and those 
who represented the military branch of government.
Variable Characteristics
I begin this analysis by first examining the key data, my measurements of the 
psychological characteristics o f the decision makers included in the study. Given the 
central role that this data has in the following analyses I first present a few descriptive 
statistics in order to provide the reader with some basic information about these 
variables. These statistics are provided in Table 3.1.
Looking over the results posted in Table 3.1 we quickly leam a number of things 
about the decision makers included in my sample. For example, it appears clear that as a 
group they preferred to employ cooperative strategies and tactics. They appear to have 
been a largely risk-averse group. The believed that the political universe in which they 
acted was neither very cooperative nor very conflictual. Instead these decision makers 
saw it as essentially neutral. Similarly, these decision makers were not especially 
optimistic or pessimistic about achieving their political goals. While they tended to see 
the world as unpredictable with chance having a major impact on world events, they 
nonetheless saw themselves as having a considerable influence on historical development.
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Table 3 .1 Descriptive Statistics o f Measurements of the Psychological 
Characteristics of Decision Makers
Psychological Characteristic Mean Std. Deviation
Need for Affiliation .450 .162
Distrust .225 .160
Conceptual Complexity 639 059
Need for Power .270 .104
Strategy, OCI1 .480 .321
Tactics, OCI2 .337 .238
Risk Orientation, OCD .142 .079
Political Universe, OCPI -.013 .311
Optimism, QCP2 .042 .315
Political Future, OCP3 .143 .113
Control, OCP4 .679 .087
Chance, OCP5 .900 .089
Note: N=55
As t do not have other groups of decision makers to compare them against, one 
should be somewhat wary of attributing these scores with too much importance. This 
especiaUy holds true of the four characteristics that are not part of the operational code 
literature. While the operational code measures are designed in such a way as to ascribe 
particular meanings to specific scores, it is more difficult to infer such meanings from the 
raw data on Hermann’s (1987b) personality trait measures. Nonetheless, taken as a 
whole these scores would seem to imply that the sample o f decision makers included in 
this analysis saw themselves as having the ability to shape a potentially malleable world 
in ways that fit with their interests and priorities. With this general perception of the 
world one would think that there is certainly room for the possibility that these decision 
makers may be affected by their own beliefs and internal drives when setting official 
policy for their respective governments.
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I proceed by reviewing another aspect of these variables’ attributes. Before 
delving into the effects that the psychological characteristics o f decision makers have on 
their policy preferences, it is appropriate to consider their relationships to one another, 
and to the other variables I use to investigate the causes of foreign policy preferences. If 
any o f these variables are too closely correlated with one another it would be improper 
to place them in regression equations together. This information is also useful in that 
seeing which variables are significantly correlated with one another lends us useful 
information that can add to our understanding of the exact nature of these variables. 
Correlation of course does not prove causation. These results will not tell us the reasons 
for the relationships that exist. But if these variables fit together in ways that match my 
hypotheses that would lend support for their validity as measures of decision makers’ 
characteristics. In the following four tables, 3 .2-3 .5 ,1 present matrices that show how 
closely the variables I use later in this chapter to represent various personal 
characteristics o f individual decision makers are correlated with one another.
Looking over the results posted in Table 3.2 we see that in most cases the 
personality traits are related to the other independent variables in ways that match my 
hypotheses. Need for affiliation, a core desire for maintaining close, friendly 
relationships with others, is significantly correlated with nine other variables. Those 
decision makers who had a high need for affiliation were likely to show low levels of 
distrust and a low need for power. They were likely to favor the use o f cooperative 
strategies and tactics and be highly risk-acceptant. They were likely to see the nature of 
the political universe as fundamentally cooperative and be optimistic about achieving
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their basic political goals. Additionally those with a high need for affiliation were more 
likely to hold diplomatic posts than military posts.
Table 3.2 Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Personality Traits
Variable Need for
Affiliation
Need for Affiliation 1.000
Distrust -.450**
Conceptual Complexity . 124
Need for Power -.498**
Strategy, OCIl .774**
Tactics, OCI2 .736**
Risk Orientation, OCI3 .609**
Political Universe, OCPI .422**
Optimism, OCP2 .449**
Political Future, OCP3 .107
Control, OCP4 .068
Chance, OCP5 -. 116
USA Decision Maker .065
British Decision Maker .000
Israeli Decision Maker -.084
Diplomatic Post 298*
Military Post -.672**
Note: N=55. ** = significant at the .01 
(2 -tailed).
Distrust Conceptual Need for
Complexity Power
-.450** .124 -498**
1 .0 0 0 -.228 .529**
-228 1 .0 0 0 -015
.529** -.015 1 .0 0 0
-.412** .187 -.477**
-.397** .172 _4 9 4 **
-.288* .049 -.523**
-.696** .068 -.367**
-.625** .008 -315*
-.143 -.050 -.225
-.370** .071 -.195
.195 .029 .254
-.378** .520** - 0 1 2
.033 -.319* - .0 0 1
4 5 4 ** -.373** .016
-.255 044 -346**
.377** n o 428**
(2-tailed). * = significant at the .05 level
Decision makers’ level of distrust, their level of wariness and misgivings about 
other political actors, was significantly correlated with eleven other variables. More 
distrustful decision makers tended to have a high need for power and a low need for 
affiliation. They tended to support conflictual strategies and tactics and be wary of 
taking risks. They tended to believe that the political universe is fundamentally 
conflictual and were pessimistic about achieving their political goals. They were likely to 
view themselves as having limited control over the course of political affairs. More
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distrustful decision makers were more likely than others to hold military posts in 
government and be Israeli. Americans were less distrustful than the other decision 
makers included in my sample.
Conceptual complexity was not significantly correlated with any of the other 
psychological characteristics. However, the results show that decision makers in 
different countries differed on this scale. American decision makers had higher levels of 
conceptual complexity than Israeli and British decision makers. This discrepancy is one 
of the few instances in which decision makers from different countries have significant 
differences between their psychological characteristic scores.
The results presented in Table 3 .2 for need for power, decision makers’ need to 
have control over others, show that it is related to nine other variables. Decision makers 
with a high need for power were more likely than others to have a low need for 
affiliation and high levels of distrust. They tended to support conflictual strategies and 
tactics and to be risk-averse. They tended to see the political universe as fundamentally 
conflictual, and they tended to be pessimistic about achieving their political goals. They 
also were more likely to hold military posts in government, and were less likely to hold 
diplomatic posts.
Turning to the results reported in Table 3.3 we see that decision makers’ 
preferred strategy was correlated with eight other variables. Those who favored 
cooperative strategies tended to have a high need for affiliation, and low levels of 
distrust and need for power. They were likely to support cooperative tactics and be risk- 
acceptant. They tended to see the political universe as a fundamentally cooperative 
place, and they were likely to be optimistic about realizing their political goals. Those
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Table 3.3 Pearson Correlation Coefficients of the 
Operational Code’s Instrumental Indices
Variable Strategy Tactics Risk Orientation
OCI1 OCI2 OCI3
Need for Affiliation .774** .736** .609**
Distrust -.412** -.397** .288*
Conceptual Complexity .187 .172 .049
Need for Power -.477** _494** -.523**
Strategy, OCT1 1 .0 0 0 .943** .725**
Tactics, OCI2 .943** 1 .0 0 0 .624**
Risk Orientation, OCI3 .725** .624** 1 .0 0 0
Political Universe, OCP1 .443** .353** .327*
Optimism, OCP2 .457** 359** 410**
Political Future, OCP3 .215 .162 .366**
Control, OCP4 .198 .217 .028
Chance, OCP5 -.234 -.184 .365**
USA Decision Maker .119 .099 .026
British Decision Maker -.023 -.089 -.076
Israeli Decision Maker -.131 -.045 .037
Diplomatic Post .294* .268* 209
Military Post -.593** -630** -408**
Note: N=55. ** = significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). * = significant at the 05 level 
(2 -tailed).
decision makers who favored cooperative strategies were more likely than others to hold 
diplomatic posts and less likely to hold military posts. Given the extremely close 
relationship between strategy and tactics (Pearson’s coefficient .943), an expected result 
given the way that these two variables are measured, it is not surprising that the 
relationships between decision makers’ preferred tactics and the other personal 
characteristics essentially mirrored the relationships between their strategy and those 
characteristics.
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Decision makers who had a high risk orientation score, those who were more risk 
acceptant, tended to have a high need for affiliation, a low need for power, and to be less 
distrustful than other decision makers. They tended to favor the use of cooperative 
strategies and tactics. They tended to see the political universe as fundamentally 
cooperative and to be optimistic about achieving their political goals. They tended to see 
the world as basically predictable with chance playing a relatively small role in foreign 
policy. These people also tended not to hold military posts in the government.
Table 3.4 Pearson Correlation Coefficients of the 
Operational Code’s Philosophical Indices
Variable Political Optimism Political Control Chance
Universe
OCPl
OCP2 Future
OCP3
OCP4 OCP5
Need for Affiliation .422** .449** .107 .068 -.116
Distrust -.696** -.625** -.143 -.370** .195
Conceptual Complexity .068 .008 -.050 .071 .029
Need for Power -.367** -.315* -.225 -.195 .254
Strategy, OCI1 .433** .457** 215 198 -234
Tactics, OCI2 .353** .359** .162 .217 -.184
Risk Orientation, OCI3 .327* .410** .366* .028 -.365**
Political Universe, OCPl 1 .0 0 0 .911** .226
«»1 "< 
O
O -.266*
Optimism, OCP2 .911** 1 .0 0 0 .245 .224 -.284*
Political Future, OCP3 .226 .245 1 .0 0 0 .330* -.986**
Control, OCP4 .281* .224 .330* 1 .0 0 0 - 444**
Chance, OCP5 -.266 -.284* -.986** _444** 1 .0 0 0
USA Decision Maker .087 .038 .014 .136 -.034
British Decision Maker .061 .050 -.130 .170 .092
Israeli Decision Maker -.168 -.095 . 1 0 2 -.330* -.041
Diplomatic Post 266* 263 .044 - . 1 0 1 -048
Military Post -.308* -.326* -036 063 042
Note: N=55. ** = significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). * = significant at the .05 level 
(2 -tailed).
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Looking over the results reported in Table 3.4 we see that the philosophical 
indices of the operational code generally fit together with other variables in ways that 
match my hypotheses. The way that decision makers viewed the political universe was 
significantly correlated with eleven other variables. Those who saw it as basically 
cooperative tended to have a high need for affiliation, a low distrust score, and a high 
need for power. They tended to support cooperative strategies and tactics and be 
risk-acceptant. They were optimistic about achieving their political goals. They saw 
themselves as having considerable control over the course of history, and attributed 
relatively little power to the role of chance. They were more likely than others to hold 
diplomatic posts, and they were less likely than others to hold military posts.
Optimism is extremely closely correlated with political universe (Pearson’s 
coefficient score of .911) so the results for these two variables are quite similar. 
However, there are two notable differences. More optimistic decision makers did not 
vary from others in the sample in terms of their belief in their ability to control events. 
Also, they were no more likely than others to hold diplomatic posts.
The political future variable is only significantly correlated with three variables. 
Two of these are very predictable. Decision makers who tend to see the world as 
predictable are more likely to see themselves as having a high degree of control over the 
development of history, and are likely to attribute little influence to chance. The other 
relationship is perhaps more interesting. Decision makers who tend to see the world as 
predictable are more likely to be risk-acceptant. If you remember, both o f these 
variables are basically measures o f the variety o f types o f actions one takes in world 
affairs. However, one (the Risk Orientation variable) focuses on actions taken by the
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self, while the other (the Political Future variable) focuses on actions taken by others.
So the variety of categories of action a decision maker is willing to take when interacting 
with the world around them is related to the number of categories of action employed by 
other political actors.
Control is significantly related to five other variables. Decision makers who 
viewed themselves as having a particularly high degree of control over their environment 
were less distrustful than other decision makers. They relied more upon cooperative 
strategies. Also, they were more risk-acceptant, perhaps being less fearful of the 
consequences of risks since they believed that they had great control over the outcomes 
that would result from their policy choices. Predictably, they viewed chance as having a 
relatively small effect in shaping their political world. Finally, Israelis were less likely 
than other decision makers to view themselves as having control over the course of 
historical development. This is not surprising given the unusual pressures affecting 
Israeli foreign relations during this time period.
Finally, decision makers’ view of the role of chance was significantly correlated 
with five other variables. Those who attributed chance with large impact in shaping the 
world around them were likely to be less risk-acceptant than other decision makers.
They were also likely to view the political world as being a relatively conflictual place, 
and to be pessimistic about achieving their core goals. They were more likely to see the 
world as unpredictable, and to believe that they have relatively little control over 
historical development.
Table 3.5 deals with the five control variables that are personal characteristics of 
the decision makers in my sample. These results show some connections between these
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Table 3.5 Pearson Correlation Coefficients o f Decision Makers’ Characteristics
Used as Control Variables
Variable USA British Israeli Diplomatic Military
Decision Decision Decision Post Post
Maker Maker Maker
Need for Affiliation .065 . 0 0 0 -.084 .298* -.672**
Distrust -.378** .033 .454** -.255 .377**
Conceptual Complexity .520** -.319* -.373** 044 1 1 0
Need for Power - . 0 1 2 - .0 0 1 016 -346** .428**
Strategy, OCII .119 -023 -.131 .294* -.593**
Tactics, OCI2 .099 -.089 -.045 .268* -.630**
Risk Orientation, OCI3 .026 -.076 .037 .209 -.408**
Political Universe, OCPl .087 .061 -.168 266* -308*
Optimism, OCP2 .038 050 -.095 263 -326
Political Future, OCP3 .014 -.130 . 1 0 2 .044 -.036
Control, OCP4 .136 .170 -.330* - . 1 0 1 .063
Chance, OCP5 -034 .092 -.041 -.048 042
USA Decision Maker 1 .0 0 0 -.632** -.700** -059 064
British Decision Maker -.632** 1 .0 0 0 - 1 1 1 .062 -.027
Israeli Decision Maker -.700** -.III 1 .0 0 0 .018 -.057
Diplomatic Post -059 .062 .018 1 .0 0 0 -.372**
Military Post 064 -.027 -.057 -372** 1 .0 0 0
Note: N=55. ** = significant at the .0 1  level (2-tafled). * = significant at the 05 level 
(2 -tailed).
individuals’ nationalities and their psychological characteristics, but there appear to be 
more linkages between the roles they fill in government and their psychological 
characteristics.
[sraelis had higher levels o f distrust than the other individuals in my sample, while 
Americans had lower levels of distrust. Americans were more conceptually complex 
than the British and Israeli officials in my sample. Israelis perceived themselves as 
having less control over the course o f historical development than the other decision 
makers in my sample.
I
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Those holding diplomatic posts in government had higher levels of need for 
affiliation, favored more cooperative strategies and tactics, and saw the political universe 
as fundmentally more cooperative than others in my sample. Additionally, they had 
lower needs for power. Those holding military posts in government had lower needs for 
affiliation, higher needs for power, and were more distrustful of others than other 
decision makers. They favored more conflictual strategies and tactics, they were less 
willing to take risks, and they were more likely to see the political universe as 
fundamentally conflictual than other decision makers.
Psychological Characteristics and Personal Policy Preferences
I begin my investigation of the effects of leaders’ psychological characteristics on 
state behavior by focusing first on the relationship between these characteristics and 
decision makers’ personal policy preferences. In order to ascertain whether or not the 
psychological characteristics of key individuals affect their support for particular policy 
options, I first test for the presence o f significant bivariate relationships between the 
psychological characteristic variables and decision makers’ preferences. In these 
analyses I separately test the effect that each of the psychological characteristics had on 
the policy preferences of the individual decision makers in my sample. I include the 
direction of the hypothesized effect after the name of the independent variable. I 
continue to do this throughout the remainder of the analyses in this project in which I 
hypothesize a variable will have a directional effect in order to make it easier to interpret 
the tables. The results of these tests are displayed in Table 3.6 .
Glancing over the results, we quickly see that at least before the influence of 
other variables is controlled for there seems to be noticeable support for the position that
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Table 3.6 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Psychological 
Characteristics on Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Psychological Characteristic B/Std. Error prob. ( 1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+) 2.301/3.815 .275
Distrust (-) -5.817/3.745 .063
Conceptual Complexity (+) 5.590/10.459 .298
Need for Power (-) -10.780/5.749 033
Strategy, OCll (+) .716/1.911 .355
Tactics, OCI2 (+) .141/2.583 479
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) 13.380/7.535 041
Political Universe, OCPl (+) 2.529/1.945 1 0 0
Optimism, OCP2 (+) 1.232/1.944 265
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 9.868/5.249 033
Control, OCP4 (+) 19.638/6.513 . 0 0 2
Chance, OCP5 (-) -14.599/6.647 016
Note: N=55.
the psychological characteristics of key decision makers affect their policy preferences.
Of the twelve psychological characteristics tested, seven are significantly related to 
decision makers’ policy preferences. Decision makers who are more distrustful of others 
were more likely to support conflictual policy options. Decision makers who had a 
higher need for power were more likely to support more conflictual policy options. 
Decision makers who were more willing to take risks were more likely than others to 
support cooperative policy options. Decision makers who saw the nature of politics as 
fundamentally conflictual were more likely than others to support conflictual policy 
options. Decision makers who saw the world around them as highly predictable were 
more likely than others to support cooperative policy options. Decision makers who saw 
themselves as having greater control over the development of the world around them 
were more likely to support cooperative policy options. Decision makers who saw the
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development o f the world around them as being strongly affected by chance were more 
likely than others to support conflictual policy options. Five psychological 
characteristics were not found to have significantly affected decision makers policy 
preferences during the decision events included in my sample. These included decision 
makers’ need for affiliation, conceptual complexity, the prospects of achieving their 
political values, their preferred strategy and their preferred tactics. While none of these 
variables had a significant effect, in every case the coefficient had the hypothesized sign.
I also conducted bivariate regression analyses testing whether or not the control 
variables hypothesized to affect decision makers’ policy preferences did in fact affect 
those preferences. The results of these tables are seen in Table 3.7.
Table 3 .7 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Control Variables 
on Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Control Variables B/Std. Error prob. ( 1-tailed)
USA Decision Maker .555/1.520 .359
British Decision Maker 2.232/2.095 146
Israeli Decision Maker -2.811/1.914 .074
Diplomatic Post 1.038/1.309 216
Military Post 925/1.427 260
Level of Provocation -U73/.429 005
Threat Level -I.872/.745 .008
Note: N=55.
Three o f these variables had a significant effect. T found that Israeli decision 
makers were more likely than others to support conflictual policy options. Decision 
makers were more likely to support conflictual policies if their opponent had taken an 
especially serious, provocative action. Finally, decision makers were more likely to
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support conflictual policy preferences if the action taken by their opponent resulted in a 
high threat to national interests. Being British or American did not significantly affect a 
decision maker’s tendency to support cooperative or conflictual policy options. Whether 
a decision maker held a post in a military or diplomatic organization also did not 
significantly affect their tendency to support cooperative or conflictual policy options.
While these results are instructive and give us valuable insights into the impact of 
particular influences on the policy preferences of decision makers, to determine the true 
impact of these influences on the beliefs and behaviors of key political leaders the effects 
o f other variables must be controlled for. Therefore, I next conducted multivariate 
regression analyses to further explore the impact of the psychological characteristics of 
leaders on the policies they supported.
In the first of these analyses I tested all of the psychological characteristics that I 
earlier found to have significant individual effects on decision makers policy preferences 
together in two multivariate models. In the first of these I excluded the third 
philosophical operational code index, the predictability o f the political future, and in the 
second I excluded the fifth operational code index, the effect of the role of chance. I ran 
these separate tests because those two variables are highly correlated. The results of 
these analyses are displayed in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. In both o f these tests only one o f the 
psychological characteristics, an individual’s belief in their ability to control historical 
development, is found to be a significant predictor o f decision makers’ policy 
preferences. In both analyses decision makers who believed they had greater control 
over the development of the world around them were more likely than other decision 
makers to support cooperative policy options.
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Table 3.8 Multivariate Regression Analysis: The Effects of Psychological 
Characteristics on Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Psychological Characteristic B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Distrust (-) .575/5.719 .460
Need for Power (-) -4.165/7.413 .289
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) 9.334/9.279 .160
Political Universe, OCPl (+) - 168/2.660 .475
Control, OCP4 (+) 17.667/8.061 .017
Chance, OCP5 (-) -2.946/7.994 .357
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=. 106. F statistical.068 (prob.= 075).
Table 3.9 Multivariate Regression Analysis: The Effects of Psychological
Characteristics on Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Psychological Characteristic B/Std. Error prob. ( 1-tailed)
Distrust (-) 571/5.714 461
Need for Power (-) -4.193/7.409 .287
Risk Orientation, OC13 (+) 9.304/9.259 .160
Political Universe, OCPl (+) -.160/2.656 .476
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 2.268/5.878 352
Control, OCP4 (+) 18.005/7 637 0 1 2
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square= 106. F statistica l^ ! (prob.= 074).
I next ran a similar set o f regression analyses. However, in these I tested not 
only the impact of the psychological characteristics of decision makers on their policy 
preferences but also three control variables, the seriousness of the opponent’s action, the 
level of stakes that are threatened during the decision-making event, and whether or not 
the decision maker was from Israel. Given that the variables measuring the seriousness 
of an opponent’s action and the variable representing the threat level are highly
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correlated I chose to test their impact in separate models. The results of these analyses 
are presented in Tables 3. 1 0  through 3.13.
Table 3.10 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining 
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. ( 1-tailed)
Distrust (-) 5.045/6.065 205
Need for Power (-) -7.433/7.109 .151
Risk Orientation, OCD (+) 8.760/8.551 .156
Political Universe, OCPl (+) 1.363/2.531 297
Control, OCP4 (+) 15.817/7.714 023
Chance, OCP5(-) -5.743/7.486 224
Level of Provocation (-) -1.312/424 . 0 0 2
Israeli Decision Maker (-) -607/2.195 392
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square= 244. F statistic=3.176 (prob.=.006).
Table 3.11 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob ( 1-tailed)
Distrust (-) 5.113/6.073 . 2 0 2
Need for Power (-) -7.487/7.123 150
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) 9.065/8.550 .148
Political Universe, OCPl (+) 1.402/2.533 292
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 3.694/5.527 .254
Control, OCP4 (+) 16.799/7.325 013
Level of Provocation (-) -1.296/.424 . 0 0 2
Israeli Decision Maker (-) -.619/2.210 391
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square= 241. F statistic=3.148 (prob.= 006).
As hypothesized, these analyses show that the level of provocation initiated by a 
state’s opponent had a very great deal to do with why decision makers in my sample 
preferred to respond to an event with either cooperative or aggressive action. However,
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Table 3.12 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tafled)
Distrust (-) 4.130/6.141 .253
Need for Power (-) -8.302/7.235 .129
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) 1.862/9.011 .419
Political Universe, OCPl (+) -.164/2.561 .475
Control, OCP4 (+) 16.337/7.831 . 0 2 2
Chance, OCP5 (-) -10.375/7.869 097
Threat Level (-) -2.294/.812 .004
Israeli Decision Maker (-) - 194/2.282 467
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square= 222. F statistic=2.925 (prob.= 010).
Table 3.13 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining 
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. ( 1-tailed)
Distrust (-) 4.254/6.152 .297
Need for Power (-) -8.391/7.257 .127
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) 2.334/8.975 398
Political Universe, OCPl (+) -.073/2.561 489
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 7.100/5.759 . 1 1 2
Control, OCP4 (+) 17.809/7.464 0 1 1
Threat Level (-) -2.232/.805 004
Israeli Decision Maker (-) -.277/2.294 .452
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.218. F statistic=2.885 (prob.= 0 n ).
this situational influence was not the only factor that shaped the policy preferences of 
individual decision makers. Even after controlling for the scale of an opponent’s action 
at least one of their psychological characteristics was strongly related to their policy 
preferences. Decision makers who perceived themselves as having control over the 
development of historical events were more likely to support cooperative foreign policy
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proposals than those who did not believe they have such an impact on events. While not 
statistically significant, it is worth noting that the Need for Power, Risk Orientation, 
Political Future and Chance variables neared significance and were in the expected 
direction in these models. However it appears that once other relevant variables were 
accounted for decision makers’ distrust o f others did not significantly affect their 
tendency to support cooperative or conflictual policy options. Neither did their 
perception of the fundamental nature of the political universe. Additionally, it appears 
that Israeli decision makers might not be as different from American and British leaders 
as they first appeared once other variables are controlled for.
But before we accept these results that seem to weaken the support for my 
hypothesis it is worth considering why these variables that at first seemed to have their 
own independent effect on decision makers’ preferences no longer appear to have such 
effects. Is it because the inclusion of a variable representing the impact that the nature of 
the move taken by a person’s opponent overwhelms the influence o f their own 
preexisting perceptions and needs? In other words, were decision makers’ responses 
shaped almost exclusively by the events that occurred around them? Or do some of these 
variables fail to attain significance simply because some of them are related to each other 
to a considerable degree and therefore including them together in the same model causes 
statistical problems that may understate their individual effects?
To get at this question I ran another set of regression models aimed at explaining 
the policy preferences of decision makers. In each of these analyses I only included two 
independent variables. In each case one of these was one o f the psychological 
characteristic variables that failed to reach th e . 1 0  significance threshold in the last set of
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regression analyses. The other variable was either Level of Provocation or Threat LeveL
I again ran separate analyses controlling for these two situational influences since these
variables are highly correlated. These tests show whether or not each of these
psychological characteristics had a significant effect on individuals’ policy preferences
after controlling for the seriousness of the action taken by one’s opponent and the nature
of the threat posed by the opponent. The results o f these analyses are displayed in
Tables 3.14-3.25.
Table 3.14 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining 
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Distrust (-) -5 044/3 564 082
Level of Provocation (-) - 1.123/ 427 006
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=. 123. Fstatistic=4 804(prob.=.0l2).
Table 3 .15 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining 
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Need for Power (-) -12.106/5.374 .015
Level of Provocation (-) -1.249/ 415 002
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=. 171. F statistic=6.556 (prob.=.003).
In ten of these twelve models the results o f these analyses show that even when 
an important situational factor is controlled for, these key psychological characteristics 
still had a significant effect on the policy preferences of decision makers. These results 
would certainly seem to bolster the argument that who makes a state’s foreign policy
i
!
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
Table 3.16 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Risk Orientation, OCB (+) 15.306/7.049 .017
Level of Provocation (-) -1.255/417 .002
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.165. F statistic=6.351 (prob.=.003).
Table 3.17 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining 
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Political Universe, OCPI (+) 2.946/1.828 057
Level of Provocation (-) -1227/ 424 003
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.l33. F statistic=5.l43 (prob = 009).
Table 3.18 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining 
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. ( I-tailed)
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 11.444/4.901 .012
Level of Provocation (-) -1.274/415 002
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.I76. F statistic=6.771 (prob.= 002).
decisions matters. Here we see that the policy preferences of decision makers, the 
preferences they took with them into the high level meetings where national policy was 
set, were partially a function of their beliefs and personality traits. This was found to be 
the case across a wide variety o f disputants and types of disagreement.
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Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Chance, OCP5 (-) -17.145/6.175 .004
Level of Provocation (-) -1.317/.408 001
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.207. F statistic=8.059 (prob = 001).
Table 3 .20 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining 
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (I-tailed)
Distrust (-) -3.980/3.708 144
Threat Level (-) -1.689/.763 016
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square= 092. F statistic=3 745 (prob.=030).
Table 3 .21 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining 
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (I-tailed)
Need for Power (-) -10.494/5.477 031
Threat Level (-) -1.843/ 727 007
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=. 133. Fstatistic=5.I55 (prob.= 009).
I conduct one final test before ending this section focusing on the effects that 
these variables have on policy preferences o f all the decision makers in my sample. 
Ideally, to investigate these relationships I would simply test all of the psychological 
characteristics together in a multivariate model. However, as the tables presented at the 
beginning of this chapter show, several o f these variables are highly correlated, and
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Table 3.22 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Risk Orientation, OCB (+) 10.609/7.360 .078
Threat Level (-) -1.255/.417 014
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.l08. F statistic=4.263 (prob.= 0l9).
Table 3 23 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining 
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Political Universe, OCPI (+) 1.820/1.892 168
Threat Level (-) -1.757/.754 012
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.089 F statistic=3.630 (prob.= 033).
Table 3 .24 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining 
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 12.980/4.964 006
Threat Level (-) -2.251/ 721 002
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.180. F statistic=6.926 (prob.=.002).
drawing conclusions from tests including several highly correlated variables is 
problematic. That is why up until now in this analysis I have relied on tests that include 
fewer independent variables. But given that a large multivariate test is ideal, it is 
appropriate to conduct one before leaving this section. The correlations between the 
independent variables require us to be wary of the results, but they are still informative.
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Table 3.25 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Chance, OCP5 (-) 
Threat Level (-)
-19.036/6.250 
-2.337/. 709
.002
001
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square= 213. F statistic=8.291 (prob. = 001)
In this model I include all but the most highly correlated variables. I exclude 
Tactics, Optimism and Chance given that they are exceptionally highly correlated with 
other psychological characteristics (Pearson’s correlation coefficients above 8 ). I also 
include a variety of control variables that I hypothesize will have a directional effect on 
decision makers’ policy preferences. These variables account for the impact o f the role 
pressures these decision makers face, their nationality, and situational factors that may 
affect decision makers’ preferences. The results o f this test are seen in Table 3.26.
The results of this test are somewhat interesting. One is likely to immediately 
notice what appear to be strong links between the tendencies of decision makers to rely 
upon cooperative or conflictual policy options, their level of risk acceptance, and their 
perception of their control over their surroundings. Of course these variables were 
found to have important effects earlier in this chapter. We also see that decision makers 
are more likely to favor more conflictual policies when they face an especially 
provocative move by an adversary, and that decision makers who hold diplomatic posts 
are more likely to favor cooperative policies. Additionally, the F statistic shows that the 
overall model has a significant effect However, other results point to serious problems
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Table 3 .26 Multivariate Regression Analysis: The Effects of Psychological 
Characteristics on Decision Makers’ Policy Preferences
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+■) -2.619/6.000
Distrust (-) 3.987/6.107 259
Conceptual Complexity (+) -.948/10.182 463
Need for Power (-) -8.400/7.016 119
Strategy, OCI1 (+) -7.015/3.289 0 2 0
Risk Orientation, OC13 (+) 25.389/11.700 .018
Political Universe, OCPl (+•) 1.348/2.620 .255
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 4.127/5.923 245
Control, OCP4 (+) 22.003/7.658 .004
Diplomatic Post (+) 1.901/1 245 068
Military Post (-) .390/1.867 .418
Israeli Nationality (-) 238/2.289 459
Information Processing Errors (-) -271/316 198
Level of Provocation (-) -982/581 050
Threat Level (-) -1.188/1 103 144
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=328. F statistic=2.759 (prob.= 006).
using this sort of multivariate analysis given the nature of my data. Though I excluded 
psychological characteristic variables that were exceptionally highly correlated with other 
psychological characteristic variables, my data set still includes variables that are 
significantly correlated with one another. Additionally, the small size of my sample limits 
my ability to find statistically significant relationships. These limitations make 
interpreting the results of this test highly problematic. They may also largely explain why 
several of these variables not only fail to achieve significance, but why some of them 
have signs that are opposite from those that were hypothesized. But despite its 
limitations it is still instructive to know that this model, the most comprehensive in this 
section investigating the link hetween decision makers’ psychological characteristics and
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policy preferences, is highly significant and explains over thirty percent o f the variation in 
the dependent variable.
How the Psychological Characteristics of Decision Units Affect Their Preferences
My analyses up to this point have focused upon my entire sample of 55 derision 
makers. However, in the next chapter I study the behaviors of three subsets o f this 
sample that come to the fore in different decision-making systems. Therefore, it may be 
instructive to know the degree to which this linkage between the psychological 
characteristics of decision makers and their personal policy preferences holds up in each 
of these decision units. It necessarily becomes more difficult to establish causal 
relationships within these subsets of derision makers as I lose many degrees if freedom in 
my models. However, before I investigate matters such as the effect that the policy 
preferences o f particular foreign policy makers have on state policy and the views of 
other derision makers, matters I study in the next chapter, it is appropriate to first 
investigate the factors that affect the policy preferences o f these derision units.
In examining how states make derisions I focus on three different 
derision-making units that may come to the fore in different policy-making situations 
The first of these is a situation in which foreign policy decision-making is guided by an 
active and interested national executive leader. The great majority of the research that 
has focused on political psychology and international affairs has dealt with how the 
psychological characteristics of national executive leaders, presidents and prime 
ministers, shape their countries’ foreign policies. This is, o f course, a sensible office to 
focus upon. As the chiefs o f their governments they have final power over how to direct 
their countries’ foreign policies. This would seem to be particularly true in marginally
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democratic or totalitarian states that are not subject to the limitations on executive 
power that exist in democracies. However, one may expect this to also often be the case 
in democracies as the influence of foreign threats gives leaders an unusual degree of 
freedom from domestic political concerns and other political rivals when choosing how 
to best pursue their nations’ interests (Hermann and Kegley 1995). In fact, democracies 
frequently “unleash foreign-policy actions before consulting popular representatives, and 
sometimes even after deliberately misleading them” (Merritt and Zinnes 199:227). And 
of course their institutional power is considerably greater than any other official who 
might wish to compete with them in their own government. As Morton Halperin 
(1974:17) has written of U.S. presidents, “His role and influence over decisions are 
qualitatively different from those of any other participant”. Given their broad power 
over foreign affairs, it is not surprising that previous literature in this area has found that 
presidents and prime ministers produce a personal imprint on their countries’ foreign 
affairs, with countries adopting policies that match the psychological needs and goals of 
their national executive leader.
However, a country’s foreign policy is not always set by its president or prime 
minister. In some governments presidents and prime ministers rely heavily on 
recommendations from their top advisors when choosing which policy options to pursue. 
In some cases they rely heavily on one particularly favored aide. This is frequently their 
Secretary of State or Foreign Minister, the cabinet official specifically charged with 
overseeing a government’s foreign policy. History is replete with instances of powerful 
Secretaries o f State and Foreign Ministers substantially shaping a state’s foreign policy 
from Talleyrand and Mettemich to Schuman and Kissinger.
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In other cases the national executive leader relies heavily on the advice of his or 
her top aides, but there is no single especially influential advisor. In these cases an 
advisory group composed of a number of decision makers often comes together to settle 
policy challenges and then pass their recommendations along to the president or prime 
minister. In several governments, for example the Clinton administration, key 
departmental decision makers were frequently given great leeway in setting policy 
options. On major issues they were often expected to deal with disputes among 
themselves and establish something at least close to a consensus before forcing the 
president to come to a decision on the topic. This type of decision-making arrangement 
may be due to an executive leader who favors a generally hands-off approach and 
delegates authority in all areas. It may be due to the president or prime minister 
preferring to concentrate on domestic affairs. Or it could be the result o f the president 
or prime minister lacking much experience in foreign affairs. Most national executive 
leaders are comfortable giving considerably responsibility their subordinates in setting 
national policy as they are likely to have appointed top aides with whom they share 
common beliefs, perceptions and ideas.
In investigating how the psychological characteristics of these decision units- 
affect their preferences I first conduct a series of bivariate regression analyses in which 
the independent variables are the presidents’ and prime ministers’ psychological 
characteristics and the dependent variable is the decision unit’s preferred policy option. 
While.it would perhaps have been preferable to test these variables together in 
multivariate models, I opted not to do that since the operational code instrumental 
indices, are highly correlated with one another. Several o f the-operational code
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highly correlated with one another as well. The results o f this set of analyses are
presented in Table 3.27.
Table 3.27 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f the Psychological 
Characteristics ofNational Executive Leaders on Their Personal Policy Preferences
Psychological Characteristics B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+) -.136/10.238 .495
Distrust (-) -4.763/9.302 309
Conceptual Complexity (+) 32.935/32.073 161
Need for Power (-) -9.397/16.929 294
Strategy, OCI (+) -1.214/5.514 .415
Tactics, OCT2 (+) -1.258/7 909 438
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) 18.638/19.942 183
Political Universe, OCP1 (+) -848/5.746 443
Optimism, OCP2 (+) -3.355/6.477 .307
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 12.890/22.086 285
Control, OCP4 (+) 33.541/15 925 027
Chance, OCP5 (-) -21.583/28.073 228
Note: N=16.
The results of this set of analyses show that once the data set is divided this way 
there appears to be less support for the proposition that the psychological characteristics 
of decision makers affect their policy preferences. Of course this may be heavily affected 
by the fact that there are far fewer degrees of freedom in these analyses than those in the 
previous chapter (sample size of 16 versus sample size of 55). But if one does not take 
that into account, most of the psychological characteristics of presidents and prime 
ministers that I measure do not strongly predict these leaders’ personal policy 
preferences.
The only variable that significantly affected the personal policy preferences of 
national executives was control. That this variable is significant is not surprising given
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the strong effect it was shown to have across the whole sample of decision makers in the
preceding chapter, even when controlling for the effects o f other psychological factors
and the seriousness of the action taken by a country’s opponent. Presidents and prime
ministers who saw themselves as having a high level o f control over historical
development were more likely than others to support cooperative policies. Additionally,
conceptual complexity approached significance in the hypothesized direction, so it seems
plausible to think that more complex leaders are indeed more likely to pursue
cooperative policy options.
This effect appears even weaker when the influence of other variables is
accounted for. I next tested whether on not a national executive leaders’ perception of
control continues to have a significant impact on their policy preferences when the
opponent’s action and the level of threat they face are controlled for. As you can see in
Tables 3.28 and 3 .29, this variable loses its significant effect when these influences are
included in my model.
[ next test whether or not the policy preferences of the advisory groups are
affected by their psychological characteristics. I do this by first computing the mean
scores of the president’s or prime minister’s advisors in a case. This includes all of the
Table 3.28 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Control and Level of 
Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences ofNational Executive Leaders
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Control, OCP4 (+) 15.976/16.745 .179
Level of Provocation (-) -1.795/.878 .031
Notp- M=lfi Adjusted R.-smiare= 337 F statistic=4.814 forob.= 0271-  -  — -  l '  -
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Table 3.29 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f  Control and Threat Level
on the Personal Policy Preferences o f  National Executive Leaders
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Control, OCP4 (+) 12.101/15.477 .244
Threat Level (-) -3.719/1.386 010
Note:N=16. Adjusted R-square=.436. Fstatistic=6.803 (prob.= 010).
individuals I coded during a decision-making event, excluding the national executive 
leader. The results of this series of bivariate analyses are reported in Table 3.30.
Once again we see only a few significant relationships. The only variable to 
significantly affect the personal policy preferences of advisory groups was need for 
affiliation. Those groups whose members had high needs for affiliation were more likely 
to support cooperative policy options. This effect is somewhat interesting given that
Table 3.30 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Advisory Group’s 
Psychological Characteristics on Their Mean Personal Policy Preference
Psychological Characteristics B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+) 12.344/5.726 025
Distrust (-) -4.920/7.001 247
Conceptual Complexity (+) 3.862/15.077 .401
Need for Power (-) -13.999/12.975 .150
Strategy, OCI (+) 2.668/3.680 .240
Tactics, OCT2 (+) 1.873/5.513 .370
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) 6.752/13.103 .307
Political Universe, OCP1 (+) 1.406/3.352 341
Optimism, OCP2 (+) -.575/3.110 .428
Political Future, OCP3 (+-) -3.406/12.351 .394
Control, OCP4 (+) 9.437/11.330 205
Chance, OCP5 (-) 2.265/17.693 450
N ote' N = 16
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need for affiliation did not have a significant effect on the individual policy preferences o f
the full sample of decision makers. It should be noted that need for power, which I
found to have a significant effect in the preceding analysis focused on national executive
leaders, nears significance in the expected direction in this model as well.
I next tested whether or not the advisory group’s need for affiliation maintained
its significant effect when situational variables were controlled for. As seen in Table
3.31, this variable still meets th e . 10 significance level when the nature o f the threat is
controlled for. It also approaches significance in the model controlling for the impact of
the opponent’s move, as seen in Table 3.32. Even in this analysis, in which attaining a
significant effect is difficult due to the small number of degrees of freedom, we see that
Table 3 31 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Need for Affiliation and 
Level of Provocation on the Mean Personal Policy Preferences of Advisory Groups
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+) 8.834/6.672 106
Level of Provocation (-) -619/580 155
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square= 166. F statistic=2.290 (prob. = 147).
Table 3.32 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Need for Affiliation and 
Threat Level on the Mean Personal Policy Preferences of Advisory Groups
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (I-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+) 
Threat Level (-)
12.110/8.342
.145/1.212
.087
.454
Note:N=I6 . Adjusted R-square= 080. Fstatistic=l.568(prob.= 252).
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advisory groups whose members seek out close relationships with others are more likely 
than other groups to advocate cooperative policy options.
The final decision unit I investigate here are the Foreign Ministers and Secretaries 
of State. Again, 1 conducted a series of bivariate regression analyses in which the 
psychological characteristics of this group of decision makers are the independent 
variables and their personal policy preferences are the dependent variables. The results 
of these analyses are displayed in Table 3.33.
Table 3.33 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Psychological 
Characteristics of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers on 
Their Personal Policy Preferences
Psychological Characteristics B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+) 10.587/10.091 156
Distrust (-) -13.369/7.097 .042
Conceptual Complexity (+) 751/20.998 486
Need for Power (-) -14.230/14.101 .165
Strategy, OCT (+) 7503/5.568 1 0 0
Tactics, 0CI2 (+) 10.623/10.692 .169
Risk Orientation, OCT3 (+) 14.514/15.774 .187
Political Universe, OCPl (+) 8.954/3.916 .019
Optimism, 0CP2 (+) 6.765/4.534 079
Political Future, OCP3 (+■) 55.334/14.339 . 0 0 1
Control, OCP4 (+) 31.677/10.137 .004
Chance, OCP5 (-) -75.664/15.658 . 0 0 0
Note: N=16.
Unlike the earlier analyses that make it appear that there is at best a weak link 
between the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders and advisory 
groups and their policy preferences, Table 3.33 shows that several o f the psychological 
characteristics o f  Secretaries o f State and. Foreign Ministers significantly affected their
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personal policy preferences. In ail, seven of these variables are significant at th e . 10 
level. This includes their levels of distrust, their preferred strategy, and all five of the 
operational code’s philosophical indices. People who held these positions and had higher 
levels o f distrust were more likely than others to favor conflictual policy options. Those 
who believed that the best approach to goals (strategy) was to use cooperative means 
were indeed more likely to support cooperative policy proposals. Those who believed 
that the nature o f the political universe was fundamentally conflictual were more likely 
than others to favor conflictual policy options. Those who were more optimistic about 
achieving their political goals were more likely to support cooperative policy positions. 
Those who thought that the political future was largely predictable were more likely to 
personally favor cooperative policies, as were those who believed they had a high level 
of control over historical development. Those who saw chance playing a major role in 
the development ofevents were more likely than others to favor conflictual policy 
proposals.
The results seen in Table 3.33 show what appears to be a strong link between the 
psychological characteristics o f Secretaries o f State and Foreign Ministers and their 
personal policy preferences. But to be sure that this relationship is indeed robust the 
effects o f other variables must be accounted for. Therefore in Tables 3.34-3.40 I test 
whether or not these relationships still exist, controlling for the seriousness of the action 
taken by these advisors’ opponents. The results of these tests show that six o f these 
relationships remain sgmficant and the seventh, the link between strategy orientation and 
the personal policy preferences o f these Secretaries and Foreign Ministers just barely 
falls short o f reaching the. 10 level o f significance. To be doubly sure of the robustness
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Table 3.34 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f  Distrust and Level o f
Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences o f  Secretaries o f  State and Foreign
Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Distrust (-) -14.603/8.067 .047
Level of Provocation (-) 348/.950 360
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.089. F statistic=l.731 (prob.= 215).
Table 3 .35 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Strategy and Level of 
Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign
Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Strategy, OCIl (+) 7.567/5.737 105
Level of Provocation (-) - 402/ 907 333
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square= 006. F statistic= 954 (prob = 411).
Table 3.36 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Nature of the Political 
Universe and Level of Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences o f Secretaries of
State and Foreign Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Political Universe, OCP1 (+) 8.974/4.160 025
Level of Provocation (-) 019/.848 .492
Note: N=I6 . Adjusted R-square=. 160. F statistic=2.428 (prob =. 127).
of these relationships I also test their effects controlling for the impact o f the level o f the 
threat that these advisors see to their national interest. The results o f these tests are seen 
in Tables 3.41-3.47. Again, most o f the these relationships remain significant, though
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Table 3 .37 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f  Optimism and Level o f
Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences o f  Secretaries o f  State and Foreign
Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Optimism, OCP2 (+) 6.679/4.840 096
Level of Provocation (-) -.070/ 928 471
Note: N= 16. Adjusted R-square=.005. F statistical.037 (prob =.382).
Table 3 38 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Political Future and Level 
of Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign
Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 62.836/15.589 001
Level of Provocation (-) .818/.708 135
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square= 493. F statistic=8.291 (prob.= 005).
strategy and optimism, fail to reach th e . 10 level. These results indicate that the 
psychological characteristics of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers significantly 
affect their personal policy preferences.
Taken as a whole, these results are intriguing. Why are the personal policy 
preferences o f Secretaries o f State and Foreign Ministers significantly affected by several 
of their psychological characteristics, when the linkage between the psychological 
characteristics of national executive leaders and advisory groups appear to have a limited 
impact on their personal policy preferences? The design of this project does not allow us 
to answer this question definitively. However, it would seem possible that there may be
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Table 3.39 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f  Control and Level o f
Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences o f  Secretaries o f  State and Foreign
Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Control, OCP4 (+) 31.654/10.424 005
Level of Provocation (-) -.362/.739 .317
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.333. F statistic=4.737 (prob.=.028).
Table 3 .40 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Chance and Level of 
Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences o f Secretaries of State and Foreign
Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Chance, OCP5 (+) -80.474/16.594 000
Level of Provocation (-) 558/ 607 375
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.594. F statistical 1.967 (prob.= 001).
Table 3.41 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Distrust and Threat Level 
on the Personal Policy Preferences o f Secretaries o f State and Foreign Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Distrust (-) -13.008/8.134 .067
Threat Level (-) -171/1.636 459
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.080. F statistical .654 (prob = 229).
something special about holding that post, and having the expertise that job requires, that 
leads them to rely on their own perceptions and beliefs more than other decision makers.
If one is hypothesizing that factors like oneTs beliefs about the structure and 
operation of the international system are likely to affect their policy preferences, one is
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Table 3.42 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f  Strategy and Threat Level
on the Personal Policy Preferences o f  Secretaries o f  State and Foreign Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Strategy, OCIl (+) 6.674/6.023 .144
Threat Level (-) -731/1.627 330
Note:N=l6 . Adjusted R-square= 006. F statistics 957 (prob.= 409).
Table 3.43 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Nature of the Political 
Universe and Threat Level on the Personal Policy Preferences o f Secretaries of State and
Foreign Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Political Universe, OCP1 (+•) 9.205/4.574 033
Threat Level (-) .191/1.593 .454
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=. 161. F statistic=2.437 (prob.= 126).
Table 3 .44 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Optimism and Threat Level 
on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (1-tailed)
Optimism, OCP2 (+) 6.559/5.586 131
Threat Level (-) -. 125/1.829 473
Note:N=l6 . Adjusted R-square=.005. F statistical.036 (prob.=.382).
presupposing that individuals have preexisting belief systems. All members o f  a national 
foreign policy decision-making team are likely to enter office with certain set beliefs 
about the nature o f world affairs. But the degree to which decision makers will have 
organized their thoughts on these issues varies greatly As Michael Brecher has noted.
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Table 3.45 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f  Political Future and Threat
Level on the Personal Policy Preferences o f  Secretaries o f  State and Foreign Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 55.514/15.642 .002
Threat Level (-) .045/. 1.214 .486
Note:N=16. Adjusted R-square=. 441. F statistic=6.9l6 (prob = 009).
Table 3.46 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Control and Threat Level 
on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Control, OCP4 (+) 34.542/9.641 002
Threat Level (-) -2.006/1 167 055
Note:N=16. Adjusted R-square= 446. F statistic=7.042 (prob.= 008).
Table 3.47 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f Chance and Threat Level 
on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Chance, OCP5 (-) -74.392/16.412 .001
Threat Level (+) -.437/1.026 339
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=,573. F statistical 1.083 (prob.= 002).
“few high-policy decision-makers have the time or inclination to formulate a coherent 
view of the world” (Brecher 1972:251). Many of those who have come to power with 
other priorities and with experience in other areas o f government are likely to be less 
conversant with foreign policy issues, and less able to develop detailed understandings of 
how to achieve their preferences in this field than foreign policy specialists. Therefore,
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considering the nature of the position and the typical background of those who fill it, 
those who are appointed to head foreign ministries are likely to have unusually 
well-developed belief systems about the nature of international relations, and how best to 
pursue one’s goals in the international arena. It certainly seems likely that national 
executive leaders with little experience in foreign affairs like Jimmy Carter, Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher would have a more malleable and less intricate 
understanding of the nature of global affairs than Cyrus Vance, George Shultz and 
Geoffrey Howe.
It would seem possible that the highly structured belief systems of foreign 
ministry chiefs may become even more elaborately structured as these individuals serve 
in their position and are bombarded with the intricacies of running complex 
bureaucracies charged with setting detailed policies in the midst o f many competing 
interests. It can be postulated then that these individuals have unusually well-developed 
beliefs, ideas and opinions about international relations and will be more likely to rely 
upon them when evaluating policy options than decision makers who have less 
well-developed belief systems. They should be the most likely officials to consider 
themselves to have all necessary information before them when studying an international 
event. They are the most likely to have preexisting belief structures and detailed 
schemata that allow them to accurately process information, make more information 
accessible, and make informed decisions whose outcomes are likely to conform with 
their goals and ideals. All these attributes would seem to make Secretaries o f State and 
Foreign Ministers more likely than other government officials to rely upon their own 
personal perceptions and propensities when settling on a favorite policy proposal.
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Additionally, it should be pointed out that if these cabinet members do in fact 
have more precise foreign policy belief systems it would also seem likely that 
measurements o f their psychological characteristics may be more accurate than the 
measurements o f others’ psychological characteristics. Being surer of themselves and 
their preferences in a wide variety of policy domains, these cabinet members’ comments 
are less likely to vary away from their true characteristics or to be influenced by the 
constraints placed upon them by uncertainty. That is, the measurements of their 
psychological characteristics may be relatively more valid than the measurements o f 
those individuals with less fully developed belief systems.
Again, this is simply a supposition. But this, as well as the fact that presidents 
and prime ministers may be more dependent upon taking other political considerations 
into account when deciding which policy option to support, seems a reasonable 
explanation to explain why the initial policy preferences of Secretaries of State and 
Foreign Ministers are more a product of their psychological characteristics than those of 
national executive leaders.
National Differences
The analyses reported earlier in this chapter show that the policy preferences of 
individual decision makers are affected by both certain personal psychological 
characteristics and the nature o f the actions taken by other political actors in their 
environment. But what other factors shape the policy options they choose to implement 
to address the foreign policy challenges that confront them? Given the results reported in 
Table 3.7 it appears possible that decision makers in certain countries may tend to be 
more cooperative or conflictual than decision makers in other countries. However, the
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results reported in Tables 3.10-3.13 suggest that this may not be the case once the 
impact of other influences are considered. Obviously the design of this project does not 
allow for a comprehensive test o f this question since it includes decision makers from 
only three countries. However, it is still worthwhile to investigate whether or not 
cross-national differences exist within this sample, and why Israeli decision makers 
appear to be more prone to support conflictual policy options than their British and 
American counterparts.
To begin to get at this question in more detail I test a model aimed at explaining 
individual decision makers’ policy preferences that includes only the Level of 
Provocation and Israeli Decision Maker variables as independent variables. The results 
of this test are reported in Table 3 48. They show that once one controls for the action 
taken by a country’s opponent, Israeli decision makers do not differ from the others 
included in the sample in terms o f whether they tend to support cooperative or 
conflictual policy proposals. I ran a separate test controlling for Threat Level instead of 
Level of Provocation, and the impact of being Israeli appeared to be even weaker in that 
model. If at first Israeli decision makers appeared to be more conflictual than the other 
decision makers included in my sample, that appears to be explained by the fact that they 
have tended to face much more provocative moves by their enemies, and considerably 
greater threats to their national security, than American and British leaders have faced 
during the later decades of the twentieth century.
This does not necessarily settle this question though. While perhaps the simple 
matter of one’s nationality does not have a direct effect on one’s tendency to favor 
responding to challenges in international affairs through either cooperative or conflictual
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Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Israeli Decision Maker (-) 
Level of Provocation (-)
-1.335/1.942
-1.071/.456
.248
012
Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.098. F statistic=3.931 (prob.= 026).
means, it does seem possible that a decision maker’s nationality may still matter in that it 
could have important indirect effects. Of particular interest to this study, it is possible 
that stable patterns of cross-national variation exist in the personality traits and core 
foreign policy beliefs of decision makers. While it may be difficult to get at the core 
reasons for such differences, for example, whether they result from differences in 
national popular cultures, the patterns of behavior that people adopt to move up in the 
political hierarchy of a country, or perhaps adaptation to a hostile environment, knowing 
whether or not such differences exist is still informative. And given the findings 
reported above showing that variation in some of these characteristics leads decision 
makers to support different types of political behavior, this investigation also could 
provide important information about why particular countries act as they do in the 
international arena. Therefore, below 1 run a series of bivariate regression analyses. In 
each I test whether being from a particular country affects the psychological 
characteristics o f political decision makers. The independent variables are dummy 
variables noting a decision maker’s nationality. The dependent variables are the twelve 
psychological characteristics. The results o f these tests are presented in Tables
3.49-3.51.
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Table 3.49 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effect o f  American Nationality
on Decision Makers’ Psychological Characteristics
Psychological Characteristic B/Std. Error prob. ( 1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation .026/.054 .319
Distrust -.150/.051 . 0 0 2
Conceptual Complexity .075/017 0 0 0
Need for Power -.Q03/.035 .467
Strategy, OCIl .094/ 108 194
Tactics, OCI2 .058/.081 .237
Risk Orientation, OCI3 .005/.027 .425
Political Universe, OCPI .067/. 105 .263
Optimism, OCP2 .029/. 107 393
Political Future, OCP3 .004/.039 .460
Control, OCP4 029/.029 162
Chance, OCP5 -007/.030 .403
Note: N=55.
Looking over the results o f these analyses we see that while a decision makers 
nationality may not have a strong independent effect on their tendency to support either 
cooperative or conflictual policies, it may nonetheless have an indirect effect. There are 
significant differences between decision makers o f different countries on a number of 
psychological characteristics.
American leaders are more conceptually complex than British and Israeli decision 
makers. This finding may at first not appear to be o f great importance given that I did 
not find that variable to be significantly related to decision makers’ tendency to support 
either cooperative or conflictual policy options. However, as a number of other works 
have linked low complexity scores to support for conflictual policies in international 
affairs (Driver 1977; Hermann 1980,1984; Hermann and Hermann 1989), and given the 
earlier analyses in this chapter showed that this variable neared significance as a factor
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affecting the personal policy preferences of national executive leaders, this cross-national 
difference could have substantive implications.
It is not immediately clear why this difference exists. It may be due to 
cross-national cultural differences. Another possibility is that in some cases foreign 
policy decision makers in the United States come from different segments of society than 
those in the United Kingdom and Israel. In particular, this may be due to the fact that an 
unusually high number o f American foreign policy decision makers come from the 
academic community, and the decision makers who have the highest conceptual 
complexity scores in my sample, Harold Brown, Anthony Lake, Madeleine Albright and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, all have that type of background in common. But whatever the 
reason, these findings would suggest that American decision makers think and 
cognitively structure the world around them in a way that is different from their Israeli
Table 3.50 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effect of British Nationality 
on Decision Makers’ Psychological Characteristics
Psychological Characteristic B/Std. Error prob. ( 1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation .000/.076 .499
Distrust .0I8/.076 .405
Conceptual Complexity -064/.026 .009
Need for Power -.000/049 .497
Strategy, OCI1 -.026/. 152 .434
Tactics, OCI2 -.073/. 112 .260
Risk Orientation, OCD -02I/.037 .290
Political Universe, OCP1 .065/147 .329
Optimism, OCP2 .055/. 149 .358
Political Future, OCP3 -051/.053 .172
Control, OCP4 .05I/.041 .108
Chance, OCP5 .028/042 252
Note* N=55
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and British counterparts. Similarly, this analysis also shows that American decision 
makers were less distrustful of other political actors than the other decision makers 
included in the study. This tendency may have led them to be less likely to favor 
conflictual policies, given that earlier I found decision maker’s level of distrust 
significantly affects their policy preferences.
Table 3 .50 shows that British decision makers did not have psychological 
characteristics that were markedly different from those of the other decision makers in 
my sample. The only characteristic on which they significantly differed from other 
decision makers was conceptual complexity. This finding was expected given that 
American decision makers were found to be more complex than the others included in 
the analysis.
As seen in Table 3.51, Israeli decision makers were significantly different from 
the others in this sample in a number of ways. They were more distrustful, less complex, 
had a lower perception of their control over historical development, and it appears they 
likely saw the political universe as more conflictual as well. These results show that not 
all decision makers think alike. There are notably cross-national differences. The pattern 
o f differences suggests that the earlier reported finding that Israelis supported more 
conflictual policies than the other decision makers included in this analysis may not have 
been solely a product of the unusually dangerous actions taken by Israel’s opponents. 
They also reflected these decision makers’ beliefs and psychological needs. While it is 
also possible that these characteristics were to a degree a function of the threats Israel’s 
people faced during this period, they may have also been a product of different cultural 
and political norms in that country. Of course these two influences are not unrelated.
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Table 3.51 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effect Israeli Nationality
on Decision Makers’ Psychological Characteristics
Psychological Characteristic B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Need for Affiliation -.043/.070 272
Distrust .232/.062 . 0 0 0
Conceptual Complexity -.070/024 003
Need for Power .005/.045 .454
Strategy, OCll -.134/. 139 .170
Tactics, OCI2 -.034/. 104 .373
Risk Orientation, OCD .009/.035 .395
Political Universe, OCPl -.166/. 134 . 1 1 0
Optimism, OCP2 -.095/. 137 .246
Political Future, OCP3 037/.049 .229
Control, OCP4 -.092/.036 .007
Chance, OCP5 -012/039 .382
Note: N=55.
The tact that for many years militancy was “the norm in Israel’s behavior towards her 
Arab enemies” (Brecher 1972:247) was certainly related to the fact that its decision 
makers viewed their neighbors as barbarians “ineluctable” in their aggressive behavior 
(Cottam and Cottam 2 0 0 1: 1 1 1 ).
Bureaucratic Politics
The design of this project allows us to investigate the impact of another factor 
that has often been attributed with a great deal of influence over the positions taken by 
decision makers during the formation of foreign policy, the pressures of bureaucratic 
politics. This influence has frequently been referred to in the foreign policy derision 
making literature, and an increasing number o f scholars are beginning to link this 
phenomenon to the work that has been done on the effects o f individuals’ personal 
characteristics. Preston and Hart (1999) provide a good review of the literature on this
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nexus. However, there has not yet been much rigorous, quantitative research into the 
relative psychological characteristics of decision makers representing different 
bureaucracies, and the policy implications o f these differences, across a varied set of 
governments. Therefore in this section of this chapter I review literature associated with 
one particularly well-known aspect of the bureaucratic politics debate, Miles’s Law, and 
then carry out statistical tests to investigate this phenomenon.
Graham Allison’s Essence o f Decision (1971) has become one of the most cited 
books in the history of the study of international relations. This seminal work greatly 
increased interest in the impact of bureaucracies and small-group decision making on the 
creation of foreign policy. Much of the previous literature investigating these factors had 
taken a rather unsystematic, ad hoc approach. Allison sought to create a theoretical 
basis for these influences. He proposed three different models as explanations for a 
state’s policy-making behavior. Model I focused on the state as a rational actor. Model 
2 focused on the role o f organizational process in the creation of policy. Model 3 
focused on the impact of governmental politics, often referred to as bureaucratic politics. 
After laying out how he expected states would behave depending upon which of these 
competing conceptual approaches was used, he then tested his theories.
The book has probably become best known for calling for more attention to the 
study of decision making, and stressing the importance of bureaucratic influences in 
shaping state policies. The most frequently quoted aphorism in Essence o f Decision 
(Allison 1971), “Miles’s law”, has become one of the most widely known phrases in the 
field of decision making. This proposition, “where you stand depends on where you sit” 
(Allison 1971:176), holds that decision makers’ policy preferences depend upon the
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position they hold in the bureaucracy. The creation of policy then becomes a game of 
“pulling and hauling” between actors most concerned with maximizing the goals desired 
by their organization.
There a number of reasons behind this belief in the influence of one’s 
bureaucratic affiliation on one’s policy preferences (Halperin 1974). Individuals have a 
great personal interest in their own success and that o f their organization. Therefore it 
follows that one will frequently back policy options that will highlight the strengths of 
one’s own organization, and require more reliance on one’s organization in future 
situations. Career officials will often back policy options that favor their organizations in 
order to ensure future promotions. And even leaders who lack a long-standing 
allegiance to their organization may still be “captured” by that organization due to their 
reliance on advisors and information from their organization and a desire to maintain 
organizational morale.
But how well has this hypothesis held up especially overtime? Is a leader’s 
organizational affiliation really a key determinant that explains their policy position? 
While perhaps the best known part of Allison’s book, this has also perhaps been its most 
frequently questioned proposition. Almost immediately it attracted serious criticism. 
Some of these noted that the behavior of the ExCom during the Cuban missile process, 
the case Allison uses to illustrate his position, did not conform to his expectations. 
Employing the proposition can be difficult. Some key individuals involved in 
policy-making discussions, for example Dean Acheson, do not “sit” anywhere. That is, 
they did not represent bureaucracies. Other leaders’ policy preferences, for example 
Secretary of Defense McNamara’s, did not match those of the bureaucracy they led
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(Krasner 1972). One crisis scholar went so far as to note that, “random selection 
probably gives better or equal results in matching statements than does bureaucratic 
position” (Bernstein 2000: 156). One must wonder how strong a theory is if the case 
used to illustrate its validity fails to show much support for it. And over time many 
articles have questioned Allison’s analysis. Some focused on problems with Allison’s 
theories (Bendor and Hammond 1992; Caldwell 1977; Perlmutter 1974; Welch 1992), 
while others involve case studies investigating the proposition and finding little support 
for it (Khong 1992; Rhodes 1994). Allison himself noted that several other forces had 
an impact on decision makers’ policy preferences. And in a later edition of Essence o f 
Decision the authors try to play down their adherence to the proposition by reworking it 
to say that “Where one stands is influenced, most often influenced strongly, by where 
one sits” (Allison and Zelikow 1999:307). But considering the number of factors that 
Allison has noted affect leaders’ preferences it may be impossible to know exactly under 
what conditions there should be a convergence between a leader’s policy preferences and 
those of his or her organization (Art 1973; Welch 1992).
But that does not mean that the reasoning behind Miles’s Law is entirely without 
merit. A number of works have shown a high degree o f convergence between the policy 
preferences of decision makers and policy options favored by the bureaucracies that 
support them (Betts 1977; Jones 1994; Lebovic 1996). And while there have been many 
critiques minimizing the effect of governmental politics, most of those in government 
continue to attribute it with a powerful effect on policy creation (Allison and Zelikow 
1999). So even if a clearly deterministic relationship does not exist between one’s stand 
and one’s “seat”, there do seem to be certain perspectives that are shared by those with a
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common bureaucratic affiliation that divide them from those in other bureaucracies. 
These differences appear to be seen most often among the conflicting bureaucracies 
involved in setting national security policy. Given this, there needs to be a further 
examination o f the nature of these differences and their effects on policy creation.
The design of this project allows us to look at two basic questions associated 
with this part of the debate over the effect of bureaucratic politics on foreign policy. 
First, do different types of people lead different organizations? That is, do leaders 
serving in different agencies and playing different administrative roles display different 
psychological characteristics and beliefs? The data in this project allow us to look at a 
variety of differences that exist between the personal characteristics of those serving in 
diplomatic positions and those serving in military positions. Secondly, do leaders in the 
military bureaucracy have markedly different policy preferences from leaders serving in 
diplomatic positions. Does one group prefer noticeably more cooperative or conflictual 
policy options than the other?
To investigate these questions I ran t-tests comparing the mean personal 
characteristic scores of those advisors in my sample who served in diplomatic roles with 
those who served in military roles. The results of these tests are displayed in Table 3.52. 
These results show that there were significant differences between the operational codes 
of leaders serving in military and diplomatic positions. For example, they saw the nature 
of the political universe differently. Military leaders tended to see the world in slightly 
conflictual terms, while diplomatic leaders tended to see the world as more cooperative. 
Similarly, military leaders tended to be more pessimistic about achieving their political 
goals and values than diplomatic leaders were. Diplomatic leaders pursued more
I
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Table 3.52 T-Tests Investigating Differences between 
Diplomatic and Military Decision Makers
Variable Diplomatic Military t prob. (2-tailed)
Mean (N=l 8 ) Mean (N=l 3)
Need for Affiliation .53 26 6.601 0 0 0
Distrust .16 -3.006 .005
Conceptual Complexity .64 .65 -578 568
Need for Power .2 1 .35 -3.828 . 0 0 1
Strategy, OCIl .63 .14 4.754 . 0 0 0
Tactics, OCI2 .44 .07 4.997 . 0 0 0
Risk Orientation, OCI3 .18 .08 3.129 .004
Political Universe, OCP1 .13 -.18 2.806 .009
Optimism, OCP2 19 - 14 2.839 008
Political Future, OCP3 .16 .14 .525 .604
Control, OCP4 .67 .69 -.585 563
Chance, OCP5 .89 .91 -.546 .590
Personal
Policy Preference -5 32 -5.25 -042 967
cooperative strategies and tactics than military leaders, though military leaders still 
tended to support strategies and tactics that were slightly more cooperative than 
conflictual. While both groups were risk-averse, diplomatic leaders were significantly 
more risk-acceptant than military leaders. The one key aspect of the operational code 
where no significant difference was found was on these groups perceptions o f their 
control over historical development. Both groups had roughly equivalent perceptions of 
their ability to affect the course of world affairs.
The results o f the t-tests also show that there were significant differences 
between the personality traits of military leaders and those o f diplomatic leaders. 
Diplomatic leaders showed a higher need for affiliation than military leaders. Diplomats 
were more concerned about maintaining close, friendly relationships with those political
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actors with whom they wished to have future relationships. Military leaders were more 
distrustful of other political actors and groups than diplomatic leaders were. And 
military leaders showed a higher need for power than diplomats. No significant 
difference was found between the complexity levels o f diplomatic leaders and military 
leaders.
According to the results o f this analysis the military leaders in my sample of 
decision makers had beliefs and feelings about the nature international affairs that were 
notably different from those of the diplomats in my sample. However, do these 
differences and other differences produced by being immersed in different, often 
competing, bureaucracies lead these two groups to support different policy options? At 
least in terms of whether they tended to favor more conflictual or more cooperative 
proposals it appears that they did not. As seen in Table 3 .52, there is not a significant 
difference between the mean score of the policy proposals personally preferred by 
members of these two groups. This result is quite surprising given the analyses earlier in 
this chapter showing how the psychological characteristics of decision makers affect 
their policy preferences.
But my finding that the personal policy preferences of military decision makers 
were not significantly different from those o f diplomatic decision makers seems to 
contradict the idea that the polity preferences of decision makers vary depending upon 
difference in their psychological characteristics, this finding matches earlier investigations 
of bureaucratic politics. While one might expect military leaders to support the use of 
military forces more often than leading diplomats in order to strengthen their 
organization’s place of precedence within the government, Betts (1977) found that
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military leaders were only more likely to support the use of force after initial decisions to 
rely on that tactic had already been made. Until that initial tactical decision was made 
they were no more likely than other decision makers to favor higher levels of conflict in 
international relations. Reviews of intra-administration policy disputes have also failed 
to find a broad pattern of disagreement between the leaders of diplomatic and military 
bureaucracies on whether or not a country should enter into armed conflicts to achieve 
its goals. While in some cases Secretaries of State like Vance and Shultz generally 
opposed the use of force and Secretaries of Defense like Harold Brown and Caspar 
Weinberger generally favored the use of force. There have also been Secretaries of State 
like Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig who tended to support the use o f force and 
Secretaries of Defense like Melvin Laird who tended to oppose it (Shepard 1988:121).
The results in Table 3 .50 show some intriguing and significant differences 
between leaders of diplomatic and military bureaucracies. They are noticeably different 
groups. What explains these differences? Three possible explanations stand out.
First, it is possible that fundamentally different types of people assume posts 
within these two segments of the government. It may be that something about the way 
these leaders are selected leads one set of people to be chosen to serve in foreign 
ministries and another type of people to serve in military posts. In fact, it is entirely 
possible that individuals are selected for leadership positions in defense and foreign 
ministries precisely because they have certain characteristics and beliefs that will lead 
them to conform to the mind-sets prevalent in their organization (Smith 1994).
However, it is also possible that once an individual assumes a post in one o f these 
bureaucracies they adjust their views to match of those generally associated with the
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culture of their bureaucracy. While of course individuals who have spent their entire 
careers within their organization are likely to be especially tied to its viewpoints and 
frame situations in ways that are similar to other members of their bureaucracy, “even 
in-and-outers are sometimes “captured” by the organizations that bring them into 
government” (Halperin 1974:62). Finally, these differences may result from the ways 
that these variables are measured. It may be the case that members of these 
organizations tend to publicly discuss very different issues and use different speaking 
styles. If present, these differences could make these groups of individuals appear more 
different from one another than they actually are.
Of course given the finding reported in Table 3.52 that there was not a significant 
difference between the mean personal policy preferences o f military decision makers and 
diplomatic decision makers it may appear that understanding the reasons for the 
differences in these two sets of advisors’ psychological characteristics has limited policy 
implications. But it should be stressed that that finding only applied to a subset of my 
overall sample of decision makers. When the results of this chapter are taken as a whole 
there is still considerable reason to expect that the psychological characteristics of 
decision makers affect their policy preferences and recommendations, so gaining a better 
understanding of the reasons why those selected to lead the military and diplomatic 
bureaucracies have significantly different psychological characteristics can help us better 
understand the reasons behind, and consequences of, intra-administration conflicts over 
foreign policy decision making. A further investigation into the reasons behind these 
differences is a project that should be carried out in the future.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND STATE BEHAVIOR
The preceding chapter dealt with how the psychological characteristics of key 
decision makers are linked to their personal policy preferences. In this chapter I take this 
research a step forward, moving beyond the linkage between decision makers’ 
psychological characteristics and their attitudes and preferences. Here I investigate 
linkages between decision makers’ psychological characteristics, their personal policy 
preferences, differences in the structure o f the decision-making group, and the official 
state policy decisions adopted during the sixteen cases I included in my sample. This 
includes directly linking the psychological characteristics of decision makers with 
consequential state actions that affected international relations.
I begin this chapter by first testing for direct relationships between the three 
decision units I investigated in the preceding chapter and the nature of the policies that 
were adopted by states in the sixteen cases o f decision in my analysis. I then investigate 
indirect effects that the psychological effects of decision makers may have on policy 
making through the advisory process and the decisions that national executive leaders 
make when deciding who to appoint to high office. Finally, I investigate another way 
that the psychological characteristics of decision makers may indirectly affect policy 
making. I study the connection between the psychological characteristics o f national 
executive leaders and their advisors on the quality of decision making, that is, the 
likelihood that groups will use vigilant, systematic decision-making techniques versus the 
likelihood that decision makers will adopt behaviors that impair careful decision making.
105
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The Direct Effects of the Psychological Characteristics of Decision Units
I begin my investigation of how the psychological characteristics of decision 
makers affected state behavior through the adoption o f official policies by conducting a 
series of bivariate regression analyses. In these analyses the dependent variable is the 
official policy adopted by a state’s decision makers in each of the sixteen cases in my 
analysis. The independent variables are the psychological characteristic scores of each of 
the three decision units I examined in the preceding chapter, national executive leaders, 
Secretaries o f State and Foreign Ministers, and advisory groups. Again I determined the 
psychological characteristics o f the advisory groups by taking the mean of all the national 
executive leaders’ advisors on each psychological characteristic. The results of these 
regression analyses are reported in Tables 4.1-4.3.
Table 4.1 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Psychological 
Characteristics o f National Executive Leaders on Official State Policy
Psychological Characteristics B/Std. Error prob. ( 1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+) .191/7.330 490
Distrust (-) -7.956/6.376 233
Conceptual Complexity (+) 25.083/22.848 .146
Need for Power (-) -19.801/11 051 048
Strategy, OCIl (+) .581/3.952 .443
Tactics, 0CT2 (+) t.855/5.646 374
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) 11.007/14.419 229
Political Universe, OCPl (+) -434/4.115 459
Optimism, 0CP2 (+■) -1.445/4.665 .381
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 8.709/15.833 296
Control, OCP4 (+) 21.351/11.773 .046
Chance, OCP5 (-) -14.243/20.162 246
Note: N=16.
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The analyses seen in Table 4.1  show limited support for the position that the 
psychological characteristics of presidents and prime ministers have a direct effect on the 
official foreign policies that their states adopt. While ten of these variables fail to have a 
significant direct effect, both need for power and control are significant at the .05 level. 
Countries whose presidents and prime ministers had a high need for power were more 
likely than others to adopt conflictual national policies. Countries whose presidents and 
prime ministers saw themselves as having a high level o f control over historical 
development were more likely than others to adopt cooperative foreign policies. 
Additionally, the conceptual complexity variable neared significance, making it appear 
that countries that are led by more complex individuals will be more likely to rely on 
cooperative policies than conflictual policies.
Table 4.2 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Psychological 
Characteristics of Secretaries o f State and Foreign Ministers on Official State Policy
Psychological Characteristics B/Std. Error prob. (t-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+) 8.187/7.362 143
Distrust (-) -4.576/5.693 218
Conceptual Complexity (+) 13.217/14.977 .196
Need for Power (-) t.266/10.697 454
Strategy, OCI1 (+) 5.568/4.073 097
Tactics, OCT2 (+) .666/8.104 468
Risk Orientation, OCD (+) 24.576/9.927 .014
Political Universe, OCP1 (+) 2.591/3 291 2 2 2
Optimism, OCP2 (+) 3.214/3.472 185
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 26.395/13.344 034
Control, OCP4 (+) 3.433/9.635 .364
Chance, OCP5 (-) -28.188/17 161 062
Note: N=16.
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Table 4.2 shows that four psychological characteristics of Secretaries of State 
and Foreign Ministers are significantly related to official state policy at th e . 1 0  level. 
Those governments that contained foreign ministry heads who believed in the use of 
more cooperative strategies were more likely than others to adopt cooperative national 
policies. Those whose Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers were more risk 
acceptant were more likely to adopt cooperative national policies. Those whose 
Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers believed the political future was predictable 
and that chance had a limited impact on world events were more likely than others to 
support cooperative national policies. Additionally, the need for affiliation variable 
approached significance, indicating that governments containing foreign ministry heads 
who had a higher need to maintain close, friendly relationships with others would be 
more likely to adopt cooperative policies.
Table 4.3 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Advisory Group’s 
Psychological Characteristics on Official State Policy
Psychological Characteristics B/Std. Error prob. (I-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+) 15.133/7.076 026
Distrust (-) -9.832/8.382 130
Conceptual Complexity (+) 16.846/18.085 184
Need for Power (-) -1.796/16.647 458
Strategy, OCIl (+) 5.524/4.381 114
Tactics, OCT2 (+) 4.975/6.696 235
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) 24.869/14.897 .059
Political Universe, OCP1 (+) -.203/4.159 481
Optimism, OCP2 (+) -.588/3.837 440
Political Future, OCP3 (+) -12.829/14.883 . 2 0 2
Control, OCP4 (+) -9.563/14.085 .254
Chance, OCP5 (-) 23.979/20.871 .135
Note: N=t6.
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The results o f the analyses reported in Table 4.3 show that two of the 
psychological characteristics of the advisory group directly affect official state policy if 
we adopt a . 10 threshold o f significance. Governments that contain advisory groups 
whose members exhibit a high need for affiliation are more likely to adopt cooperative 
foreign policies. Governments whose advisory groups are composed of risk takers are 
more likely than other states to adopt cooperative foreign policies. Additionally, it 
should be noted that both the first instrumental operational code index and advisors’ 
distrust near significance and are in the hypothesized direction. Therefore it appears that 
governments that contain foreign policy advisors who believe in the utility of cooperative 
policy options, and who are less distrustful, will be more likely to adopt cooperative 
policies.
Taken as a whole the results seen in Tables 4.1-4.3 once again show some 
support for the proposition that foreign policies are at least partially the product of the 
psychological characteristics of those who design them. Perhaps surprisingly, more of 
the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders and advisory groups 
appear to affect national policy than they do the initial personal policy preferences of 
those individuals and groups.
But before we can be sure of the strength of these relationships we must first 
examine whether or not these psychological characteristics variables maintain their 
effects when the influence of other variables that affect decision makers during the final 
stage of decision making are accounted for. 1 initially considered controlling for three 
other influences on decision making — the degree of threat to national interests at stake, 
the degree of force that one’s opponent is using, and the number o f information
ii
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processing errors committed by the decision-making group when it was considering what 
policy to adopt during a case. The third control variable was included given that earlier 
work on decision making has found that groups that commit several errors when 
processing information, for example ignoring key advice or biasing the assessment of 
data, lead states to pursue more conflictual methods o f action (Herek, Jam's and Huth 
1987; Jam's 1982; Schafer and Crichlow 1996). But in a bivariate regression equation I 
found that the number of information processing errors committed by a decision-making 
group did not significantly affect whether states adopted cooperative or conflictual 
policies in this set of cases. Therefore, that variable is excluded from further models 
examining what affects official state policy, though I will return to the question of how 
the psychological characteristics o f derision makers influence the process of decision 
making latter in the chapter.
In Tables 4.4-4.151 conduct a series o f multivariate regression analyses. In each 
of these the official state policy that was adopted by the derision makers in the sixteen 
cases included in this analysis is the dependent variable. The key independent variables 
are those psychological characteristic variables that were found to have significant 
effects, or neared significance at th e . 10 level, in the preceding bivariate analyses. Each 
of these variables is included in two separate regression equations that control for the 
impact of the type of action taken by a country’s opponent and the scale o f the threat to 
national interests. Again, these control variables must be tested in separate analyses as 
they are highly correlated with one another AH of the psychological characteristics of 
the national executive leaders that I test can be included together in the same model.
That is also true o f the advisory groups’ psychological characteristics that I test.
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However, once more I must test the impact o f  the psychological characteristics o f
Secretaries of States and Foreign Ministers separately as their strategy and risk
orientation scores are extremely highly correlated, as are their political future and chance
scores. While this lengthy exposition o f tables is perhaps not ideal, it is unfortunately
necessary as testing these variables together in the same model would produce skewed
results. Tables 4.4-4.5 deal with the impact of the psychological characteristics of
national executive leaders. Tables 4.6-4.7 deal with the impact of the psychological
characteristics of members of the advisory group. Tables 4.8-4.15 deal with the impact
of the psychological characteristics o f Secretaries o f State and Foreign Ministers.
Table 4.4 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of National Executive Leaders’ 
Psychological Characteristics and Level o f Provocation on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (I-tailed)
Need for Power (-) -12.533/11.284 144
Control, OCP4 (+) 9.736/13.258 239
Level o f Provocation (-) -805/707 138
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.204. F statistic=2.284 (prob.=. 131).
Table 4.5 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of National Executive Leaders’ 
Psychological Characteristics and Threat Level on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Power (-) -9.289/11.463 .217
Control, OCP4 (+) 8.237/12.795 266
Threat Level (-) -1.795/1.228 085
Note:N=16. Adjusted R-square=.251. F statistic=2.678 (prob.= 094).
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Table 4.6 Multivariate Regression. Analyses: The Effects o f Advisory Groups’
Psychological Characteristics and Level o f  Provocation on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+) .262/9.284 .489
Strategy, OCIl (+) -6.599/5.970 .147
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) 53.500/21.740 .016
Level of Provocation (-) -1.841/.633 007
Note:N=16. Adjusted R-square=.458. F statistic=4.l63 (prob.= 027).
Table 4.7 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Advisory Groups’ 
Psychological Characteristics and Threat Level on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (I-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+) 2.504/9 869 402
Strategy, OCT1 (+) -9.516/6.673 091
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) 42.910/22.113 039
Threat Level (-) -2.887/1 204 018
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.370. F statistic=3.202 (prob.= 057).
Table 4.8 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f Secretaries o f State and 
Foreign Ministers’ Strategy and Level of Provocation on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Strategy, OCIl (+) 5.777/3.538 063
Level of Provocation (-) -1.320/.560 .018
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.287. Fstatistic=4.022(prob.= 044).
The results of these multivariate regression analyses show that some of the 
psychological characteristics of key decision makers are indeed directly related to the 
official policies that states adopt, though controlling for the impact of variables related to
i
i
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Table 4.9 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f  Secretaries o f  State and
Foreign Ministers’ Risk Orientation and Level o f  Provocation on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (1-tailed)
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) 27.236/7.602 .002
Level o f Provocation (-) -1.462/.438 003
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=. 568. F statistic=l 0.853 (prob.=.002).
Table 4.10 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f Secretaries of State and 
Foreign Ministers’ View of the Political Future and Level of Provocation on Official
State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (1-tailed)
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 17.543/14.048 117
Level o f Provocation (-) -965/638 077
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=233. F statistic=3.279 (prob.= 070).
Table 4.11 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Secretaries of State and 
Foreign Ministers’ View of Chance and Level of Provocation on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (1-tailed)
Chance, OCP5 (-) -18.881/16.891 142
Level of Provocation (-) -1.079/.618 052
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=,216. F statistic=3.07l (prob.=.08l).
the nature of the international system and the conflict at hand weakens these effects. 
Perhaps surprisingly, it appears that the psychological characteristics of national 
executive leaders do not have a direct effect on official state policy. And only one 
psychological characteristic Of advisory groups maintained a significant effect in the
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Table 4.12 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f  Secretaries o f  State and
Foreign Ministers’ Strategy and Threat Level on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (I-tailed)
Strategy, OCll (+) 2.928/3.742 224
Threat Level (-) -2.328/1.011 019
Note: N=t6. Adjusted R-square= 277. F statistic=3.876 (prob = 048).
Table 4.13 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Secretaries of State and 
Foreign Ministers’ Risk Orientation and Threat Level on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (I-tailed)
Risk Orientation, OC13 (+) 18.798/9.009 029
Threat Level (-) -2.060/.887 019
Note: N= 16. Adjusted R-square= 433. Fstatistic=6 727 (prob = 010).
Table 4.14 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Secretaries of State and 
Foreign Ministers’ View of the Political Future and Threat Level on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (I-tailed)
Political Future, OCP3 (+) 17.879/12.381 .086
Threat Level (-) -2.143/ 961 044
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square= 348. F statistic=4.998 (prob = 025).
anticipated direction. Governments that adopt more cooperative policies are likely to 
have presidential advisory groups that are composed of risk acceptant individuals. 
However, a  number of the psychological characteristics o f Secretaries of State and 
Foreign Ministers maintain direct effects on official state policy even after key attributes 
of international disputes are controlled for. It appears that if a government’s Secretary
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Table 4.15 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f  Secretaries o f  State and
Foreign Ministers’ View o f  Chance and Threat Level on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Chance, OCP5 (-) -21.408/14.879 .087
Threat Level (-) -2.327/.930 013
Note:N=16. Adjusted R-square=347. F statistic=4.986 (prob = 025)
of State or Foreign Minister is risk acceptant and prefers to rely on cooperative 
strategies then the government will be more likely to adopt cooperative policy proposals. 
While the results are somewhat mixed, it also appears that governments are more likely 
to adopt cooperative policies if their chief foreign affairs minister believes that the 
political future is basically predictable and that chance has a relatively minor role in 
shaping world events. These findings are probably the most remarkable in this chapter. 
There had heretofore not been this kind of rigorous, statistical confirmation, across a 
large, varied set of foreign ministers, that the psychological characteristics of a state’s 
chief foreign affairs minister significantly affect official state policy. This is an important 
finding that should enlarge the scope of projects studying the linkage between the 
personal characteristics of foreign policy decision makers and official state action. 
Overall, the results seen in Tables 4.4-4.15 show that the psychological characteristics of 
key advisors may play a considerably more important role in shaping the official foreign 
policies that states adopt than many would have thought.
Before leaving this section focusing on the direct effects that decision makers’ 
psychological characteristics have on the policies that states adopt, it is appropriate to 
test how the characteristics of leaders and their advisors work in tandem to affect official
j
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policy. The best way to do this is with a comprehensive multivariate OLS model. 
Unfortunately the small size of my sample of cases makes this extremely difficult. 
Statistical requirements only allow me to include a small number o f variables together in 
the same equation. Still, it is worth investigating whether or not the central 
characteristics o f these decision makers affect policy when tested together.
The point of this investigation is not so much to test whether or not specific 
variables have significant effects. The earlier analyses investigated that question. Here I 
am interested in whether or not the model as a whole, including the variables I expect 
would be most fundamental in shaping these decision makers’ foreign policy preferences, 
is significant.
In this test I focus on the core psychological characteristics of the two sets of 
individuals who have the greatest ability to shape international policy, the national 
executive leaders and the heads of their foreign ministries. As I can only include a few 
variables in this model, I chose to test the effects o f national executive leaders’ belief in 
their ability to control events and their need for power, as well as foreign ministers’ 
general strategic orientation and their conceptual complexity. I expect these variables 
are particularly important in shaping these decision makers’ foreign policy preferences 
for the following reasons.
First, generally speaking, most national executive leaders do not enter office with 
a deep knowledge of foreign affairs. The matters they are most likely to immediately 
have to confront in this area upon taking office deal with gaining a better understanding 
of their country’s resources and place in the world. Hence many, upon being confronted 
with a challenge, are likely to first consider the question, “What can we do?” They are
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likely to develop a general understanding of international relations, and to rely on their 
aides for more specific knowledge and ideas. Seeing national executive leaders as 
typically policy generalists, I would expect that the psychological characteristics that are 
most central to their foreign policy preferences deal with the issue o f what they think 
their state can do, and their level of satisfaction with that power. The two psychological 
characteristics that may be the most central in shaping how they will respond to 
international events are their belief in the ability to control events and their need for 
power. The first o f these deals with their belief about what their country can do, their 
perception of the power of their government and their country The second of these 
variables deals with the degree to which they feel a need to control their surroundings. 
This deals with their intrinsic need to augment the level of power that they perceive 
themselves as having.
While national executive leaders are policy generalists, foreign ministers are 
typically the chief architects o f their states’ foreign policies. A central part of their job is 
to set a state’s basic strategy in foreign affairs. They often serve as a state’s chief thinker 
on foreign affairs issues. This being the case, I expect that the first operational code 
instrumental index and conceptual complexity will be especially important in shaping the 
policies advocated by these individuals, since these two psychological characteristics deal 
with these individuals’ basic policy orientations and how they structure their thoughts 
and beliefs.
I include these four variables together in the most comprehensive 
theoretically-driven model I can construct. This model includes Level of Provocation as 
a control. The results of this test are seen in Table 4.16. Unfortunately, the F statistic
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shows that the model does not significantly affect the dependent variable, official state 
policy. The adjusted R-square shows that the model explains eighteen percent of the 
variation in the dependent variable, a fair amount considering the small size o f my 
sample. These results do not, of course, mean that the central psychological 
characteristics o f national executive leaders and foreign ministers lack a direct effect on 
policy. I have already found such links between individual psychological variables and 
state policy. And in this particular model three of the variables approach significance in 
the expected direction. But the small sue o f my sample made it unlikely that I would 
find statistically significant relationships. Overall, these results suggest while individual 
variables may have important effects, establishing which variables play the most 
fundamental role in shaping decision makers’ preferences, and establishing how the 
characteristics of decision makers fit together in affecting policy, will be a complicated 
endeavor. Nevertheless, these are two important issues that should be pursued in future 
research.
Table 4.16 Multivariate Regression Analysis: The Effects o f the Core Psychological 
Characteristics ofNational Executive Leaders and Foreign Ministers and 
Level of Provocation on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (1-tailed)
Leaders’ Need for Power (-) 
Leaders’ Control, OCP4 (+) 
Ministers’ Strategy, OCI1 (+)
-9.630/11.907
10.881/15.284
4.523/4.021
-9.905/17.214
-1.052/.749
.219
.247
.144
289
.095
Ministers’ Conceptual Complexity (+) 
Level o f Provocation (-)
Note:N=16. Adjusted R-square=.l77. F statistical.643 (prob.=235).
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The Indirect Effects of the Psychological Characteristics of Decision Units
The preceding analyses focused on only the direct effects that these variables 
have on state policy. There are a number o f indirect ways m which the influence o f these 
variables is also felt. For example, consider the feet, seen in Table 4.17, that the official 
policy a state adopts is strongly related to the personal policy preferences o f its decision 
makers, irrespective o f the decision unit that sets state policy. In the preceding chapter I 
showed that the policy preferences o f these decision units are affected by their 
psychological characteristics. So the policy preferences of decision makers are an 
intervening variable linking their psychological characteristics to the official state policies 
they adopt.
Table 4.17 shows that the personal policy preferences of national executive
leaders have an enormous effect on the policies their states adopt, explaining sixty-six
percent o f the variance. These preferences are another intervening variable
between the psychological characteristics of foreign policy decision makers and official
state policy. This is because these preferences are affected by more than just the
Table 4.17 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effect o f the Policy Preferences of 
Decision Units Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (l-tailed)
Leader’s Preference (+) .591/. 108 .000
N=16. Adjusted R-square=.660. F statistic=30.084 (prob.=.000).
Foreign Minister Preference (+) .422/.160 .010
N=16. Adjusted R-square=.284. F statistic=6.942 (prob.=.020).
Advisory Group Preference (+) .711/.301 .018
N=16. Adjusted R-square=260. F statistic=S-566 (prob.=.036).
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psychological characteristics o f national executive leaders. Presidents and prime 
ministers frequently do not develop a preferred policy option in a situation until after 
some consultation with then senior aides. So another set o f factors that affect the 
personal policy preferences of national executive leaders is the preferences o f their top 
advisors. Table 4.18 shows that in my sample o f decision makers the personal policy 
preferences o f  national executive leaders are powerfully affected by the policy 
preferences o f their advisors. These advisors’ preferences are, in turn, affected by their 
own psychological characteristics. These linkages provide a further avenue of indirect 
effects by which the psychological characteristics o f  decision makers affect official state 
policy.
Table 4.18 Bivariate Regression Analysis: The Effect o f the Personal Policy Preferences 
of Foreign Ministers and Advisory Groups on the Personal Policy Preferences o f
National Executive Leaders
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (I-tailed)
Foreign Minister Preference (+) .576/226 .012
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.267. F statistic=6.475 (prob.=.023).
Advisory Group Preference (+) .955/.428 .023
Note: N=T6. Adjusted R-square=.235. F statistic=4.984 (prob.=.045).
But o f course this type o f indirect relationship does not run in just one direction. 
While advisors affect leaders through the advice and expertise they provide, leaders 
affect who advise them as wefl. Most importantly, they decide which individuals should 
fill these influential positions. And, generally speaking, one can expect an executive 
leader to choose top aides with whom they share a variety o f common characteristics. 
These include similar goals, similar world views, and other personal traits that should
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lead to the operation o f a well-functioning decision-making team. Typically, one can 
expect a president or prime minister to appoint top advisors who they believe share their 
core viewpoints, and who will act m ways that the president or prime minister will 
support. As Anthony Bennett described the American cabinet, “A president likes to 
gather round him people with whom he feels comfortable, who share the same kind of 
basic goals in economic, foreign and social policies, who have the same kmd of social 
and academic background, are o f the same generation and are in agreement with his way 
of doing things” (Bennett 1996:222).
Of course in some cases other considerations come into play in the appointment 
process and lead a chief executive may appoint a top advisor with whom he or she has 
noticeable differences. This was seen, for example, in Margaret Thatcher’s appointment 
of Francis Pym as her Foreign Secretary at the beginning of the Falklands War following 
the sudden resignation o f Lord Carrington. Thatcher wrote that she and Pym “disagreed 
on the direction of policy, in our approach to government and indeed about life in 
general” (Thatcher 1993:306), and after a  budget dispute between the two earlier in her 
government she had removed him as Defence Secretary (Cosgrave 1985). But Pym 
nonetheless was named Foreign Secretary because he had the requisite experience, was 
popular within the House o f Commons, and his appointment would not necessitate a 
major reshuffling o f her cabinet. Extraordinary tunes and political imperatives can, on 
occasion, lead to unlikely alliances. But appointments such as this are a relatively rare 
occurrence. When appointees who strongly disagree with the beliefs and favored 
approaches o f then leaders are named to high office, one can expect a greater than 
normal chance that they will be marginalized within the decision-making group. The
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example o f Francis Pym also matches this tendency. His approach to foreign policy was 
opposed by Prime Minister Thatcher throughout much o f his tenure hi office (Sharp 
1997), and he was soon replaced as Foreign Secretary (Harris 1988; Thatcher 1993).
So did the national executive leaders in my sample appoint advisors whose 
psychological characteristics were like their own? To get at this question I run a  series of 
bivariate regression equations, the results of which are displayed in Table 4.19. The 
independent variables are the psychological characteristics o f the national executive 
leaders. The dependent variables are the corresponding psychological characteristics of 
those leader’s Secretaries o f State and Foreign Ministers. 1 focus on investigating 
whether or not the individuals who hold those position share common personality traits 
and core foreign policy beliefs for two reasons. First, the Secretary o f State or Foreign 
Minister is the national executive leader’s top foreign policy aide. Therefore, one would 
expect that the national executive leader would be more concerned about placing an 
individual similar to himself or herself in this position than in most other top foreign 
policy offices. Second, I earlier found that the psychological characteristics of 
Secretaries o f  State and Foreign Ministers are particularly strongly related to their 
personal policy preferences, and to the policies that states adopt. Therefore, knowing 
whether or not national executive leaders appoint individuals similar to themselves to 
these posts is especially important.
Looking at the results we see that only two variables were significant at the .10 
IeveL Presidents and prime ministers tended to appoint foreign ministry chiefs whose 
strategic views and need for affiliation were like then own. However, a  number o f other 
variables approached significance. Overall it looks like national executive leaders were
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Table 4.19 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects o f  the Psychological
Characteristics o f  National Executive Leaders on the Psychological Characteristics o f
Their Foreign Ministry Heads
Psychological Characteristics B/Std. Error prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+) .386/J233 .061
Distrust (+) .344/294 .131
Conceptual Complexity (+) .384/.401 .177
Need for Power (+) J201/.301 258
Strategy, OCI1 (+) .321/228 .091
Tactics, OCI2 (+) .193/.180 .150
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+) .408/.312 .106
Political Universe, OCP1 (+) .164/224 .310
Optimism, OCP2 (+) .285/.341 .209
Political Future, OCP3 (+) -.086/.282 283
Control, OCP4 (+) -.041/261 .456
Chance, OCP5 (+) -.103/.291 264
Note: N=16.
careful to name Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers whose instrumental 
operational code indices matched their own. This implies that they were careful to turn 
over the reins o f foreign policy making to people with whom they saw eye-to-eye on 
how one should interact with other political actors m the world around them. It also 
appears possible that national executive leaders name top foreign policy advisors with 
whom they have common levels o f distrust and conceptual complexity as these variables 
approach significance. These findings show another indirect way in which the 
psychological characteristics o f decision makers affect state behavior. By naming 
individuals like themselves to direct them country’s foreign policy apparatus, national 
executive leaders create another path by which their psychological characteristics affect 
their government’s behavior.
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Another way we can observe the impact that psychological characteristics of 
national executive leaders have on foreign policy decision making is to look at which 
advisors they favor when making decisions. Since more often than not leaders seek input 
from a number o f aides before deciding to promote an official state policy it may be 
instructive to know if they tend to favor the policy positions promoted by those aides 
who are most like them. If they do act this way, that may provide further support for the 
position that these factors play a role in creating foreign policy.
To investigate this I reviewed the data in the 14 cases in which leaders faced a 
group of top foreign policy advisors who were strongly divided at the beginning o f the 
final stage o f decision making over what policy to pursue. This included all the cases 
except for the British decision to sanction South Africa and the Israeli decision to invade 
Lebanon. The national leader sided with the position favored by the advisor closest to 
them on seven o f the variables — Need for Power, Control, Distrust, Chance, Need for 
Affiliation, Tactics, Political Future — m over half o f these cases. There was a 
particularly high level o f congruence on the first two of these variables. In 11 o f the 14 
cases (79%) the leader opted to support the position favored by the advisor who had the 
Need for Power score closest to his or her own. In 10 o f the cases (71%) the leader 
supported the position of the advisor who had the Control index score closest to his or 
her own. On two variables -- Strategy and the Political Universe — the leader opted to 
support the position favored by the advisor with the closest score m half the cases. 
Leaders chose to support the policy position initially favored by the advisor who had the 
Complexity, Optimism and Risk Orientation score closest to them in less than half o f the 
cases.
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Since it appears that leaders tend to rely more on those advisors who are most 
like themselves, I next investigated what factors affected this tendency. Some earlier 
studies found that leaders’ paychological characteristics affected the types of individuals 
they were likely to appoint to office. For example, leaders with low complexity scores 
(Glad 1983) and a high need for affiliation (Winter and Stewart 1977) were found to be 
more likely to appoint people like themselves to office. Given these findings we might 
expect that these leaders might also be more likely to rely on similar advisors when 
making decisions. Therefore, I tested whether or not a leader’s tendency to support the 
policy position advocated by the advisor with the psychological characteristics most like 
his or her own was affected by these variables. I did not find a significant relationship.
Another factor I hypothesized could affect a leader’s tendency to rely on the 
advisor with the most similar psychological characteristics is their level of experience in 
foreign affairs. This factor has frequently been linked to the level o f personal 
engagement that a leader takes in setting national policy, how much they rely on advisors 
and how they structure the decision-making group (George 1980; Hermann 1986; Levy 
1994; Preston and Hart 1999). We can expect that leaders who lack foreign policy 
experience will be more likely to rely on advisors when making decisions. Therefore, it 
seems plausible to think that inexperienced leaders will be more likely than others to rely 
upon the advisors most similar to themselves.
I conducted a  logit analysis to test whether or not this variable had an effect on 
leaders’ tendency to favor particular aides. My dependent variable was whether or not 
the leader sided with the advisor whose psychological characteristics were most similar 
to their own in an intra-administration policy dispute. My independent variable, policy
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expertise, was also coded dichotomously. I coded three of the leaders in my sample as 
having policy expertise in foreign affairs since they had dealt with international issues for 
several years before they came to power. Prime Minister Begin had served as the leader 
o f his party for many years and as such was very familiar with regional and international 
issues before he was elected. Through service in a variety o f government posts in the 
1970s and 1980s President Bush was well experienced in international affairs before he 
was inaugurated. Finally President Johnson was also knowledgeable on these issues 
having served as Vice President and Senate Majority Leader before becoming President 
of the United States. He was also a member o f the Naval Affairs Committee throughout 
his tenure in the U.S. House o f Representatives and a member of the Armed Services 
Committee throughout his years in the Senate. The other five leaders in my sample had 
notably less experience m dealing with foreign affairs issues when they came to power. 
Therefore, I would expect those five leaders to be more likely to rely on aides with 
whom they had the most in common. This analysis was conducted over thirteen cases. 
The cases dealing with the invasion of Lebanon and British sanctions against South 
Africa were not included since the key advisors were not deeply divided. I also excluded 
the Cuban Missile Crisis as I was unable to determine which advisor’s characteristics 
most closely resembled President Kennedy’s. I coded three advisors in that case and 
Kennedy’s scores were closest to each o f them on four o f the twelve characteristics. The 
results o f this analysis are seen m Table 4.20. These results show that leaders who lack a 
long-standing interest in and knowledge of foreign affairs are indeed more likely than 
others to rely on the advice given them by especially similar advisors when making 
foreign policy decisions.
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Table 4.20 Logit Analysis: The Effect of Policy Expertise on Leaders’ Reliance on the 
Advisor Most Similar to Themselves
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (1-tailed)
Foreign Policy Expertise (-) -2.351/1.406 .047
Note: N=13. Initial Iog-likelihood is 16.048286; at convergence 12.758.
Overall, these results would suggest that the psychological characteristics of 
national executive leaders do indeed have an effect on official state policy. They may 
have a small direct effect on state policy. But they nonetheless matter in that they name 
people with similar perceptions, needs and beliefs to top posts, and the analyses reported 
in the previous chapter show that the psychological characteristics of Secretaries of State 
and Foreign Ministers affect their policy preferences and political behavior. Also leaders 
tend to support the policy positions advocated by those with the psychological 
characteristics closest to their own, out o f a group that already closely resembles their 
own personal traits to begin with. And o f course I have shown that the personal policy 
preferences o f  national executive leaders strongly affect state behavior.
I do not mean to overstate these effects. The statistical analyses reported earlier 
show that there was at best a weak direct link between the psychological characteristics 
o f national executive leaders and then: policy preferences in these 16 cases. This finding 
may give pause to those who believe a  stronger link exists between these variables. 
Given the findings o f a considerable body of earlier work m this area (Hermann 1980, 
1984; Hermann and Hermann 1989; Schafer and Crichlow 2000; Walker, Schafer and 
Young 1998; Winter 1987) I expected stronger effects. I can not be sure why I did not
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find stronger relationships. It seems possible that this may be due to the rather small 
sample size, or perhaps there is something peculiar about this sample o f cases.
But whatever the reason, the lack o f strong direct effects in the statistical 
analyses dealing with national executive leaders does not mean that what types of 
individuals lead states does not affect national policy. It is clear that they are important 
in that they decide who to appoint to their country’s top foreign policy making positions. 
The data show that these individuals who make many decisions themselves, and upon 
whom leaders rely when settling conflicts over what policies to purse, are significantly 
affected by their own personal dispositions and traits when setting state policy. And 
leaders appear to rely particularly strongly on those with whom they share common 
beliefs, traits and perceptions, thus reinforcing the effects that these variables have m the 
policy making process.
Psychological Characteristics and High Quality Decision Making
Earlier in this chapter I brought up the issue o f information processing errors 
occurring during the decision making process. Previous research into the effects of 
decision-making processes (Haney 1997; Herek, Janis and Huth 1987; Janis 1982; 
Schafer and Crichlow 1996; Schafer and Crichlow 1998) has found that low quality 
decision making can produce poor outcomes for states, and makes them more likely to 
adopt conflictual policy options. As mentioned earlier, and seen in Table 4.21, such a 
relationship was not found to be significant in this set o f  cases, although it does approach 
significance and is in the expected direction. While this relationship is not significant in 
this set o f cases, considering the strong link that has been found between the quality of 
decision making and the policies that states adopt in other work in this area, and the
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unique data set this project makes available, before leaving this chapter it is appropriate 
to investigate the linkages that exist between the psychological characteristics of decision 
makers and the quality o f information processing that these leaders and advisors carry 
out.
Table 4.21 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effect o f Information Processing Errors
on Official State Policy
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (1-tailed)
Information Processing Errors (-) -.444/.429 .159
Note:N=l6. Adjusted R-square=.005. F statistical .071 (prob.=.318).
Much of the literature investigating the causes o f variation in the quality of 
information processing by elite decision-making groups has focused on how the personal 
characteristics o f a  group’s leader shape its behavior. A number o f the personality 
characteristics measured in this project have been linked to group leaders’ leadership 
behavior. For example, given that more conceptually complex leaders tend to be more 
receptive to considering the views of others (Hermann 1984) and more capable of 
dealing with problems arising from a complex environment (Vertzberger 1990), we may 
expect that elite decision-making groups behave in more careful and methodical ways if 
their leader is high in conceptual complexity. Leaders with a  low need for power are 
more willing to accept ambiguous situation and tolerate disagreements among their 
advisors (Preston 1997) that may aid the careful consideration of a  wide variety o f policy 
alternatives. By a  common logic we may hypothesize that groups led by leaders who 
have lower levels o f  d is tr u s t will commit fewer information processing errors as they
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
may be more willing to consider the views o f a variety o f aides and experts when 
considering competing policy options. It also seems possible that leaders who have a 
high need for affiliation may be more receptive to considering the advice o f their aides, 
though previous research has shown that high affiliation groups may put friendship and 
collegiality ahead o f rigorous decision making and produce poor outcomes (Winter and 
Stewart 1977).
However, group leaders are o f course not the only individuals whose behavior 
can be expected to affect the quality o f group decision making. The reasoning behind 
the hypothesized relationships between the personality traits o f group leaders and group 
behavior can be extended to the personality traits o f other group members as welL We 
can expect that groups whose membership is high in need for affiliation, high in 
complexity, low m distrust and low m need for power will commit fewer information 
processing errors. They will be more likely to fully consider a wide variety o f policy 
options and behave in open, collegial ways with then colleagues, seeking an outcome 
that is good for the group as a whole.
I conducted two multivariate regression analyses to test whether these variables 
influenced the quality o f information processing m the hypothesized way m the sixteen 
cases in my analysis. In the first o f these I included as independent variables the scores 
o f the national executive leaders on these four measures. In the second of these I 
included as the independent variables the mean scores of the advisors I coded in these 
cases on each of these four personality trait variables. The number o f information 
processing errors committed by the decision-making group is the dependent variable. 
The results o f these analyses are reported in Tables 4.22 and 4.23.
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Table 4.22 Multivariate Regression Analysis: The Effect o f  the Personality
Characteristics o f  National Executive Leaders on the Quality o f  Information Processing
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (1-tailed)
Leader Need for Affiliation (-) -5.493/4.630 .130
Leader Distrust (+) -3.307/5.231 .270
Leader Conceptual Complexity (-) -24.539/14.767 .063
Leader Need for Power (+) -4.543/8.956 .311
Note:N=l6. AdjustedR-square=.045. F statistic=T.177 (prob.=.373).
Table 4.23 Multivariate Regression Analysis: The Effect o f the Personality 
Characteristics o f Advisors on the Quality o f Information Processing
Variable B/Std. Error prob. (1-tailed)
Advisor Need for Affiliation (-) -7.914/3.825 .032
Advisor Distrust (+) 9.174/4.374 .030
Advisor Conceptual Complexity (-) - 11.094/9.541 .135
Advisor Need for Power (+) 1.755/8.323 .419
Note: N=I6. Adjusted R-square=.I76. F statistic=.439 (prob.=.778).
These results confirm some of my hypotheses, but not all o f them. In terms of 
the psychological characteristics o f group leaders, one o f these variables was significant 
at the .10 level, and another neared significance and was in the expected direction. 
These results show that groups led by more conceptually complex leaders performed 
their decision-making responsibilities welL They committed comparatively few 
information processing errors. Likewise, those leaders who had a  high need for 
affiliation appear to have been more likely to run groups that committed few decision 
making errors.
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The results seen in Table 4.23 also show some support for my hypotheses.
Groups whose members had a high need for affiliation were more likely to conduct 
high-quality decision making. And though the complexity variable did not quite meet the 
significance threshold it appears that groups whose members are more conceptually 
complex may also commit fewer information processing errors. These results fit well 
with the results seen in Table 4.22 and suggest that there may be an important linkage 
between individuals’ need for affiliation and conceptual complexity and decision-making 
behavior.
Table 4.23 though also shows one puzzling finding. It appears that groups that 
were more distrustful of others committed fewer information processing errors than 
groups containing more trusting individuals. Additionally, it should be noted that 
decision makers’ need for power appears not to affect the likelihood that they will 
commit information processing errors. But while I can not explain these results, they 
should not distract from the fact that generally the quality of information processing was 
found to be significantly affected in predictable ways by two of the personality traits of 
members o f elite decision-making bodies.
While I should not overstate the impact o f these findings since I did not find the 
information processing variable to significantly affect the policy choices states made in 
the sixteen cases I included m this project, these are nonetheless important findings as 
other studies have found a important link between the quality o f decision making and the 
pattern o f policies states adopt. This, therefore, can be said to be one more intervening 
variable through which the psychological characteristics o f decision makers affect foreign 
policy behavior.
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THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS
IN TWO CASES
The statistical models I investigated in the preceding chapters showed that the 
policy preferences and political actions taken by decision makers were at least partly a 
function of some of their psychological characteristics. Those findings, using rigorous, 
quantitative research techniques, add to our knowledge of how individuals have a 
personal impact on world politics. But unfortunately not all of the psychological 
characteristics o f political leaders that may affect then foreign policy preferences can be 
easily quantified. Therefore I was not able to include a number o f potentially important 
psychological characteristics o f decision makers in the models I previously tested. 
Additionally, a reliance on statistical models can obscure some o f the specific details that 
help to more clearly convey the manner m which individuals’ psychological 
characteristics affect then behavior. Therefore, in this chapter I present two case 
studies. I do this with the goal o f expanding the work that was done in the preceding 
chapters by considering the impact o f new psychological-characteristic variables, and 
delving deeper into the effects o f the variables that were included in the statistical 
analyses.
In examining these two decision events I first lay out the historical setting in 
which they occurred. I review the precipitating event. Then I provide short 
biographical sketches o f the individuals that I  focused upon in my earlier analyses, 
including an examination of their core beliefs and personality traits as they related to
133
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international affairs, and how they came together as a decision-making team. I also 
make hypotheses about how these factors are likely to have affected their behavior 
during the decision-making process. I next review the decision-making process and the 
nature o f their response. This includes the participants’ initial policy preferences, the 
process by which the decision makers adopted an official national policy, and option they 
chose to set as official state policy. Through tracing the process o f decision making 
(George and McKeown 1985) I test whether or not these preferences and processes 
were affected by the psychological characteristics o f  the decision makers involved in 
ways that matched my hypotheses.
The Mission to Rescue American Hostages in Iran
Relations between Iran and the United States deteriorated almost immediately 
upon the Shah’s departure from his country and Khomeini’s return to Iran. The United 
States embassy was besieged by Marxist demonstrators on February 14,1979. A group 
of U.S. Air Force employees were held hostage for several days. Anti-American protests 
increased. Americans were urged to leave the country and the number o f people 
attached to the United State embassy was cut from over a thousand to less than a 
hundred. The Carter administration became even more worried about the future of 
relations when they agreed to let the Shah come to New York for medical treatment.
But as poor and tense as relations had become, the events that began on 
November 4, 1979 when thousands of Iranians stormed the United States embassy in 
Tehran and took scores of Americans hostage were unanticipated. While American 
decision makers were initially hopeful that the Iranian government would disperse the 
demonstrators and free the hostages, it soon became clear that this would not occur.
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Therefore, the Carter administration soon turned to weighing diplomatic options, rescue 
plans and possible military and economic sanctions to bring about the release of the 
hostages.
This seizure rocked American foreign and domestic politics like few events have 
since. Developing a response to this difficult situation involved many decision makers in 
a variety o f policy roles. However, my examination o f American decision making will 
focus on five individuals who played particularly active roles in the decision-making 
process, and whose psychological characteristics I measured and included in the earlier 
statistical analyses, Jimmy Carter, Cyrus Vance, Warren Christopher, Zbigniew 
Brzezmski and Harold Brown.
President Jimmy Carter
Jimmy Carter entered office without a great deal of knowledge or experience in 
dealing with international issues. While he began to think about these issues in earnest 
and exchange ideas with experts in foreign affairs after he joined the Trilateral 
Commission m the early 1970s, they still never became a primary focus of his 
professional life prior to assuming the presidency, and they were not a top priority during 
his successful campaign in 1976. That said, by all accounts Carter was an extraordinarily 
bright political leader. Once put m a position where he needed to confront these issues, 
he actively sought to become more knowledgeable on international matters. He sought 
not only to maximize American interests in situations he faced, but to study problems 
from a theoretical, big-picture standpoint. Indeed, one o f the reasons he is said to have 
developed such a close relationship with his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew
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Brzezinski, is that the two shared a common love for lengthy theoretical discussions 
(Hargrove 1989).
In terms of what he wished to accomplish in the realm of foreign affairs, Jimmy 
Carter entered the White House in 1977 with a desire to promote an idealistic foreign 
policy based on morality and a  belief in freedom and democracy, something he felt that 
the United States had lacked since the Truman administration (Carter 1982:142).
Indeed, his statements during the campaign and early in his term show that he was so 
committed to this approach that he was to “the left” o f all of his senior advisors (Rosati 
1987). One example o f his desire to move the direction o f foreign policy was his 
prioritization o f human rights issues. He felt it was important not only to criticize abuses 
made by political opponents, but also to criticize abuses by right-wing regimes, even if 
they were longtime American allies. In general, he wished to bring a  fresh approach to 
foreign policy. While he was o f course committed to maintaining the security of 
Americans, he downplayed traditional concerns about political realism in foreign policy, 
and took considerable risks from the standpoint o f domestic politics. As seen in his 
handling of such prominent challenges as arms control strategy with the Soviet Union 
and the ratification o f the Panama Canal Treaties, Carter was willing to put the power of 
his office behind clearly unpopular policies if he believed they served the national 
interest.
This focus on new ideas and perspectives, combined with his lack o f foreign 
policy experience may lead some to believe he suffered from a considerable level of 
naivete. But this also shows the types o f things he would likely prioritize, or not 
prioritize, when facing a  crisis. For example, while he clearly wanted to do what was ir
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the best interests of the country, his conception o f what that meant appears to have 
differed from the opinions of his predecessors. Perhaps rooted in his unusually strong 
religious convictions (Glad 1980) Carter appears to at times have valued life and the 
quality o f life more than maintaining the image o f a superpower. This fits in with his 
general thrust to try and do what he perceived as just or moral in a given situation.
While he certainly wished the country to be seen as strong m a traditional realpolitik 
sense, he also wished to be seen upholding the values that he believed the country was 
built upon values that he believed when publicized would strengthen the resistance 
against totalitarian states around the world (Carter 1982:142).
But while he entered office with plans to change the direction of American 
foreign policy, he gradually moved to a more traditional posture. While he “continued to 
express hope for a cooperative and just global future, he also began to see the negative 
side of global complexity and change” (Rosati 1987:76). As early as the summer of 
1977 Carter was already tom between visions o f a  “gentler, freer, more bountiful world” 
and “the nature o f the world as it really is (Serfaty 1978:19). He faced difficult 
challenges, not only with the ever-tense relationship with the Soviet Union, but also with 
new issues arising in Cuba, Southeast Asia, Yemen, Iran and Central America. Having 
to develop responses to these events Carter began to rely on more and more traditional 
techniques o f influence and persuasion, for example by increasing the defense budget.
He certainly maintained a desire see the world transform into a community o f democratic 
nations that respected human rights. However, he also saw himself pushed by changes in 
the international system to revert from cooperative policies to taking tougher stances 
when dealing with other international actors.
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la  terms of psychological characteristics I measured earlier hi this analysis, 
Carter’s scores are shown in Table 5.1. As one would expect given his ideals, Carter 
preferred the use o f cooperative strategies and tactics. However, perhaps due to the 
changing world around him he was generally averse to taking risks. He saw the world 
around him as somewhat conflictuaL, and was slightly pessimistic about attaining his 
political goals. He believed that the political world was unpredictable, though not as 
unpredictable as several o f his aides saw it. He believed chance played a major role in 
world affairs. While he believed he had an impact on the development o f history, he was 
less confidant o f that than his top advisors were. Overall, these scores generally match 
the case study work that has been done on Carter’s foreign policy beliefs, and they 
resemble another measurement o f Carter’s operational code, which examined changes in 
Carter’s belief system before and after the invasion o f Afghanistan (Walker, Schafer and
Table 5.1 Psychological Characteristic Scores o f Carter Administration Officials m the 
Period Preceding the Seizure o f Hostages in Tran
Variable Carter Vance Chris. Brzez. Brown Sample Mean (SD)
Need for Affiliation .41 .44 .67 .40 .42 .47(.ll)
Distrust .21 .12 .02 .17 33 .17(.1I)
Conceptual Complexity .64 .61 .71 .63 .79 -68(.07)
Need for Power 39 .08 .03 .33 .46 .26(.19)
Strategy, OCI1 .40 .69 1.00 .56 .41 .61(.25)
Tactics, OCI2 37 .54 .60 .43 .35 .46(.ll)
Risk Orientation, OCI3 .06 .14 37 .11 .06 .15013)
Political Universe, OCP1-.25 .11 .58 -.12 -35 -.07(37)
Optimism, OCP2 -.16 22 .70 -30 -35 .02(.44)
Political Future, OCP3 .15 .08 .56 .08 .09 .19021)
Control, OCP4 .69 .75 .83 .75 .71 .75(.06)
Chance, OCP5 .90 .94 3 4 .94 33 .85(.18)
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Young 1998). Even late in his presidency when he was wary of many international 
actors he still maintained a basic desire to interact with others in a cooperative fashion.
In terms of the four personality traits I measured, Carter’s need for affiliation, 
distrust o f others and conceptual complexity were generally near the mean o f my sample 
o f decision makers. However, in the period prior to the seizure o f the hostages in 
autumn of 1979, he had an unusually high need for power. His score was over one 
standard deviation above the mean o f my sample o f decision makers. In terms of 
another characteristic, Carter was judged by his contemporaries to have a high 
dominance personality. That is, he insisted upon having a high degree o f control over his 
subordinates and policy making (Shepard 1988), something that is clearly evident in his 
descriptions o f his behavior toward subordinates m his presidential memoir (Carter 
1982). Investigations o f this personality characteristic have shown that decision makers 
with high dominance personalities are more likely than others to support the use o f force 
(Etheredge 1978; Shepard 1988).
What hypotheses can we make about Carter’s behavior? Given his background, 
beliefs and ideals, it seems likely that Carter would not be the sort o f politician who 
would immediately respond to a threat or other negative action by increasing the tension 
in a situation. He seems likely to be the type o f individual who would first turn to 
negotiations or cautious sanctions. He would not be quick to turn to the use o f military 
force. However, his negative views o f other international actors, his pessimism about 
achieving his goals, his high need for power, and his high dominance personality all 
suggest that if he were not able to fold a  diplomatic solution to his liking that he would 
be quite willing to employ force to achieve his aims.
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Eventually turning to military force as an option would seem even more likely 
given his views o f Khomeini. Both before and after the hostages were seized Carter 
judged his behavior to be deplorable, bizarre and untrustworthy. In mid-1979 Carter 
believed Khomeini’s “statements and actions were irrational, and he and some o f his 
fanatical followers kept Iran m constant turmoil” (Carter 1982:453). Following the 
seizure o f the hostages Carter believed, “Khomeini was acting insanely” (Carter 
1982:459).
Secretary o f State Cyrus Vance
Cyrus Vance’s nomination as Secretary o f State was announced on December 6, 
1976, the first cabinet nomination announced by president-elect Carter. Unlike Carter, 
he bad a wealth o f experience dealing with international affairs and national security 
issues. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations he had served as General 
Counsel at the Department o f Defense, Secretary o f the Army, and Deputy Secretary o f 
Defense. He had served as a negotiator or special representative o f the president in a 
variety o f difficult international situations, including the Paris peace conference on 
Vietnam, the Panama Canal Crisis o f 1964 and the Dominican civil war in 1965. He had 
been active in a  number o f organizations dealing with international issues, including the 
Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission. Though Vance had 
originally backed the 1976 presidential bid o f Sargent Shriver, once Shriver dropped out 
o f the contest Vance began giving Carter advice on foreign policy issues. While they had 
only met twice before the campaign (Vance 1983), Vance developed a close personal 
rapport with Carter. Carter respected Vance’s views, and given his background and the
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number o f people suggesting his appointment, he was a natural choice to be named 
Secretary o f State.
In terms o f his long-term vision and goals, Vance was much like Carter. Both 
sought to create a new kind o f global community featuring greater cooperation and 
respect for human rights. Both believed “a reliance on military instruments o f foreign 
policy would be counterproductive” (Rosati 1987:61). Both strongly believed that 
“mankind and the international system could be reformed and unproved” (Rosati 
1987:63). As the Carter team faced more and more obstacles to its aim of creating a 
new foreign policy system, Vance remained optimistic about meeting this goal.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, and to a lesser extent Jimmy Carter, adopted tougher stances and 
altered their images of other political actors as they encountered an increasing number of 
political setbacks. But Vance remained true to the perceptions and beliefs he held when 
he took office throughout his three and a half year tenure, even m the face of 
considerable opposition horn other international actors (Rosati 1987). If pressed to take 
a conflictual approach to a situation, Vance always wanted to avoid the use o f military 
force. As Harold Brown put it, “Secretary Vance was persuaded that anything that 
involved the risk o f force was a  mistake” (Brzezinski 1983:44).
We see twelve o f Vance’s psychological characteristics measured in Table 5.1.
As expected, these show that Vance preferred to use cooperative strategies and tactics. 
While risk averse, he was less so than most o f his colleagues. He viewed the political 
universe as fundamentally somewhat cooperative. He was also rather optimistic about 
achieving his political goals. While he saw the world as an unpredictable place in which 
chance played a considerable role, he also saw himself as being able to strongly affect
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historical development. Additionally, while three o f his personality trait scores neared 
the mean, o f my sample o f decision makers, his need for power was remarkably low.
Also, his contemporaries considered Vance to have a low dominance personality 
(Shepard 1988), making it even less likely that he would back the use o f force.
Given these characteristics and other aspects o f his background, such as the 
effect that serving in the Pentagon during the Vietnam War had on him, it seems likely 
that Vance would be loathe to resort to the use o f force to achieve his aims in a conflict. 
We can expect that Vance would prefer to rely upon diplomatic efforts. He would likely 
try to keep the lines o f communication open with all actors at all times.
Deputy Secretary o f State Warren Christopher
Vance’s Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, was a prominent attorney who 
had previously been Deputy Attorney General. Like Vance he was viewed by many to 
be part o f the East Coast establishment, even though he was from Los Angeles. But 
while he may have made his career in law and lacked Vance’s lengthy experience in 
foreign affairs, he closely mirrored Vance in terms o f their shared commitment to a new, 
more cooperative and idealistic foreign policy. Like Vance he preferred to avoid what 
Brzezinski referred to as “the unavoidable ingredient o f force in dealing with 
contemporary international realities” (Brzezinski 1983:42).
Table 5.1 shows that Christopher exceeded even Vance in his belief in an 
optimistic, cooperative world. He strongly believed hi using cooperative strategies and 
tactics, and relatively speaking, he was quite willing to take political risks. He saw the 
political universe as basically cooperative and was very optimistic about achieving his 
foreign policy goals. He saw the world as relatively predictable, with chance having only
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a limited impact on events. He saw himself as having the ability to affect historical 
developments. He had an unusually low need for power and an unusually low level of 
distrust. His score on the power index was over two standard deviations below the 
mean, and his distrust score was over one deviation below the mean. And he had 
unusually high need for affiliation and conceptual complexity scores. Both were more 
than one standard deviation above the mean o f the decision makers in my sample. While 
Christopher has not been judged to have either a  high dominance or low dominance 
personality, it would seem safe to presume that he has the latter given that he appears to 
have been exceedingly deferential when he was involved in top-level meetings, and given 
Brzezinski’s comment about how much better he was at playing supporting roles in 
government than leading roles (Brzezmski 1983:42). Given all o f these characteristics 
we can expect that Christopher would have been extremely unlikely to advocate the use 
o f force to achieve his ends.
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezmski
Zbigniew Brzezmski came into government with a background that m some 
senses was considerably different from that o f his colleagues. Brzezmski, who came 
from an elite Polish family, had been an “impressionable teenager” during the Communist 
takeover ofPoIand in 1945 (Prados 1991:382). That event apparently made a lasting 
impact on him, and his relatively tough stands against Moscow made him appear to be a 
staunch cold warrior. But while certain aspects ofhis personal history were unique from 
those ofhis colleagues, he nonetheless had much in common with the other top decision 
makers in the Carter administration. In feet, while he might have generally been the 
“one central actor who didn’t  share the views of the majority”, his views were still
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enough like the other top decision makers that they formed a “homogeneous body” 
which featured a great deal o f agreement on policy issues (Moens 1990:23).
He had met Carter through his work on the Trilateral Commission and in time 
became his top foreign policy advisor during the campaign. As one would expect o f 
someone holding such a position, Brzezinski and Carter generally had quite similar views 
and goals about how American foreign policy should be pursued. Brzezinski also hoped 
to build a more peaceful world community and he greatly admired Carter's commitment 
to upholding fundamental principles in the conduct o f world affairs. Both wanted to 
replace Kissinger’s foreign policy o f “power realism” with a new policy o f “planetary 
humanism” (Serfaty 1978:19). He sought to prioritize topics like the North-South divide 
(Drew 1978), and considered the inequality o f less developed countries a “moral problem 
for our time” (Serfaty 1978:6). Early hi the administration he even had a “hopeful but 
skeptical” view o f the Soviet Union (Rosati 1987:56). While he was perhaps always the 
advisor closest to having a conventional realpolidk view o f foreign policy, he was still 
sympathetic to Carter’s goals, particularly early in the Carter presidency.
However, while he may have initially had a more cooperative and hopeful view o f 
foreign policy than is often referred to, there is no question that as Carter’s presidency 
progressed Brzezmski took progressively tougher stances and cemented his reputation as 
the administration's leading hawk. Facing a  string o f challenges to American interests 
Brzezmski saw “an increasingly turbulent, unstable system conducive to Soviet 
interventionism” (Rosati 1987:133). While he had always been more willing to use force 
to project an image o f a  strong superpower, for example his desire to send a carrier task 
force to the Horn o f Africa during the crisis in that region in 1977 and 1978, changing
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circumstances only strengthened his belief in the need to show the nation’s strength in 
order to achieve its aims. This is not to say that he abandoned Carter’s desire for a 
pacific global community that embraced fundamental values like human rights. He 
maintained those goals, but unlike Vance once he was in office he became noticeably 
more pessimistic about his chances for achieving them.
The psychological characteristic measurements seen in Table 5.1 appear to 
support this view of Brzezinski. In the months preceding the seizure o f the hostages he 
favored the use o f cooperative strategies and tactics, perhaps to a surprising degree. 
However, he was risk averse, viewed the political universe as at least marginally 
conflictual and was somewhat pessimistic about achieving his political goals. While he 
viewed the political world as unpredictable and heavily influenced by chance, he also saw 
himself as being able to affect the course of history. Brzezinski’s scores show that he 
was near the sample mean on the four personality characteristics seen in Table5.1. As 
one might expect, his need for power and level o f distrust were higher than Vance’s 
measurements, and his need for affiliation was lower. Additionally, Brzezmski was 
considered to have a high dominance personality (Shepard 1988).
What do these characteristics and personal history predict? Brzezmski’s first two 
instrumental operational code indices would appear to show a predisposition to rely on 
diplomatic means to solve international challenges. However, his negative view o f other 
political actors, his pessimism about achieving his goals, his view o f an unpredictable 
world, his concern for maintaining an image o f strength, and prestige, as well as his high 
dominance  personality all suggest that he would be likely to back the use o f force under 
certain circumstances. Additionally, his relative lack o f concern about endangering
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vulnerable Americans in order to ensure that the prestige and strength o f America were 
evident to all (Carter 1982; Strong 2000), also would make him more likely to back the 
use o f force. He would clearly appear more likely to back the use o f force than Vance or 
Christopher.
Secretary o f Defense Harold Brown
Harold Brown brought with him to the Department o f Defense a mastery o f 
many o f the highly technical issues that confront leaders o f that enormous department 
that probably exceeded that o f any other Secretary, before or since. A noted physicist 
who had received his doctorate at the age o f 21, he had served as Director o f the 
Livermore Radiation Laboratory in the 1950’s and as Director o f Research in the 
Department o f Defense from 1961-1965. He also had years o f administrative 
experience, having served as Air Force Secretary during the Johnson administration and 
President o f Cal Tech.
Like the rest o f the decision-making team he had a commitment to assisting 
President Carter achieve his aims for a new kmd o f foreign policy. However, while he 
held to this mind set early in the administration backing Vance in several disputes with 
Brzezmski, as time went on and the administration faced more assertive foes, he began to 
side more and more with the National Security Advisor (Brzezinski 1983). To some 
degree this shift was perhaps natural given his need to promote the interests ofhis 
department and maintain the support ofhis subordinates. But it also matches the 
changes that the president himself experienced, while in office, and perhaps also reflects 
his generally cautious tendencies (Garrison 1999).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
In feet when we look at Table 5.1 we see that several o f Brown’s psychological 
characteristic scores were much like those o f President Carter. Both had a tendency to 
back cooperative strategies and tactics. Both were risk averse. Both had conflictual 
views o f the nature o f the political universe, and both were pessimistic about achieving 
their goals. They saw the political universe as unpredictable with chance heavily 
affecting events, yet they also believed they could affect the course of historical 
development. They had similar needs for affiliation, and both had high dominance 
personalities (Shepard 1988). Brown had a very high need for power, even higher than 
Carter’s. He also had a rather high level o f distrust o f others. Finally, Brown had an 
extraordinarily high level o f conceptual complexity. This score is the highest in my 
sample o f decision makers, two and a half standard deviations above the mean. This 
score is not surprising given Brown’s widely acknowledged intellectual brilliance.
His high complexity level and the first two instrumental indices ofhis operational 
code would seem to imply that he would be reluctant to use force to settle a conflict. 
However, the rest ofhis psychological characteristics point to a proclivity to support the 
use o f conflictual policy options to achieve his goals. Overall, like Carter who has a 
similar psychological profile, perhaps we should consider Brown to be a “pragmatic 
idealist” (Crichlow 1998). That is, someone who generally sought to rely on cooperative 
policy options and engagement techniques to achieve their aims, but whose commitment 
to that strategy was tempered by the influence o f a hostile environment.
The Decision
Following the seizure o f the hostages, and the Iranian government failing to free 
them after a few days, the Carter administration took a number o f punitive actions.
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These included ending oil importation from that country, ordering Iranian students in the 
country illegally to leave, and freezing all Iranian assets in American banks (Carter 1982; 
Rosati 1987). These actions were generally taken with the unanimous support o f 
Carter’s advisory team, with the main force slowing their implementation being working 
out then legality and how they affected relations with allies.
But while they agreed on certain actions, there were still divisions between 
Carter’s advisors, especially between longtime rivals Brzezmski and Vance. Tensions 
were evident very early in the decision-making process. One early divide was over 
whether to insist that the Shah leave the United States when he had recovered from his 
medical treatments. Vance believed that he must leave as there was little chance that the 
hostages would be freed while he was in the United States. Brzezinski strongly opposed 
forcing a close ally out o f the country (Turner 1991). This was just the beginning of 
what would become a deep split between the two over the proper policy to pursue on 
this issue.
Early in the crisis there was a clear desire by most participants to find a 
nonviolent solution to the conflict. Carter and Vance opened a key meeting during the 
first week o f the crisis with statements opposing the use o f military force, and proposals 
advocating such measures received scant attention (Turner 1991). However, as the 
situation persisted and there failed to be much movement on the diplomatic front, 
planning for a potential rescue mission or military strike, planning which began just days 
after the hostages were taken, intensified. The pace o f this planning was accelerating 
quickly when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan m December o f 1979. That event made 
military action even less appealing as it would likely undercut opposition in the Islamic
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world to the Soviet action during a period when the Carter administration was trying 
very hard to organize opposition to the invasion (Brzezmski 1983). But by mid-March 
the lack o f movement on the diplomatic front led Carter and his advisors to again begin 
to reconsider then options.
As proposals began to be put forward that included military action, two potential 
policy options got the most attention. One was a punitive military attack against Iran. 
The leading proposal in this regard, and one that Carter initially liked, was mining Iranian 
harbors. The other policy option was a rescue mission. At the early-April National 
Security Council meetings when the decision to launch the rescue mission was adopted 
virtually all o f Carter’s advisors backed military action. The only exception was Warren 
Christopher who was sitting in for Cyrus Vance. Christopher pushed for a continued 
reliance on diplomacy. While Vance was absent from these sessions Carter was aware 
that his Secretary o f State also opposed any military attack unless there was an 
immediate threat to the hostages (Strong 2000; Turner 1991).
The president made the decision to launch a rescue mission in a meeting of the 
National Security Council on April 11, 1980. Everyone present except Deputy Secretary 
Christopher approved o f this option. Brzezmski had begun trying to drum up support 
for this plan, the option he had favored, as for back as March. Toward this end he had 
shared some o f the secret plans for the operation with Vice President Mondale, and with 
top Carter political aides Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell (Strong 2000). Additionally, 
Defense Secretary Brown and General Jones, the chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff 
had earlier strongly argued against the mining proposal for fear that it would hurt 
relations with the Islamic world and drive Iran closer to the Soviet Union (Turner 1991).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
For a group that was thoroughly frustrated and saw no sign that the hostages would be 
released the rescue plan was widely appealing. Perhaps because they were so eager to 
pursue this new active policy Brzezmski was the only individual to raise the subject of 
planning for a possible M ure (Strong 2000).
The behavior o f the decision group generally matches what one would expect 
given them respective psychological characteristics. When first confronted with this 
extremely serious problem there was virtual unanimity in this largely “homogeneous 
body” (Moens 1990:23) to avoid the use o f military force. While they possessed varied 
opinions about nonmilitary policy responses they initially agreed on this key point. CIA 
Director Stansfield Turner notes having been disappointed m the group’s unanimity in 
blocking out all consideration o f military options during the first weeks o f the crisis 
(Turner 1991).
This initial response matched the group’s commitment to the foreign policy ideals 
espoused by Jimmy Carter at the beginning of the administration. It also matches the 
instrumental operational code scores o f all five decision makers I coded. All five 
preferred to rely on the use o f cooperative strategies and tactics. All five also saw 
themselves as having considerable control over historical development. As shown earlier 
in this project, that characteristic has been linked to a tendency to favor cooperative 
policy options. Additionally, all o f the members o f Carter’s decision-making team 
except for Defense Secretary Brown had distrust scores lower than the average o f my 
sample o f decision makers. That also would seem to point to them being slower to turn 
to military policy options than other decision makers.
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However, by the spring a division, had developed between these decision makers. 
After observing what appeared to be months o f untrustworthy behavior by the Iranians 
and coming to doubt more and more that the hostages would be released Carter, 
Brzezinski and Brown all came to believe that the United States should take military 
action to bring them home. Vance and Christopher though remained committed to 
pursuing further diplomatic measures. They did not want to risk, military action.
This division matches what many would expect given the general perceptions of 
these individuals. Brzezinski was considered the administration’s “hawk”, at least 
relatively speaking, from the beginning o f the administration (Drew 1978), and both 
Brown (Brzezmski 1983) and Carter (Rosati 1987) were widely perceived to have 
moved in that direction as time went on. In contrast, Vance and Christopher were 
considered strong “doves” throughout their tenure. Brzezinski has described Vance as 
“the ultimate example o f a good man who has been traumatized by his Vietnam 
experience” (Jordan 1982:264). Whether or not it was because ofhis service m the 
Defense Department during that period, it was true that Vance opposed the use of 
military force most o f the times it was proposed during the administration. And of 
course he was so strongly committed to that belief that he conveyed his resignation on 
April 17, a week before the rescue operation was launched, one o f the few tunes m the 
twentieth century that a cabinet member resigned on a question o f principle. Christopher 
was widely seen as just as strongly opposed to the use o f the military, desiring to rely 
upon more peaceful policy options. One comment o f Christopher’s illustrates this quite 
well At a meeting on April 16, 1980 he inquired if'“taking out” Iranian guards perhaps
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meant shooting them in the shoulder. The mission commander informed him that it 
meant shooting them between the eyes (Strong 2000:249).
This division was also seen in the psychological characteristics o f these decision 
makers. The three whose philosophical operational code indices show that they saw the 
world as fundamentally conflictual and were pessimistic about achieving their goals 
opted to use military force. The two who saw a cooperative world and were optimistic 
about achieving their goals wanted to rely on diplomatic measures and economic 
sanctions. Those with marginally less faith in then: ability to controLevents favored the 
use o f military force. The three who favored the rescue mission bad much higher needs 
for power than the two who opposed the mission. Brzezmski, Carter and Brown all had 
high-dominance personalities. By contrast Vance had a low-dominance personality 
(Shepard 1988), and it seems likely that Christopher did. as well given the deference he 
tended to show other decision makers (Brzezinski 1983; Vance 1983). And to some 
degree these groups may have been shaped by different events. Vance was said to have 
been heavily influenced by his experience in Vietnam (Brzezinski 1983; Jordan 1982), 
while Brzezmski’s world view was frequently said to have been shaped by his view of the 
Soviet Union (Drew 1978; Serfaty 1978).
Overall, the psychological characteristics o f these decision makers played an 
important role m shaping their behavior during this crisis. The early actions o f the 
decision makers match those that were predicted on the basis o f their core beliefs and the 
manner they hoped world politics would function. The divisions that developed within 
the administration also followed predicted patterns, with those who were more 
pessimistic and saw the world as a  more conflictual place turning to support a policy of
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military action against an enemy they considered to be irrational and untrustworthy. The 
three decision makers who favored military action differed from those who wanted to 
rely on economic sanctions in predicted ways on the psychological characteristics I 
measured. Their differences also match predicted patterns according to the literature on 
high-dominance, low-dominance personalities (Shepard L988). Additionally, the 
decision makers who seemed to have been most affected by particular periods o f conflict 
in the past differed in a pattern that matches expectations given the analogies that were 
likely to be dominant in their way o f thinking about international affairs. Vance, shaped 
by the Vietnam experience (Brzezinski 1983), was reluctant to use force. Brzezinski, 
shaped by World War H and Soviet aggression under Stalin’s rule (Prados 1991; Serfaty 
1978), was more willing to use aggressive military action, [t appears that in this case the 
policy preferences and political behaviors of these decision makers was powerfully 
affected by their psychological characteristics.
The American Military Buildup Preceding Operation Desert Storm
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 stunned the Bush administration. 
That is not to say that there were not signs o f it that should have raised suspicions. Of 
course Iraq had claimed the emirate as far back as when the United Kingdom granted it 
independence m 1961. But in the summer of 1990 Iraq was doing much more than 
issuing threats. Saddam Hussein had amassed an army o f over 100,000 men near the 
border in late July. His forces were not limited to their usual training area, and they were 
deployed in ways that allowed them to be quickly put into action. The intelligence 
bureau at U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM Commander Norman Schwarzkopf and 
the Defense Intelligence Agency all believed a war was imminent (Schwarzkopf 1992).
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Middle East expert Charles Allen, the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Intelligence 
Officer for Warning, hand delivered a memo to Richard Haass of the National Security 
Council noting a seventy percent chance of an invasion (Parmet 1997) and alerted 
colleagues in the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department to the threat, but 
nonetheless the intelligence community was divided on the likelihood o f an invasion 
(Gordon and Tramor 1995). Perhaps believing the counsel o f Arab allies who doubted 
Saddam would go through with an invasion (Gordon and Tramor 1995; Parmet 1997; 
Schwarzkopf 1992), or perhaps out o f a desire to avoid coming to terms with a failed 
policy o f engagement with Iraq (Gordon and Trainor 1995; Parmet 1997), the Bush 
administration did not take action to block the invasion before it began.
While his government had not prevented the attack, Bush quickly committed the 
United States to opposing Iraq in the wake o f the invasion. At an emergency meeting of 
the National Security Council most potential policy options were dropped as 
unworkable. Secretary o f State Baker, who was out o f the country, and Secretary o f the 
Treasury Brady both initially spoke of how the world could adjust to the new situation. 
President Bush recognized the difficulties involved m reversing this invasion, but he was 
distressed that he and National Security Advisor Scowcroft were the only leading 
officials in the government who believed that the invasion must be overturned (Dufiy and 
Goodgame 1992). Even though he lacked bureaucratic support and plans for how to go 
about it, Bush famously announce, “this will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait” 
(Pfif&er 1993:4). To spur movement against the invasion and develop an international 
consensus in favor o f tough action Bush made some fifty calls to world leaders during 
the first five days o f the crisis (Parmet 1997). Soon the deployment o f over two hundred
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thousand American troops began as a means to deter Hussein from attacking Saudi 
Arabia (Freedman and Karsh 1993).
Over the next few months the Bush administration continued to expand the 
coalition against Saudi Arabia. They succeeded in getting more countries to voice 
support, to send troops and to send money. They were successful in every one of these 
areas. In feet by the end o f the operation close to ninety percent o f the cost was paid by 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Germany, Japan and South Korea 
(Greene 2000). But while the administration was successfully isolating Iraq, Bush was 
becoming impatient with waiting on sanctions to dislodge Hussein. Many participants in 
the early stages o f decision making, including the president himself have noted that Bush 
strongly wanted to attack just weeks after Iraq’s invasion (Bush and Scowcroft 1998; 
Powell 1995). With little movement on the diplomatic front, Bush eager to move, and 
more and more American soldiers arriving on the scene, in October American decision 
makers made the key decisions that would lead to the coalition forces to attack the Iraqis 
in January 1991.
The primary decision makers who set the country’s path at this tine were 
President Bush, Secretary o f State Baker, Secretary o f Defense Cheney, National 
Security Advisor Scowcroft and Joint Chiefs o f Staff Chairman Powell (Pfiffher 1993). 
Unfortunately I was not able to obtain comments made by Scowcroft and Powell in the 
period preceding this decision that met the coding criteria, so I was not able to measure 
them psychological characteristics in this case. Therefore this analysis focuses primarily 
on the other three decision makers, though I include some discussion of the behavior and 
characteristics o f Powell and Scowcroft
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President George Herbert Walker Bush
George H. W. Bush, entered the White House with, more foreign policy expertise 
than most o f the other men who served as President o f the United. States during the 
twentieth, century. During his service as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, head of 
the U.S. Liason Office in Beijing, Director o f Central Intelligence, and Vice President, 
Bush gamed broad knowledge and experience about the processes o f international 
relations and key issues facing the United States. That should not imply that he had 
spent most ofhis life dealing with foreign affairs. He did not take his first international 
post until he was in his late forties, and he only served one or two years m each of the 
positions he filled m the Nixon and Ford administrations. But Bush believed that “his 
major expertise” was in foreign policy (Hilsman 1992:246), and that greatly affected the 
issues he prioritized during his administration and his decision-making style.
While he entered politics enthusiastic about dealing with foreign affairs, he was 
enthusiastic in a way notably different from President Carter. He did not have any grand 
plans about changing the fundamental issues and diplomatic behaviors common in 
international relations. Bush was “unsentimental about power politics” (Duffy and 
Goodgame 1992:139). He “had trained all his life to be the consummate Cold Warrior” 
(Duffy and Goodgame 1992:177), and his “tolerance for human rights abuses and 
autocracy” extended far beyond what were judged by many to be his government’s 
exceedingly understanding remarks to the Chinese government following the Tiananmen 
Square massacre (Duffy and Goodgame 1992:184).
But while he prioritized the traditional goals o f state power and security, he 
frequently did so by engaging in cooperative tactics, as seen in his relations with the
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Chinese. Bush was not an extreme hawk, and in feet pursued many policies built around 
the concept o f breaking down old barriers and collaborating with other states to create a 
safer, more productive world. If he felt he could trust and work productively with 
another political actor he was quite willing to engage that person or country in 
cooperative policies that benefited the national interest. For example, with the warming 
o f relations with what was seen as a less contentious Soviet Union, he began to make 
decidedly non-hawkish changes in U.S. strategic forces. He presided over sizable cuts in 
the U.S. military. Indeed at the time o f the Iraqi attack Defense Secretary Cheney was 
finalizing plans to announce a twenty-five percent reduction in the size o f the U.S forces 
(Parmet 1997). Bush also enthusiastically embraced arms control in certain areas, 
working hard on treaties like the Conventional Forces m Europe agreement and the 
START treaties (Baker 1995). He led the country while it adopted “scores” (Baker 
1995:605) o f bilateral trade agreements, and pursued major multilateral trade agreements 
like the North American Free Trade Agreement. And o f course the way he prosecuted 
the early months o f the Gulf War, building an enormous coalition of states to work 
together (Birch 1993), fits well with his desire for establishing close relationships with 
other states m order to pursue the national interest. Bush then can be said to have been a 
politician who was motivated to pursue traditional foreign policy goals, especially 
maintaining a position o f strength and power for the United States, but one who 
preferred to go about that by using cooperative means to engage other countries.
While President Bush appears to have entered office with a clear understanding 
ofhis foreign policy beliefs and how he wanted to go about putting them into action, his 
international behavior appears to have been heavily influence by a few key aspects ofhis
|
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personality. Foremost among these was the extraordinary influence Bush placed on 
personal relationships. President Bush strongly valued his friendships. These became 
very close bonds. Generally speaking, Bush was “exceptionally well mannered, modest, 
restrained, generous, and considerate o f others” (Duffy and Goodgame 1992:202). He 
was remarkably loyal and willing to take political risks for his friends. For example, he 
pardoned a half dozen leading Reagan administration officials for then role in the 
Iran-Contra scandal, something that President Reagan, a notoriously personally cool 
individual who had limited feelings o f loyalty, refused to do (Parmet 1997:510).
In international relations this behavior was seen in a  unique kind of diplomacy. 
He became personal friends with several world leaders. He pursued this personal 
approach so assiduously that by his third year in office he had made more trips abroad 
than any previous president. While this behavior certainly produced valuable links with 
other countries that could strengthen American interests in the world, it was perhaps led 
to the president giving “more weight to Ieader-to-Ieader relationships than state-to-state 
relationships” (Htisman 1992:246). This could lead Bush to engaging in perhaps 
surprisingly cooperative behavior with some leaders. But it could also lead him to be 
vindictive if he felt he had been betrayed by a  friend (Hilsman 1992; Winter 1993).
The measurements o f Bush's psychological characteristics that I included in the 
earlier analyses are presented in Table 5.2. They largely match the descriptions o f Bush 
that are found in the case study literature. Bush preferred to rely on the use of 
cooperative strategies and tactics, though he was somewhat reluctant to take risks. As 
befits a  man who frequently sought to engage other countries in cooperative operations, 
and reduced his country’s military, he saw the political universe as basically cooperative.
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He believed that he could affect world events and was marginally optimistic about 
achieving his goals, characteristics one would expect given the priority and personal 
attention he gave foreign policy matters. But he also saw the political universe as highly 
unpredictable with chance having a heavy impact in shaping the world. He had a 
somewhat low need for power, and a somewhat low level of distrust o f others. He had a 
rather high need for affiliation and a rather high level o f conceptual complexity. 
Additionally, fitting with his low need for power, according to Shepard (1988) Bush had 
a low-dommance personality.
Table 5.2 Psychological Characteristic Scores o f Bush Administration Officials in the 
Period Preceding Operation Desert Storm
Variable Bush Baker Cheney Sample Mean(SD)
Need for Affiliation .51 .40 26 .39(.13)
Distrust .11 .06 .17 .11(.06)
Conceptual Complexity .69 .66 39 .65(.05)
Need for Power 21 21 .43 .28(.13)
Strategy, OCI1 .64 25 -.01 29(33)
Tactics, OCI2 .41 24 .00 22(21)
Risk Orientation, OCI3 .14 .06 .03 -08(.06)
Political Universe, OCPl 21 .23 20 .23(.03)
Optimism, OCP2 .14 24 39 •26(.13)
Political Future, OCP3 .05 .12 .09 .09(.03)
Control, OCP4 .67 .72 .85 .75(.09)
Chance, OCP5 .96 .91 .93 .93(.03)
What hypotheses can we make about President Bush given these psychological 
characteristics? Generally speaking, Bush appears to have been unlikely to resort to the 
use o f military force given his personal attributes in 1990. With the exception o f him 
seeing the political universe as highly unpredictable and being heavily influenced by 
chance, all ofhis other characteristics point to a  propensity to rely on cooperative policy
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means and avoid the use o f military power to solve international challenges. However, 
his unique approach to foreign policy and politics generally, relying so heavily on 
personal relationships, and his high need for affiliation, point to the possibility that there 
would be one circumstance in which he would perhaps be likely to lash out against an 
opponent. Believing so strongly m personal loyalty, if Bush felt that a personal friend 
was turning against him, he could become vindictive (Hilsman 1992; Woodward 1991). 
As David Whiter has written, “Hell hath no fury like an affiliation motivated person 
scorned, or being double crossed” (Winter 1993:114).
Given that building a close relationship with Iraq was a leading part o f Bush’s 
Middle East policy, and that the Bush administration had worked to help develop Iraq 
into a stronger, richer ally (Freedman and Karsh 1993; Gordon and Tramor 1995;
Greene 2000), Saddam Hussein’s invasion appears to have provoked a sense o f betrayaL 
Bush quickly came to think that he had completely misjudged the Iraqi leader.
Rebuilding a  cooperative relationship with Hussein would have been difficult enough, but 
was further complicated by the feet that he saw himself as having more knowledge of the 
Middle East than anyone else in his government. He had told his aides that “he new 
more about the region.... than any of them” (Parmet 1997:443). So it would be difficult 
for anyone to move his opinions once they were formed. And since he was quickly 
referring to Hussein as “a new Hitler” (Hilsman 1992:227), “evil” and a “madman” 
(Greene 2000:122), it was clear that there was a  serious chance o f a war developing 
between the United States and Iraq. This was particularly likely as Bush, whose first 
experiences away from his home and the elite confines o f Phillips Andover were as a 
navy aviator in World War H, “relied on the 1938 Munich debacle to infer that
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unchallenged tyrants view the absence of opposition to their attempts to aggrandize their 
powers as a  weakness to be exploited” (Hybel 1993:66). This riveting “personal 
experience seems to have strengthened his conviction in the righteousness o f the war” 
(Wayne 1993:39).
Secretary of State James A. Baker, III
James Baker’s appointment as Secretary o f State was made in record time. 
President Bush named him the day after the election (Bennett 1996). But this was not a 
surprise. Baker’s appointment had been foreseen for some time. A fellow Texan, he had 
been close to President Bush for many years. He had also run both o f Bush’s campaigns 
for the presidency. While he did not enter his office with as much foreign policy 
experience as several ofhis recent predecessors (Duffy and Goodgame 1992; Moore
1994), he had become conversant with several international issues, particularly economic 
matters, during his tenure as President Reagan’s Chief o f Staff and Treasury Secretary 
and even earlier from his work in the Commerce Department during the Ford 
administration. Besides, Bush planned to be his own chief foreign policy expert. What 
he sought m Baker was a  trusted aide with excellent negotiating and political skills who 
could successfully win over others to support Bush policies (Duffy and Goodgame 
1992).
Compared to some others in the administration, Baker had tended to be less o f a 
hard-liner during the Cold War on issues like arms control. He strongly believed in the 
long term benefits o f establishing more cooperative relationships when possible. For 
example, in comparing his views to those o f Cheney, Baker noted, “Dick was more o f a 
cold warrior than I was” (Baker 1995:24). He was a  “closet moderate” (Parmet
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1997:103). Predictably, the thawing o f the Cold War did not change his belief in the use 
o f cooperative policies o f engagement to achieve foreign policy goals. This is not to say 
that he was a trailblazer who sought to transform the world to match Wilsonian ideals. 
But he generally opposed relying upon the use o f force in international affairs.
Given this basic orientation, his psychological characteristic scores seen in Table 
5.2 are not surprising. They are also fairly close to those o f President Bush. The 
instrumental indices o f Baker’s operational code show that he preferred to rely on 
cooperative strategies and tactics. He was averse to taking risks. He saw the political 
universe as basically cooperative. He believed he could affect historical development, 
and he was optimistic about achieving his goals. He believed the political universe was 
unpredictable and that chance affected world affairs. He had a somewhat low need for 
power. His distrust level was very low, over a  standard deviation below the mean of my 
sample o f decision makers. His conceptual complexity level and his need for affiliation 
were near the mean o f my sample o f decision makers. These scores lead me to 
hypothesize that he would be unlikely to back the use o f force and launch a war against 
Iraq, and from the beginning o f the conflict with Iraq Baker “had reservations about the 
speed and lack o f deliberation with which the president was committing the United 
States to military objectives” (Pfififaer 1993:4).
Secretary o f Defense Richard B. Cheney
Richard Cheney had o f course not been President Bush’s initial choice to head 
the Defense Department. But after the nomination of former Senator John Tower o f 
Texas went down to defeat, Cheney seemed a safe choice to head the Pentagon. He had 
not ever realty developed expertise in foreign affairs or national security issues.
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However, be had developed a broad policy expertise during his days in the Ford 
administration and his six terms in the U.S. House o f Representatives, including service 
on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and as Minority Whip. He was 
extremely conservative. He was an “unreconstructed Cold Warrior” who “had never met 
a weapons system he didn’t like” (Gordon and Trainor 1995:32). But he was widely 
respected by members o f both parties in Washington (Duffy and Goodgame 1992), and 
he was easily confirmed.
Cheney recognized that the Cold War was thawing and was presiding over the 
Pentagon at a  tune when the U.S. military was being cut (Parmet 1997). But while he 
saw an increasingly cooperative and peaceful world, that should not imply that he had 
abandoned his faith m pursuing aggressive policies that showed the strength o f the 
United States. He remained a believer hi the use o f force when he thought it was called 
for to push traditional U.S. interests, and he was highly skeptical o f using U.S. force and 
prestige to support new foreign policy goals like humanitarian aid operations (Baker
1995).
Cheney’s psychological characteristic scores in the period before the invasion of 
Kuwait are seen in Table 5.2. Cheney was divided as to his favored strategies and 
tactics. He appears to have preferred using conflictual and cooperative policy options 
about an equal number o f tunes. He was extremely reluctant to take risks. He saw the 
political universe as somewhat cooperative. He was optimistic about achieving his goals, 
and he believed he could affect historical development. He saw the world as 
unpredictable with chance affecting world events.
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His level of distrust was higher than that o f Bush or Baker, though still somewhat 
low. His level o f conceptual complexity was relatively low. His need for power was 
unusually high, and his need for affiliation was unusually low. Both o f these indices were 
more than a standard deviation from the mean o f my sample o f decision makers. Overall, 
these two needs, along with his conceptual complexity score and his instrumental 
operational code indices point to Cheney being willing to support the use o f military 
force to achieve U.S. interests in certain situations. This proclivity was seen from the 
beginning o f the conflict. Cheney was looking at how the United States could topple 
Saddam from power as early as the day o f the invasion. He wanted the invasion 
reversed, not just stopped (Gordon and Tramor 1995:33).
The Decision
President Bush had wanted to expel Iraq from Kuwait ever since the invasion. 
However, that seemed highly unpractical m early August. He did not have the necessary 
forces m the area. Several ofhis advisors were unenthusiastic about the idea. And there 
was the prospect that without fis t marshaling international support that action by the 
government o f the United States could undermine its position with a variety of important 
countries in the world. Therefore, the initial U.S. planning and diplomatic work was 
centered around defending Saudi Arabia, not liberating Kuwait. American forces started 
to flood into the area, and Americans took the lead in isolating Iraq and imposing 
sanctions against it. But Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, 
remained determined to strike back at Iraq (Woodward 1991). By Iate-September and 
eariy-October decision makers in Washington began to once again confront the issue o f 
whether they would rely on sanctions to punish Iraq, or whether they would change the
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military operation in the Middle East from a defensive one to an offensive one. Such an 
operation seemed more realistic as more troops and equipment poured into Saudi Arabia, 
and as the growing coalition of nations opposed to Iraq held together and promised to 
devote more resources to the cause (Freedman and Karsh 1993; Greene 2000).
Bush’s foreign policy advisors formed the “most collegial” national security team 
in the postwar era (Duffy and Goodgame 1992:138). They had worked together in top 
government posts since the Ford administration. But while they had much in common 
and often agreed on policy questions, hi this instance a division developed between them 
on whether or not to ratchet up American forces to enable an allied military attack to 
free Kuwait. Bush, Cheney and Scowcroft were sympathetic to using military force from 
the outset. Their desire to institute such a policy was only momentarily tempered by the 
need to make battle plans and deploy the resources necessary to carry them out. 
However, Baker, along with Joint Chiefs o f Staff Chairman Colin Powell favored relying 
upon sanctions and a containment policy to force Iraq to leave Kuwait (Baker 1995; 
Freedman and Karsh 1993; Hybel 1993; Woodward 1991). Powell, whose early years m 
the military were powerfully affected by the Vietnam War (Powell 1995), was 
notoriously cautious and generally only backed the use o f force when victory was 
assured with minimal losses, and the goal was likely to be widely popular with the 
general public. In this case he had reasons to doubt both propositions noting that the 
“American people do not want their young dying for $1.50 gallon ofl” (Gordon and 
Tramor 1995:33). He was also concerned that the decision-making process was limiting 
the consideration o f nonmilitary means to force Iraq out of Kuwait (Woodward 1991). 
Secretary o f State Baker was the “most important believer in containment in the Bush
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administration.” (Hybel 1993:72). He had worked hard to get most o f the world’s 
countries to support a policy o f containment, and believed that that policy should be 
given time to work before it was tossed aside in favor o f military options. He also 
doubted the public’s commitment to support a war.
The division among the president’s advisors largely matches what one would 
generally expect given their psychological characteristics. Cheney’s operational code 
indices show that he did not believe as strongly in relying upon the use o f cooperative 
strategies and tactics as Baker did. Additionally, he had a higher need for power, a 
lower need for affiliation, a higher level o f distrust and a lower level o f conceptual 
complexity. Considering those relative characteristics one would generally expect that 
Cheney would be more willing to support the use o f military force than Baker. These 
characteristics also match expectations created by descriptions o f those two men by then 
contemporaries that describe Cheney as more o f a hard-liner (Baker 1995; Duffy and 
Goodgame 1992; Parmet 1997).
General Powell also fits into this division as you would expect given his 
psychological characteristics. While I was not able to include Powell’s characteristics m 
this case in my statistical analyses because I was not able to locate remarks he made 
during the period preceding the decision to adopt an offensive military option that met 
the coding criteria, the coding that I conducted for the other Bush administration case 
showed that he had characteristics that would seemingly make him unlikely to favor the 
use o f military force. His instrumental operational code indices looked much like 
Baker’s. He saw the political universe as more cooperative than Bush, Baker and 
Cheney. He had a very low need for power and a very low level o f distrust o f others.
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He also had a relatively high conceptual complexity leveL These characteristics, when 
combined with the feet that his world view was heavily affected by what he perceived as 
the lessons o f the Vietnam War, would seem to make it very unlikely that Powell would 
often favor the use o f military force.
But looking at President Bush’s psychological characteristic scores in Table 5.2 
we quickly see that his behavior did not match what we would expect given my 
hypotheses. For example, he generally preferred to use cooperative strategies and 
tactics. He saw the political universe as fundamentally cooperative. His conceptual 
complexity and need for affiliation scores were rather high, while his need for power and 
distrust o f others scores were rather low. Even though he saw the world as 
unpredictable and was perhaps less personally convinced that he could affect world 
events than his advisors were, given the other scores I would not have expected him to 
so quickly choose to adopt such a  highly conflictual stance. Not only that, we saw in the 
Iran Hostage case that President Carter opted to support the policy option favored by 
the advisors whose psychological characteristics were most like his own. In this case 
Bush took a position that was opposed by advisors whose characteristics were more like 
his own, and was supported by Secretary o f Defense Cheney whose characteristics were 
less like his own.
So why do Bush’s general psychological characteristics not match his behavior in 
this case when they seem to do a good job explaining the positions o f the other decision 
makers in this case, and o f the decision makers m the Iran Hostage case? It seems that 
part o f the answer very likely lies in psychological characteristics I did not include m the 
statistical analyses, or that may have more complicated effects than I hypothesized. As I
!
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
168
mentioned earlier, President Bush, placed a  great deal o f weight in his personal 
relationships with his friends. This matches his high need for affiliation. And Bush 
thought of many international leaders as his friends (Parmet 1997). It seems quite 
reasonable to think that Bush took Saddam Hussein’s behavior as a personal affront, and 
being someone who often struck back vindictively at those who deserted him 
(Woodward 1991), he immediately decided that Hussein must be punished for his action. 
As Winter (1993) has noted, many people with a high need for affiliation are quick to 
lash out at those whom they believe have betrayed them.
But this does not mean that he was attacking Hussein solely on the basis o f a 
personal grudge. It appears that Bush’s initial disgust and annoyance quickly developed 
into a much more intense dislike and distrust. When added to Bush’s tendency to rely 
upon the Munich analogy when thinking about how he should deal with rogue dictators, 
this led him to favor an extremely harsh response (Hybei 1993; Wayne 1993). As John 
Robert Greene has written, “Bush was completely sincere in his hatred of Saddam; it was 
easy for him to equate the Iraqi dictator’s actions to those o f the 1940s’ dictators he had 
risked his life to defeat” (Greene 2000:123). O f course he did not immediately 
implement plans to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. But from the outset of the 
conflict he was determined to standup to him, something seen in his active personal 
diplomacy that quickly isolated the Iraqi regime.
His reliance upon himse lf as his country’s chief foreign policy expert during this 
conflict (Hilsman 1992; Parmet 1997) virtually ensured that the United States would take 
tough action and eventually employ force to expel the invading Iraqi forces. Also 
matching Bush’s high need for affiliation, he often closed off debate o f policy options he
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did not like (Hybel 1993; Woodward 1991). He set his administration’s foreign policy, 
not his aides. Given this very personal leadership style on foreign policy issues Roger 
Hilsman’s comment that, “more than any other man in modem history, the war in the 
Persian Gulf was a personal struggle between two men” (Hilsman 1992:225) seems quite 
fair.
In this case as well we see that even though President Bush’s behavior did not 
match predictions made on the basis o f the psychological characteristics I measured in 
the earlier analyses, these factors nonetheless had an important impact on decision 
making. Baker’s and Cheney’s behavior largely matched expectations based on then 
psychological characteristics, as did that o f General Powell. The president’s behavior 
was shaped by his own psychological characteristics as well. While m general Bush may 
have favored relying on cooperative policy options, preferences seen in his attempts to 
open trading markets and to improve relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe 
and China (Bush and Scowcroft 1998), this decision event required that Bush, deal with, 
an unusual situation. Here he was dealing with a  former ally turned, to his eyes, rogue 
evil, threat to peace and security (Greene 2000). And given his unusually personal style 
o f foreign policy, his high need for affiliation, and his reliance on the Munich analogy, he 
pursued a more conflictual approach than would otherwise have been expected. Overall, 
in this case as in the Iran Hostage case there appears to be considerable evidence that the 
behavior o f decision makers was affected by their psychological characteristics.
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CONCLUSIONS
The data and analyses in the preceding chapters have shown that a link exists 
between the psychological characteristics o f decision makers, then personal policy 
preferences, and the official policies that states choose to pursue in international affairs. 
These results show that who leads matters. Decision makers bring with them to the 
policy-making table a set o f personal beliefs and personality traits. Decision makers will 
perform their official duties m ways that are shaped by these psychological 
characteristics. This means that different sets o f decision makers may lead states to act 
in noticeably different ways, even if they all face the same situation.
In the following sections I will review my findings. I first focus on how the 
psychological characteristics o f decision makers affected their personal policy 
preferences. I then review the findings on how these factors affected state policy and 
decision-making patterns. I conclude by discussing the Imitations o f this project and its 
implications for future research in this area.
Explaining Personal Policy Preferences
The analyses investigating the fifty-five decision makers in my sample showed 
that no fewer than seven o f the psychological characteristics I measured had a significant 
effect on then personal policy preferences. More distrustful individuals were more likely 
to favor conflictual policies. Decision makers with a  higher need for power were more 
likely to favor conflictual policy options. Individuals who were more willing to take 
risks were more likely to favor cooperative policies. Individuals who believed the world
170
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was basically conflictual were more likely to favor conflictual policies, while those who 
believed the political universe was basically cooperative were more likely to favor 
cooperative policy option. Decision makers who believed that the future was predictable 
and who saw chance having a small role in shaping world politics were more likely than 
others to favor cooperative policies. Finally, the greater an individual’s perceived 
control over historical development, the more likely that person was to favor cooperative 
policy proposals. When variables controlling for the effects o f the scale o f an opponent’s 
move and the level o f the threats at stake are included in models along with, these 
psychological characteristics, some o f these personal influences no longer remain 
significant at the .10 level However, the inclusion of these variables in multivariate 
models does not stop all o f these effects. Individuals’ perception o f then control over 
their environment still has a significant effect, and the variables measuring decision 
makers’ risk orientation and need for power near significance as welL it therefore 
appears that the personal policy preferences o f decision makers are affected by certain 
psychological characteristics, even when the nature o f the situational environment is 
controlled for. The types o f policies decision makers preferred and advocated depended 
upon their central emotional needs and their beliefs about the nature o f the world around 
them and how best to interact with it.
These results should be widely generalizeable. They were found over a varied set 
o f decision makers. This included both national executive leaders as well as key 
advisors. These were government officials from three countries who had different 
ideologies and faced a varied set o f international challenges over a forty year period.
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The analyses focusing onhow these links were evident in each o f the three 
decision units I focused on, the national executive leaders, the Secretaries o f State and 
Foreign Ministers, and the advisory groups, also found significant relationships between 
psychological characteristics and policy preferences, though these effects were found to 
be especially strong in one o f these units. There is a very strong connection between the 
psychological characteristics o f foreign ministry chiefs and their policy preferences. I 
found significant relationships between seven o f their psychological characteristics and 
their policy preferences, and two more psychological characteristic variables neared 
significance. These nine variables represent a wide spectrum of the psychological 
characteristics o f these individuals’ beliefs and personality traits and include their 
preferred strategies, belief about the nature o f the political universe, then level of 
optimism, their beliefs about the predictability o f the political future and the role of 
chance, then belief about their control o f historical development, their level o f distrust, 
their need for power, and their need for affiliation. This unusually strong relationship 
between the characteristics and preferences o f foreign ministry heads is one o f the most 
interesting findings in this project. There has been relatively little work o f this type done 
focusing upon the individuals who hold these posts, and given their often extremely 
prominent position in foreign policy making, this finding is very informative.
I found fewer linkages between the psychological characteristics o f national 
executive leaders and other advisory group members and their policy preferences. 
However, I still found some significant relationships. For example, those leaders who 
believed they had more control over their environment were more likely to back 
cooperative policies, as were those advisory groups whose members had a relatively high
I
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need for affiliation. But it appears that those individuals who are mostly likely to have 
highly developed belief systems dealing with foreign policy issues, those who head 
foreign ministries, are the decision makers most likely to be affected by those beliefs.
I also investigated whether or not other differences between members o f my set 
o f decision makers affected then policy preferences. I did not find any differences 
between the policy preferences o f members o f different bureaucratic organizations. 
However, it appears that one’s nationality may affect their policy preferences. It appears 
Israeli decision makers may back more conflictual policy options than then British and 
American counterparts, though that effect is mitigated by the feet that they tend to fece 
more severe threats to their security. The psychological characteristics o f Israelis also 
differ from those o f the other decision makers m ways that would seem to indicate a 
tendency to back more conflictual policies. They have higher levels o f distrust, lower 
levels o f conceptual complexity and perceive themselves as having less control over the 
development of history than their British and American counterparts.
Finally, the reviews of the decision-making processes in the Iran hostage crisis 
and the Gulf War show evidence o f other psychological characteristics also affecting the 
personal policy preferences o f decision makers. It appears, for instance, that the 
dominant analogies decision makers used as then: reference point for understanding 
world affairs affected their policy preferences. For example, those who appear to have 
been heavily shaped by the Vietnam War, like Cyrus Vance and Colin Powell, appear to 
have been more reluctant to advocate the use offeree than decision makers, like 
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Richard Cheney, whose foreign policy views were substantially 
shaped by then views o f the Cold War and the Soviet Union. Additionally, these case
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histories show more support for the position, that decision, makers with, low dominance 
personalities were less likely to support the use o f violent force than, those who had high 
dominance personalities (Shepard 1988). The behavior o f Carter and Bush also appears 
to support the contention that leaders who are subjected to long periods o f intense stress 
may be more likely to adopt conflictual policies (Holsti 1972). And the images that the 
presidents had o f their opponents, as irrational and evil beings, appears to have affected 
the manner in which the leaders o f the United States responded to these threats to their 
security. Finally, it appears that leaders bring very personal idiosyncrasies with them that 
affect their policy making. For example, the Carter administration's strong desire to 
move away from a tough realpolitik approach to foreign policy may have delayed their 
adoption o f a military response to the Iran crisis. And President Bush's high need for 
affiliation and close, personal style o f diplomacy appears to have affected his response to 
the invasion o f Kuwait 
Explaining State Policies
The analyses in chapter 4 show a number o f direct relationships between the 
psychological characteristics o f decision makers and state behavior. Leaders’ belief 
about their control over their environment and their need for power were initially found 
to significantly affect state behavior, and leaders’ complexity level neared significance, 
though these relationships M ed to reach the .10 level o f significance once variables 
controlling for the nature o f the challenged posed by the opponent are included in the 
models. The relationships between the psychological characteristics o f advisors and state 
behavior are stronger, with most o f them maintaining significant effects even after the 
effects o f key situational influences are controlled for. Countries whose advisory groups
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favor cooperative strategies, and who are relatively more willing to take risks, are more 
likely to adopt cooperative foreign policies. Likewise, countries that have Secretaries o f 
State or Foreign Ministers who believe in cooperative strategies, are more willing to take 
risks, believe that the political future is predictable and who attribute chance with a 
relatively small impact on world affairs, are more likely to adopt cooperative 
international policies.
The results o f the analyses m chapter 4 also show a number o f ways through 
which the psychological characteristics o f decision makers indirectly affect state 
behavior. One o f these is through the personal preferences o f decision makers. As seen 
in chapter 3, the policy preferences o f all three decision units are at least partly a function 
o f then: psychological characteristics. The analyses in chapter 4 show that, in turn, these 
policy preferences affect state behavior.
Additionally, the members o f the decision-making team are affected by each 
other’s preferences and psychological characteristics. The preferences o f national 
executive leaders are significantly affected by those o f then advisors, while we see that 
national executive leaders appoint top foreign policy advisors whose instrumental 
operational code indices, need for affiliation and level o f distrust are similar to their own. 
Additionally, national executive leaders, especially those with relatively high levels o f 
distrust like Jimmy Carter m the later years o f his presidency, tend to back the policy 
options advocated by those individuals whose psychological characteristics are most like 
their own. They particularly sided with those advisors whose need for power and whose 
perception o f then control over historical development were most like then own.
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I also found that the psychological characteristics o f decision makers affected 
then tendency to carry out high-quality decision making techniques, a factor that other 
research (Haney 1997; Herek, Janis and Huth 1987; Janis 1982; Schafer and Crichlow 
1996) has found to affect state behavior. The decision-making groups in my sample that 
had leaders and advisors with greater needs for affiliation and higher levels o f conceptual 
complexity were more likely to commit fewer information processing errors. Therefore, 
given earlier findings (Herek, Janis and Huth 1987; Schafer and Crichlow 1996) we can 
expect that they were more likely to adopt policies that produced positive outcomes in 
terms o f the national interest and produced lower levels o f international conflict. 
Limitations o f the Project
While 1 have made a number o f important findings that improve our 
understanding o f how the psychological characteristics o f decision makers affect foreign 
policy, I should again note some o f the limitations o f this research. Probably the most 
important o f these limitations concerns my measurements o f the psychological 
characteristics. While I followed measurement techniques that have been carefully 
developed on firm theoretical foundations (Hermann 1987b; Walker, Schafer and Young 
1998), it is possible that these at-a-distance measurement techniques do not represent the 
characteristics o f decision makers as accurately as I would hope. While decision makers’ 
comments are surely affected by them psychological characteristics, it is possible that the 
match is not perfect and that it may vary between individuals. Additionally, my use of 
these tools is not perfectly precise. My reliance on coding decision makers comments by 
band adds some error into the process. While my inter-coder agreement scores with 
other trained coders were very high, they did not show one hundred percent agreement.
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It is also possible that my measurements were not entirely accurate as they were made on 
the basis o f a relatively smalt number o f public, spontaneous comments over a fairly brief 
time span. While I was careful to minimiVe these problems to the degree that I could, 
this research method has limitations.
Moving beyond how I measured these characteristics, my research results may 
have been skewed by whose psychological characteristics I measured. I only included 
those individuals who made public, spontaneous comments that met the coding criteria in 
my analysis. This limited my analysis to an examination o f relatively recent decisions 
made by leaders and advisors in wealthy countries that were actively engaged m world 
affairs and had relatively strong militaries. It is possible that countries that are weaker 
militarily and economically, and thus have fewer resources to use as leverage m their 
interactions with other states, may act differently. While one may expect that the 
personal policy preferences o f decision makers in poor, weak states may still be heavily 
influenced by their psychological characteristics, it is possible that having fewer policy 
options at their disposal will lead them to be less likely to rely on psychological 
influences when setting state policy.
Future Research
These two major limitations on my project point to two areas where fixture 
research can build on this work. First, while some researchers are likely to continue to 
question the validity of measures o f the psychological characteristics o f decision makers 
that are based upon them public comments, concerns about the reliability o f these 
measures can be overcome by replacing human coders with computer coding. When 
computer programs that are capable o f measuring these phenomena are completed it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
178
seems appropriate to revisit this project and similar research to determine whether or not 
a lack o f precision resulting from, the use o f multiple coders skewed the results.
Secondly, more research on this topic should be done on decision makers outside 
o f the United States. While this project did not focus exclusively on decisions made by 
Americans, three-quarters o f the cases I included focused on American decision makers. 
It seems possible that the unusual power o f the United States, and even the relatively 
powerful positions held by the United Kingdom and Israel, might make the behavior o f 
these decision makers different from those in weaker countries. While obtaining the data 
necessary to code the psychological characteristics o f foreign policy decision makers m 
many other countries is extremely difficult, it is an important question to investigate.
One other topic that merits investigation given the results o f my project is the 
degree to which my findings regarding the importance o f Secretaries of State and 
Foreign Ministers hold up over time and in other governments. As the linkage between 
the psychological characteristics o f these individuals, then preferences and state behavior 
is surprisingly strong in the cases I study, it would be interesting to know whether or not 
these linkages were present during other periods o f history, and in the decision-making 
processes o f other countries.
Overall, this project has reinforced the findings o f many previous pieces o f 
research on the impact that individual decision makers have on world politics, and it has 
presented new findings across a varied set o f decision makers that show novel ways m 
which the psychological characteristics o f decision makers affect foreign policy. The 
premier innovative contribution that this work makes to this growing literature are the 
findings dealing with the impact o f the psychological characteristics o f top-level advisors.
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Particularly significant, we see that the psychological characteristics o f Secretaries of 
State and Foreign Ministers powerfully affect both the policy preferences that they 
advocate at the highest level o f decision making, and the official policies that states 
adopt. This is a  very important insight. Much o f the work that has been done in this 
area has focused exclusively on the psychological characteristics o f national executive 
leaders. Here we see these variables having a powerful effect on another set o f decision 
makers that has great influence over foreign policy. The foldings dealing with the 
reinforcing way by which leaders and advisors with similar psychological characteristics 
come to the fore and shape national policy are also especially significant. To sum, this 
work shows not only that the psychological characteristics o f individual decision makers 
affect international relations, but that this relationship exists across both a broad set of 
psychological characteristics and across a varied group o f individuals holding a  variety of 
governmental posts.
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